Essays on external ideation : exploring innovative online consumer behavior by Vossen, Alexander
 
 
Essays on External Ideation: Exploring Innovative Online Consumer Behavior  
 
 
Von der Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften der 
Rheinisch-Westfälischen Technischen Hochschule Aachen 
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades eines Doktors der 
Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften genehmigte Dissertation 
 
 
vorgelegt von 
 
Dipl.-Kfm. Alexander Vossen 
 
 
 
Berichter: Univ.-Prof. Dr.rer.pol. Frank Thomas Piller  
 Univ.-Prof. Dr.oec. Daniel Wentzel 
 
 
 
Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 19.03.2013 
 
 
Diese Dissertation ist auf den Internetseiten der Hochschulbibliothek online verfügbar. 
 
II 
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Table of Contents ....................................................................................................................... II 
Acknowledgments ...................................................................................................................... 3 
Abstract ...................................................................................................................................... 4 
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 6 
1.1 Managerial relevance ....................................................................................................... 6 
1.2. Theoretical relevance ...................................................................................................... 7 
2. Theoretical background ........................................................................................................ 11 
2.1 Motivation ..................................................................................................................... 11 
2.1.1. Intrinsic motivation ................................................................................................ 12 
2.1.2. Extrinsic motivation ............................................................................................... 13 
2.1.3. Prosocial motivation ............................................................................................... 14 
2.2. Motivation in user innovation ...................................................................................... 15 
2.2.1. Individual perspective—innovative single (lead) users ......................................... 16 
2.2.2. Collaborative perspective—innovative user communities ..................................... 17 
2.3. Impact of monetary incentives ..................................................................................... 19 
2.3.1. On motivation and performance ............................................................................. 19 
2.3.2. On innovative users and their performance ............................................................ 21 
3. Research gap and questions .................................................................................................. 23 
4. Short summary of the research papers ................................................................................. 27 
4.1. Paper 1: The Ambiguous Role of Monetary Rewards in Ideation with Users ............. 27 
4.2. Paper 2: The Prosocial Boundaries of Monetary Incentives in Idea Co-creation ........ 29 
4.3. Paper 3: Attracting Consumers to Idea Co-creation ..................................................... 31 
5. General discussion and outlook............................................................................................ 35 
5.1. Role of monetary reward (expectations) in ideation contests ...................................... 35 
5.2. Role of non-monetary reward (expectations) in ideation contests ............................... 37 
5.3. Contributions and implications ..................................................................................... 41 
5.4. Outlook ......................................................................................................................... 44 
References ................................................................................................................................ 47 
Appendix: Research papers ...................................................................................................... 55 
Paper 1 ...................................................................................................................................... 55 
Paper 2 ...................................................................................................................................... 85 
Paper 3 .................................................................................................................................... 112 
3 
 
Acknowledgments 
I would like to thank Frank Piller, Daniel Wentzel, Christine Harbring, and Florian Siems for 
serving on my committee. I am very grateful to Christoph Ihl for continuous guidance and 
support throughout my whole dissertation process and for evoking my passion for research. I 
would also like to thank my colleagues at RWTH TIM group for their help, especially Robin 
Kleer, Vera Blazevic, Viktoria Boss, and Franziska Miebach. Finally, I like to thank my fami-
ly and friends for their support in the last years. 
 
 
  
4 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This thesis investigates the motivation of consumers to engage in creative online behavior, 
such as developing ideas for new products or services that fit their individual needs and pref-
erences. Due to the rise of the Internet, consumers who previously mostly used their work-
bench or garage as a setting to develop such ideas have been granted a wider range of tools 
and possibilities to individually and collectively engage in creative behavior. Firms have be-
gun to benefit from this by holding so-called online ideation contests, offering a monetary 
reward for product or service ideas a consumer shares with them. In addition, firms also en-
courage consumers to comment and elaborate on other peoples' ideas within the same contest. 
Opposing this firm practice, the main findings of past research on innovative consumers have 
shown that monetary motivation, as incentivized by firms, is not a driver of creative behavior 
and in turn highlight non-monetary benefits (e.g., use benefits), since consumers benefit from 
using a product, not from selling it. Nevertheless, consumers frequently participate in such 
ideation contests. Hence, this thesis aims to generate deeper insight into why consumers actu-
ally do so and how their participation can be encouraged by setting proper monetary as well 
as non-monetary incentives. In terms of theory, I rely on motivational theory and build on 
literature on management, marketing, psychology, and behavioral economics. Using various 
theories from these fields, I show that participation depends on both non-monetary and mone-
tary benefit expectations, and that their effectiveness is contingent on individual characteris-
tics of the participants, as well as characteristics of the host of the contest and certain design 
aspects of the contest itself. To show this, I use three research papers. Paper 1 combines a 
survey with actual behavior data to examine whether monetary and non-monetary benefit ex-
pectations lead to different kinds of individual behavior. It shows that both are conducive to 
different behaviors and that the effect is contingent on individual traits of the participants. 
While monetary incentives can encourage consumers to share their ideas with the host of the 
contest, they cannot induce collectively oriented behavior, such as commenting and improv-
ing on other people's ideas. Such collectively oriented behavior by consumers can only be 
incentivized through non-monetary benefit expectations, especially the expectation of an in-
novative outcome. Both effects are also contingent on individual traits of the consumers. For 
consumers with a high personal need regarding a host's offering, e.g., a very dissatisfied con-
sumer, the effect of monetary incentives is diminished, while the effect of non-monetary ben-
efits is reinforced. Hence, results show that hosts must take into account what kind of behav-
ior is more important in achieving their goals and tailor the incentives correspondingly. Fur-
ther, they must consider whom they want to address with the contest when deciding between 
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monetary and non-monetary incentives.  In order to examine the role of monetary incentives 
in more in detail, Paper 2 uses a scenario-based online choice experiment that addresses the 
efficiency of monetary reward expectations, focusing in particular on prosocial boundaries. 
The paper shows that the effect of monetary incentives depends on who offers them (the or-
ganizational stereotype of the host), what they are offered for (the contest's topic), and how 
much is offered (the amount of money). When for-profit hosts asks for ideas on a commercial 
topic, a topic within their primary task domain, monetary rewards are a reliable incentive and 
a higher reward increases consumers' willingness to join a contest and exert effort in it. The 
same mechanism also applies to for-profit hosts offering a contest related to a prosocial topic, 
a topic outside their primary task domain. In this case, the offered money works as a signal by 
the host, demonstrating competence and willingness to utilize the ideas generated by consum-
ers. Non-profit hosts, such as welfare organizations, cannot rely on monetary incentives for 
prosocial tasks, a topic within their primary task domain, since they lead to a crowding out of 
participants' prosocial motivations. Hence, when within their primary task domain, for-profit 
firms can rely on monetary incentives to trigger consumer participation, while non-profit 
hosts cannot. In contrast, the results show that outside their primary task domain, both types 
of hosts, even non-profits, can use monetary incentives to signal competence and willingness 
to use the consumer-generated ideas. In order to explore the usefulness of non-monetary bene-
fit expectations more closely, Paper 3 relies on an online field experiment to examine non-
monetary benefit expectations and their efficiency in attracting consumers to idea contests. 
The paper shows that an innovative outcome, as the strongest non-monetary benefit expecta-
tion, is contingent on who receives the benefit of the innovative outcome, how this benefit is 
communicated, and how much individual relevance the topic has. Highlighting an outcome 
for others is particularly effective in increasing consumer attention to the idea co-creation 
initiative when the individual relevance for the consumer is low. In contrast, the results show 
that emphasizing the negative consequences of non-participation (e.g., the decrease of use 
benefit) is especially promising for consumers with a high individual relevance. The results 
show that innovative behavior can be motivated by the expectation of benefits for others, not 
just by a potential personal gain or chance to win a prize, as commonly addressed by firms. 
The results of this dissertation contribute to the literature on user innovation, prosocial behav-
ior, and motivation in general, and they show further contingencies of the efficiency of mone-
tary and non-monetary reward expectations as an incentive for idea co-creation by consumers. 
From a managerial perspective, it helps decision makers of different organizations decide on 
how to compose the incentive structure of their own ideation contest.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Managerial relevance 
Generating innovations and bringing them to the market is a crucial task in ensuring compa-
nies' long-term success. For each company, the process of creating successful innovations 
starts with the development of promising ideas. Instead of building exclusively on in-house 
R&D, managers from diverse industries have turned their attention to external sources of ide-
as for new products or services. New communication platforms and channels have made the 
Internet a promising medium for getting in touch with consumers and using their knowledge 
for innovation purposes, facilitating them as co-creators (Fuchs, Prandelli, and Schreier, 2010; 
Ogawa & Piller, 2006).  
The number of firms relying on idea co-creation is rising continuously and includes 
firms from diverse business fields such as Procter & Gamble, AT&T, BMW, Starbucks, 
McDonald's, and Dell. Hence, integrating consumers into the innovation process has become 
a common and popular method, especially for large companies (e.g., Bayus, 2011; Füller, 
2010; Leimeister et al., 2009; Piller & Walcher, 2006). Moreover, in a survey among top 
managers from diverse business fields, the consultancy Grant Thornton (2009) found that 
managers worldwide consider their own customers to be their number-one source of ideas—
more important even than their own R&D departments or top management.  
One popular method used by companies to address their customers are firm-initiated in-
novation or ideation contests (IC), which have been used extensively in recent years in diverse 
business fields (e.g., Bayus, 2011; Boudreau, Lacetera, and Lakhani, 2011; Leimeister et al., 
2009; Terwiesch & Xu, 2008). Drawing on Piller and Walcher (2006), ICs can be described 
as a competitive activity that is hosted by a firm in order to gather external ideas from con-
sumers with respect to specific topics. ICs basically allow two different activities for partici-
pants: (1) submission of ideas related to a specified topic, and (2) evaluation, discussion, and 
improvement of other participants' ideas. The former activity is typically carried out by indi-
vidual users, whereas the latter is a more collectively oriented task in which users interact. 
The number of IC is constantly growing, because they are relatively cheap, easy to im-
plement, and yield impressive results (Füller, 2010; Piller & Walcher, 2006). This could lead 
to the result that a seemingly infinite crowd of potential participants might become a scarce 
good in some branches of industry or on some topics, since customers can choose between the 
co-creation offers of various firms. This potential problem becomes especially relevant when 
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taking into account that ideation in this form is dependent on simultaneous work, and that a 
critical mass of participants is therefore crucial, since more participants can work more on 
specific ideas simultaneously (Benkler, 2002; Boudreau et al., 2011; Howe, 2008). This form 
of co-creation is further fundamentally connected to the number of participants, since having 
more participants usually means having more distinct individual backgrounds, which helps to 
foster the creativity of ideas and solutions (Jeppesen & Lakhani, 2010; Howe, 2008). Conse-
quently, it is in the utmost interest of a firm to have as many participants as possible in order 
to maximize the benefit of using ICs. As participation starts with proper recruitment, firms 
must gain deeper knowledge on how to attract consumers to ICs. In a general perspective de-
rived from communication literature, a prerequisite for finding a way to motivate consumers 
to perform an act, such as signing up for an IC, is knowing how to communicate the conse-
quences of performing that act (Levin, Schneider, and Gaeth, 1999), showing why consumers 
should spend their precious time for the sake of a firm. Hence, it is crucial that firms find out 
what benefits most effectively motivate consumers to participate in ICs. Therefore, this thesis 
aims to identify relevant benefits that drive consumer participation and provide profound in-
sight into different motives of consumers and how firms can proactively shape and influence 
their impact on actual participation behavior in ICs.  
Besides the relevance for for-profit firms, ICs have also become a major tool for non-
profit and governmental organizations. Those contests often address non-commercial aspects 
of life, such as prosocial or common-good topics, like developing ideas to fight world hunger 
or improve the image and surroundings of a city. To date, managers of non-profit or govern-
mental hosts do not necessarily know how to incentivize consumers for prosocial topics. As a 
consequence, many of them mimic for-profit organizations and their typical reward scheme, 
namely offering monetary rewards for participation. However, they do not know whether this 
is indeed effective, since offering them in social-market settings could actually be harmful 
(Heyman & Ariely, 2004). Hence, this thesis also shows managers of non-profit and govern-
ment organizations how to incentivize consumers in order to leverage their creative potential 
by way of ICs. 
1.2. Theoretical relevance 
The theoretical relevance of this thesis is mainly founded on the fact that the insights generat-
ed by prior research on motivation in ICs are puzzling in two ways: First, they partially con-
tradict the results of very popular research on motivational mechanisms. Second, they com-
pete somewhat with the results found in studies on innovative consumer behavior that exam-
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ine why and how consumers innovate. More specifically, regarding the first issue, prior re-
search on ICs (e.g., Füller, 2010; Leimeister et al., 2009, Piller & Walcher, 2006) highlights 
the positive role of both monetary incentives and the competitive contest setting as drivers of 
consumer participation, which partially contradicts the literature on negative effects of mone-
tary rewards (e.g., Ryan & Deci, 2000a) and negative effects of competitive (tournament) 
incentives (e.g., Harbring & Irlenbusch, 2008). Although the positive effect assumption of the 
abovementioned studies may be correct in their specific setting, whether this assumption is 
universally valid remains questionable. 
Especially concerning the effect of monetary incentives, previous research from the 
field of economics and psychology has delivered rather ambiguous results that speak against 
the universal validity of the positive effect of monetary incentives. While some studies find a 
negative crowding-out effect of monetary incentives (e.g., Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; 
Ryan & Deci, 2000a), others find a positive effect (e.g., Toubia, 2006; Burroughs et al., 
2011). In addition, the results of several meta-analyses in this field show directly opposing 
results (see Deci, Koster, and Ryan [1999] and Eisenberger, Pierce, and Cameron [1999] for 
insights on this debate). It remains unclear whether the assumption of the universal effective-
ness of a monetary incentive is actually true. Whether or not this is the case may depend on a 
number of factors such as the way monetary incentives are presented (Eisenberger et al., 
1999). Such factors have not yet been the subject of dedicated studies in the context of ICs.   
Similar aspects could be valid for the contest-like character introduced by the hosts. 
This practice could have detrimental effects on the collaboration among users, which is often 
seen as a key advantage of collective innovation (von Hippel & von Krogh, 2003; 2006). Lit-
erature on tournament incentives (e.g., Harbring & Irlenbusch, 2008) shows that competitive 
rewards can dramatically change people's behavior for the worse and even lead to sabotage, 
which would in turn lower the efficiency of the community-based approach of ICs. Therefore, 
it remains questionable whether the competitive structure of ICs is indeed beneficial and fos-
ters participation. 
With regard to the second issue mentioned above, there are also interesting aspects con-
cerning the literature on motivation to innovate in specific. Past studies on co-creation and 
from the field of user innovation have already addressed the question of why and how con-
sumers individually and collectively become innovative (see von Hippel, 2005; 2010 for 
overviews). In a community-based online setting such as ICs, literature on user communities 
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(e.g., Franke & Schah, 2003) and open-source software development (OSS) (e.g., Lakhani & 
von Hippel, 2003) are prominent examples of efforts to explain consumers' motivation to in-
novate. As a consequence, prior research on ICs (e.g., Füller, 2010; Piller & Walcher, 2006) 
often refers to this literature, highlighting in particular motives like enjoyment, reciprocity, 
and getting one's own problems solved.  
Interestingly, even though studies on ICs theoretically attach themselves to OSS, they 
neglect fundamental differences between online innovation communities like OSS and ICs. In 
online communities, users govern the exploitation of their creativity themselves, with each 
user deciding for him- or herself what to share and adapt from other people (e.g., Lakhani & 
von Hippel, 2003). In contrast, ICs represent a case where a predominant hosting entity gov-
erns the exploitation of consumers' output (Bayus, 2011; Füller, 2010; Piller & Walcher, 
2006), leading to a loss of control over the outcome of their own creativity. Thus, the standard 
outcome governance mechanism (e.g., the free revealing), which is commonly seen as a cru-
cial aspect of OSS (e.g., von Hippel & von Krogh, 2003; 2006), does not apply to ICs. This 
issue becomes even more important when taking into account that users typically benefit from 
using an innovation, not from selling it (Harhoff, Henkel, and von Hippel, 2003). But with no 
possibility to use the product generated by the submitted idea as long as the host does not put 
it into practice, participants' motivation could be significantly lowered. 
Addressing this exploitation issue, Harhoff and Mayrhofer (2010, p. 137) provide con-
ceptual insights on what they call hybrid community governance systems, where "one entity 
systematically and repeatedly capitalizes commercially on freely revealed innovations gener-
ated by a user community." However, since Harhoff and Mayrhofer's (2010) approach is con-
ceptual, no empirical research has yet examined this asymmetric exploitation and the effect of 
the presence of a predominant host on participants' motivation, their willingness to join, and 
their subsequent behavior. In light of this crucial difference, it remains questionable whether 
the insights on innovative consumers generated within the field of free-revealing and collabo-
rative online communities such as OSS can be a valid source for deriving motivational in-
sights for consumer participation in ICs.  
To date, no study has examined whether, how, and when monetary rewards and a con-
test-like character indeed have an objective positive effect on participants' intention to join an 
IC and their actual subsequent behavior. In addition, research that explicitly examines the 
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impact of these specific IC design aspects and how they should be communicated to the par-
ticipants is scarce.  
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2. Theoretical background 
In line with the abovementioned problems, this chapter briefly introduces the theoretical 
background of the thesis and provides basic definitions for the concepts and theories used in 
it. In accordance with my main research objectives—enhancing user participation and analyz-
ing contingencies of user motivation in external online ideation—I first provide definitions of 
motivation and drivers of behavior in general. Regarding motivation, I focus primarily on 
intrinsic, extrinsic, and prosocial motivation, which I expect to be of the greatest importance 
for my research approach. I then briefly summarize the state of the art on motivation in user 
innovation and provide a brief literature review. Regarding user innovation literature, I focus 
primarily on two distinct streams, namely the individual perspective, or single (lead) users, 
and the collective, community-based perspective. The chapter concludes with a review of the 
literature on the efficiency of monetary incentives. As a final step, I examine the interplay of 
monetary incentives and motivation in general as well as monetary rewards in user innova-
tion. The following figure summarizes the theoretical building blocks of this thesis. 
 
Figure 1: Theoretical building blocks of the thesis 
2.1 Motivation 
In their seminal paper on motivation, Ryan and Deci (2000a, p. 69) emphasize that "motiva-
tion is highly valued because of its consequences: Motivation produces." Thus, motivation is 
traditionally considered to be an important, influential antecedent of behavior and is examined 
extensively in various empirical and conceptual studies. As this thesis aims to identify drivers 
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of innovative behavior, it therefore seems promising to take a closer look at the motivational 
antecedents in order to generate insights on how different motives lead to different behavior 
in ICs. Striving for systematization in motivation research, authors typically differentiate be-
tween intrinsic and extrinsic motivation (e.g., Ryan & Deci, 2000a; Ryan & Deci, 2000b; 
Benabou & Tirole, 2003). "Intrinsic motivation […] refers to doing something because it is 
inherently interesting or enjoyable, and extrinsic motivation […] refers to doing something 
because it leads to a separable outcome" (Ryan & Deci, 2000b, p. 55). Hence, both types of 
motivation focus on oneself as the recipient of the consequences of the specific behavior.  
In addition, a decent amount of research has addressed the question of whether other-
related motivation may also induce behavior. A popular stream of literature on other-related 
motivation is summarized under the field of prosocial behavior. An excellent overview of the 
theories on prosocial behavior can be found in Meier (2007), who differentiates between out-
come-based prosocial preferences, reciprocity, and self-identity. In the following, I provide 
some basic definitions to clarify and differentiate the abovementioned categories. 
2.1.1. Intrinsic motivation 
Intrinsic motivation has been identified as a major driver of human behavior and an important 
aspect of overall motivation. Ryan and Deci (2000a, p. 70) highlight that intrinsic motivation 
consists of tendencies "to seek out novelty and challenges, to extend and exercise one's capa-
bilities, to explore, and to learn." Adding a facet, Davis, Bagozzi, and Warshaw (1992, p. 
1112) point to the fact "that intrinsic motivation refers to the performance of an activity for no 
apparent reinforcement other than the process of performing the activity per se," or more 
comprehensively, as "the individual's desire to perform the task for its own sake" (Benabou & 
Tirole, 2003, p. 490). 
One popular theory that addresses differences in individual intrinsic motivations is cog-
nitive evaluation theory (Deci & Ryan, 1985), which highlights the influential role of both 
social and environmental factors. As an example, Deci and Ryan (1985; as well as Ryan & 
Deci, 2000a) propose that two crucial aspects of fostering intrinsic motivation are competence 
and autonomy. Moreover, competence is only useful in evoking intrinsic motivation when 
accompanied by autonomy. A third influential factor proposed by cognitive evaluation theory 
is social relatedness, hinting at the fact that intrinsic motivation is more likely to be evoked 
when the interpersonal settings of the activity show a high relatedness. Ryan and Deci (2000a, 
13 
 
p. 71) also point to the fact that "people will be intrinsically motivated only for activities that 
hold intrinsic interest for them." 
It seems plausible that intrinsic motivation is very likely to be associated with tasks 
such as hobbies or creative behavior (e.g., Burroughs et al., 2011). However, it also plays an 
important role in other aspects, such as work (Gagné & Deci, 2005). The work setting is espe-
cially interesting, since people typically also get a monetary reward that is often associated 
with extrinsic motivation (see Section 2.3 for an analysis of the interplay between intrinsic 
and extrinsic motivation).  
A further example of intrinsic motivation is provided by Cordova and Lepper (1996), 
who show that at an early age, schoolchildren learn due to intrinsic motivation. This example 
shows that activities like learning can be viewed as a task consumers pursue for the fun or 
challenge derived from the process. All examples further show that intrinsic motivation as an 
important driver of consumer behavior can be found in various settings and applications. 
2.1.2. Extrinsic motivation 
As opposed to intrinsic motivation, extrinsic motivation refers to "the performance of an ac-
tivity in order to attain some separable outcome" (Ryan & Deci, 2000a, p. 71). Hence, being 
extrinsically motivated implies that one performs an activity to get a specific reward. The 
most common of these expected specific rewards is money or a similar kind of financial com-
pensation (Benabou & Tirole, 2003).  
However, such expected benefits are not always monetary. A popular example of the 
continuum of different types of extrinsic motivation is provided by Ryan and Deci (2000a; 
2000b). Their self-determination theory assigns different kinds of extrinsic motives to four 
categories depending on their level of self-determination. For categorization purposes, they 
include regulatory styles, which describe how motivation is regulated, the perceived locus of 
causality from this regulation, and relevant regulatory processes that are used to enforce the 
psychological reason. In terms of regulatory styles, Ryan and Deci (2000a) differentiate be-
tween externally regulated, introjected, identified, and integrated. The first two types are the 
most extreme examples of extrinsic motivation. Externally regulated extrinsic motivation rep-
resents the least autonomous form of extrinsic motivation, since it is fully caused by external 
sources. Ryan and Deci (2000a, p.72) highlight that "it is external regulation that was typical-
ly contrasted with intrinsic motivation in early laboratory and field studies." Introjected regu-
lation is the second category of extrinsic motivation, where a regulation is internalized, but 
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not fully accepted. Thus, introjected extrinsic motivation refers to the case when "behaviors 
are performed to avoid guilt or anxiety or to attain ego enhancements such as pride" (Ryan & 
Deci, 2000a, p.72).  
Symmetrically, the first of the more self-determined types of extrinsic motivation is 
identified extrinsic motivation, which states that the action performed due to extrinsic motiva-
tion is individually accepted by oneself and may even be of great personal relevance. The 
extrinsic motivation most closely related to intrinsic motivation is integrated extrinsic motiva-
tion, which occurs when "identified regulations are fully assimilated to the self, which means 
they have been evaluated and brought into congruence with one's other values and needs" 
(Ryan & Deci, 2000a, p. 73). Hence, they come closest to intrinsic motivation, but are still 
different since they nevertheless aim at generating a separable outcome from the activity ra-
ther than focusing on pure enjoyment of the activity itself. 
One popular practical example of the continuum of extrinsic motivation is provided by 
Hars and Ou (2001). Examining motivation in open-source software development, they find 
that internalized extrinsic motives explain a large portion of programmers' behavior. These 
include aspects such as building human capital, e.g., improving one's skills, and self-
marketing, e.g., skill signaling for potential employers. Further, it includes one's own personal 
use benefit, e.g., programming software to satisfy certain personal needs and the expectation 
of future monetary rewards. This example illustrates the different facets of extrinsic motiva-
tion and gives clear evidence of the fact that extrinsic motivation does not necessarily involve 
monetary incentives. Moreover, extrinsic motivation has various facets that all have the po-
tential to significantly influence people's behavior. 
2.1.3. Prosocial motivation 
Both intrinsic and extrinsic motivation typically refer to oneself, i.e., one's own fun in terms 
of intrinsic motivation and one's own separable benefit in terms of extrinsic motivation. This 
is in line with traditional economic theories such as the expectancy value theory (von Neu-
mann & Morgenstern, 1944), which states that any action will be performed only if the ex-
pected utility from doing so is high enough. Hence, people only pursue a task if their per-
ceived personal benefit is high enough. However, in everyday life, one can also observe that 
people are not only motivated by the acquisition of personal benefits. Consequently, econom-
ic literature has developed additional theories to explain why the expectation of benefits for 
others and caring for others can also explain people's behavior.  
15 
 
Many of the most prominent of those theories are summarized under the topic of proso-
cial behavior (see Meier 2007 for an overview). Those theories can be categorized into out-
come-based prosocial preferences, reciprocity, and self-identity. Outcome-based prosocial 
preferences are based on the assumption that "the utility of others can either (1) influence 
one's utility directly (pure altruism theories), (2) influence one's utility partly, because helping 
others produces a 'warm glow' (impure altruism theories), or (3) have an effect on one's utility 
that depends on the difference between one's own and another's well‐being (theories of ine-
quality aversion)" (Meier, 2007, p. 54). Additionally, Meier (2007, p. 56) defines reciprocity 
as the situation "when individuals act in a pro‐social manner in response to the friendly be-
havior of others and in a hostile way in response to unfriendly behavior." Self-identity theo-
ries highlight that people "undertake certain activities—pro‐social activities—in order to self‐
signal their good traits" (Meier, 2007, p. 60). 
Examples of prosocial motives related to others and resulting behaviors have been ex-
tensively identified by prior research. Among the most popular is donation behavior in gen-
eral (e.g., Ariely, Bracha, and Meier, 2009; White & Peloza, 2009) and blood donation behav-
ior in particular (e.g., Titmuss, 1997). Meier (2007) summarizes other examples, such as or-
ganizing community events, volunteering, or protecting the environment. Another recent 
study on the impact of prosocial motivation on behavior has been provided by Grant and Ber-
ry (2011), who demonstrate how caring about and helping colleagues improves the creativity 
of employees. They found that psychological processes focused on others (in their case, per-
spective taking caused by prosocial motivation) make employees develop novel ideas with 
higher creativity. Grant and Berry explain this with the fact that "prosocial motivation pro-
vides employees with the meaningful outcome goal of helping others" (2011, p. 78). In sum-
mary, prosocial motivation has been shown to have a major influence on people's behavior.  
After having briefly defined and introduced three main streams of motivational research 
and having exemplarily shown their impact on behavior, I use the abovementioned insights 
and turn to the second theoretical building block, namely user innovation literature. 
2.2. Motivation in user innovation 
Building on the results of the prior chapter, I now set the focus on how motivation can be 
transferred to an innovation-related setting. To do so, I examine how the three different mo-
tives are used in user innovation literature. User innovation literature was created by Eric von 
Hippel in the late 1970s. In his seminal book on the sources of innovation (von Hippel, 1988), 
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he discovered that a high percentage of new products developed in the fields of scientific in-
struments, machines, and software were actually initially developed by users, and only later 
adopted by firms. As a key motivational aspect, von Hippel identified unfulfilled needs and 
the lack of a more suited available commercial solution (von Hippel, 2005). Next to individu-
al users innovating, von Hippel (2005) also distinguishes between groups of users innovating, 
with the most prominent example being open-source software (OSS). Within OSS, collabora-
tion and social aspects are also important factors that influence the motivation of innovative 
users (e.g., Lakhani & von Hippel, 2003). Similar insights are provided by Boudreau & 
Lakhani (2009), who point out that the decision on whether to rely on competitive single users 
or collaborative communities is a crucial aspect of managing cooperation with external inno-
vation sources. Consequently, I pick up this systematization of the individual and collabora-
tive perspective for the next section, giving definitions and examples for both.  
2.2.1. Individual perspective—innovative single (lead) users 
Recent research has dealt extensively with the question of why users become innovative as 
individuals (see Bogers, Afuah, and Bastian, 2010; O'Hern & Rindfleisch, 2010, for literature 
reviews). Examples have been shown in the industrial goods sector (von Hippel, 1978) as well 
as the consumer goods sector (e.g., Franke & Shah, 2003). A well-known model of an innova-
tive user is the lead user (Urban & von Hippel, 1986; Herstatt & von Hippel, 1992). Lead us-
ers become innovative due to a strong personal need that cannot be satisfied with the current 
market offer. The associated individual trait labeled as "individual lead userness" has been 
found to significantly influence the likelihood of becoming innovative (Schreier & Prügl, 
2008). Next to their innovativeness, lead users carry one important trait, namely that they can 
foreshadow a future demand (von Hippel, 2005). Their own very individual present demand is 
likely to turn into a general demand in the future. Recent research has dealt extensively with 
the question of why lead users engage in innovative behavior (see von Hippel 2010 for an 
overview). One central finding of prior motivational research is the fact that users' motivation 
to innovate is diametrically different from that of companies, since they benefit essentially 
from using an innovation (von Hippel & von Krogh, 2003; Harhoff, Henkel, and von Hippel, 
2003). This is in line with von Hippel (2005), who finds that users' strongest motivation to 
engage in innovative activities results from their desire to get their own problem solved, not 
from the desire to sell it (see von Hippel [2005] for a detailed list of user innovations that 
were freely revealed or handed over to companies in order to transform them into a working 
solution). This points to the fact that lead users' main motivation is the expectation of an out-
17 
 
come of innovation that results in an increase of the personal use benefit (Lüthje & Herstatt, 
2004). Franke, von Hippel, & Schreier (2006, p. 302) labeled this the "high expected benefit 
component" of lead user motivation. Consequently, this high expected benefit can be seen as 
the main driver of innovativeness of single users shown in past research. 
2.2.2. Collaborative perspective—innovative user communities 
Due to advances in information and communication technology and the rise of the Internet, 
innovative users not only work alone for themselves, but increasingly also unite within online 
communities (von Hippel, 2005). Although the first examples dealt with professionals who 
invented tools of their own to ease their work (as mentioned in the preceding chapter), more 
recently the consumer product domain has benefitted tremendously from this trend (see von 
Hippel, Ogawa, and de Jong [2011] for an overview of different fields where consumers en-
gage in innovative behavior). Facilitated by the Internet, even people with relatively uncom-
mon hobbies or interests can easily find each other and share their experiences, problems, and 
solutions. One popular example is sport-related communities, where users assist each other in 
creative behavior by generating and providing feedback on equipment prototypes (e.g., 
Franke & Schah, 2003) and even turn their prototypes into actual products (Baldwin, Hie-
nerth, and von Hippel, 2006). Next to the physical consumer goods area, perhaps the best-
known example of online communities that collaboratively share and improve ideas for new 
or better products is open-source software development (OSS), where many users unite and 
create a freely available software program (Hars & Ou, 2001; Roberts, Hann, and Slaughter, 
2006; Haefliger, von Krogh, and Spaeth, 2008; Lakhani & von Hippel, 2003; Harhoff et al., 
2003).  
Past research has shown that the collaborative perspective of users innovating together 
adds various additional motivational aspects, especially those related to the interpersonal con-
nections with other participants (Hars & Ou, 2001; Lakhani & von Hippel, 2003; Lakhani & 
Wolf, 2005). More importantly, collaborative settings also allow for an analysis of additional 
distinct types of innovative behavior besides pure idea generation, such as elaboration on oth-
ers' ideas, feedback, and joint work. One key aspect mentioned in various studies is intrinsic 
motivations like fun and challenge (e.g., Hars & Ou, 2001; Lakhani & Wolf, 2005; Roberts et 
al., 2006). Those studies find that intrinsic motivation leads to an increase of innovative activ-
ity in collaborative user innovation. Different facets of extrinsic motivation also play a crucial 
role in collaborative user innovation. A central factor identified in prior research is reputa-
tional gain (e.g., Hars & Ou, 2001; Lakhani & Wolf, 2005; Roberts et al., 2006). Studies show 
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that, due to the long-term character of online communities, many people are driven by the 
desire for recognition from their peers, which leads them to invest more innovative activity in 
order to gain more recognition from their peers. Another extrinsic motivational aspect is job 
signaling (Lakhani & Wolf, 2005; Hars & Ou, 2001), giving evidence of the fact that people 
who aim to signal competence and commitment to potential employers are much more willing 
to actively engage in OSS communities.  
Striving for a more comprehensive model of participation in OSS, von Hippel and von 
Krogh (2003; 2006) observe that traditional models aiming to explain people's motivation for 
innovative behavior are insufficient for explaining OSS; they therefore introduce a new moti-
vational model called the private-collective innovation model, building on the two predomi-
nant motivational models for innovation, namely the "private investment" and the "collective 
action" model (von Hippel & von Krogh, 2003; 2006). The private investment model assumes 
"that innovation will be supported by private investment and that private returns can be ap-
propriated from such investments" (von Hippel & von Krogh, 2003, p. 212); thus, market 
players are motivated by the desire to receive compensation for doing so, mostly in terms of 
specific rights connected to the innovation, e.g., patents. In contrast, the collective action 
model is commonly applied when explaining the provision of public goods that typically are 
non-excludable and non-rival (von Hippel & von Krogh, 2003). "Collective" motives for in-
novation are thus very different from private ones, since people not only benefit from the 
things they have done themselves, but may also free-ride on the contributions of others.  
Von Hippel and von Krogh's private-collective model diverges from the private invest-
ment model in that users, unlike selling manufacturers, are not motivated by the expectation 
of monetary compensation for their innovations. This may be due to low competition among 
users, low expected profits from selling their innovations, and a desired benefit from simply 
using the innovation (von Hippel & von Krogh, 2006; Harhoff et al., 2003). On the other 
hand, the model also deviates from collective action in that freely revealed user innovations 
are not always public goods that free-riders can benefit from to the same extent. Private bene-
fits that free-riders cannot enjoy to the same extent as the revealing or contributing users typi-
cally include aspects like reputational gains or intrinsic pleasure from being innovative, while 
collective benefits others cannot free-ride on result from innovation outcomes that are better 
adapted to their personal needs. 
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Using OSS as an example, consumers use their personal resources (e.g., their own com-
puter, electricity, and time) to develop software at their own expense, which they reveal freely 
afterwards, opposing the principles of the private investment model, as they do not ask for 
monetary compensation. On the other hand, their innovative effort is not truly "collective" 
either, since contributors can get private benefits from participation that others cannot free-
ride on, such as enjoyment or social reputation (e.g., Lakhani & Wolf, 2005). Besides those 
private benefits, one major outcome of the private-collective innovation model is collective 
benefits, like the freely available innovative outcome expectation mentioned in the last chap-
ter that benefits oneself as well as others (von Hippel & von Krogh, 2003; 2006). Thus, users 
freely reveal their ideas (von Hippel & von Krogh, 2006; Haefliger et al., 2008), transforming 
them into a kind of public good. By doing so, they aim to get input and feedback to improve 
their own original idea in order to arrive at a better solution (the innovative outcome) for 
themselves and others. Thus, the collaborative perspective on motivations to innovate empha-
sizes the utmost importance of the innovative outcome expectations and the expected benefit 
from innovation as key drivers of motivation to innovate, but also further motivational aspects 
resulting from the interaction with others.  
2.3. Impact of monetary incentives 
Having giving a brief definition and overview in the preceding section, in this section I exam-
ine how the abovementioned aspects of motivation in general and user innovation in particular 
are influenced by monetary rewards. Hence, I first show results from exemplary prior research 
concerning the effect of monetary rewards on intrinsic, extrinsic, and prosocial motivation. In 
a second step, I examine prior research on the relationship between monetary incentives and 
individual and collective motivation in user innovation. The results derived from this chapter 
serve as the foundation for the derivation of this thesis' research program presented in Chapter 
3.  
2.3.1. On motivation and performance 
Due to their extrinsic nature, monetary rewards are often believed to have a negative impact 
on both intrinsic and prosocial motivation to pursue a task, lowering the efficiency of these 
kinds of motives on behavior. In terms of intrinsic motivation, psychology literature hosts a 
living debate on whether monetary incentives actually lead to crowding out. Many psycholo-
gists highlight the negative impact of monetary incentives, since they lower intrinsic motiva-
tion (e.g., Ryan & Deci, 2000a; Deci, Koestner, and Ryan, 1999). Deci and Ryan (1985) ex-
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plain this with the fact that extrinsic rewards are very likely to induce a control setting, where 
people feel forced to behave in a way they normally would not.  
In their seminal paper, Deci et al. (1999, p. 628) summarize different empirical settings 
in which crowding out of intrinsic motivation has occurred. They categorize different contin-
gencies of the effect of monetary rewards built on cognitive evaluation theory (Deci & Ryan, 
1985), namely "task-contingent rewards, which are given for doing or completing the target 
activity; and performance-contingent rewards, which are given specifically for performing the 
activity well, matching some standard of excellence, or surpassing some specified criterion 
(e.g., doing better than 80% of the other participants)." Further, they distinguish between 
"task-contingent rewards that are explicitly dependent upon completing the target task ([…] 
completion-contingent rewards) and those that are dependent upon engaging in the activity 
but do not require completing it ([…] engagement-contingent rewards)" (Deci et al., 1999, 
p.628). They find that "both engagement-contingent and completion-contingent rewards did 
decrease free choice intrinsic motivation and self-reported interest" (Deci et al., 1999, p. 653). 
However, they also find that "unexpected rewards and task non-contingent rewards did not 
have a detrimental effect because participants were not doing the task in order to get those 
rewards, so they did not feel controlled by them" (Deci et al., 1999, p. 653). Hence, to foster 
behavior by means of extrinsic rewards, this research suggests that it is useful to rely on per-
formance-contingent rewards. 
Opposing cognitive evaluation theory and the work by Deci and colleagues, Eisenberger 
and colleagues argue from a different point of view. While Deci and colleagues argue that 
rewards lower people's self-determination and thus their intrinsic motivation, Eisenberger, 
Rhoades, and Cameron (1999) argue that the opposite is in fact true, since offering a reward 
for a certain action signals that the person offering the reward has no control over the recipi-
ent of the reward. Due to this lack of control, they have to offer the reward, thereby actually 
increasing the self-determination of recipients, since they now get a signal (via the reward) 
that the offer results from the fact that the reward provider is aware of his lack of control, 
since he would otherwise not offer it. In their own meta-analyses, Eisenberger, Pierce, and 
Cameron (1999) provide evidence from various studies for the fact that a "reward can de-
crease, have no effect, or increase intrinsic motivation depending on its method of presenta-
tion" (Eisenberger et al., 1999, p. 677). Hence, psychology literature is not consistent with 
regard to the presence of a crowding out of intrinsic motivation. 
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Besides the direct impact on motivation, further studies have examined the impact of 
monetary incentives on individual performance and often find it negative. Ariely et al. (2009) 
demonstrate that for physical tasks performance-based monetary incentives work efficiently 
and enhance performance, while for cognitive tasks they lead to choking and decrease per-
formance. Heyman and Ariely (2004) show that whether or not monetary incentives are bene-
ficial depends heavily on the market in which they are offered. In money markets, where ex-
change is based on economic principles, monetary incentives have a positive effect, whereas 
in social markets, where exchange is based on social norms, their effect is negative. Similarly, 
Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) find that whether or not monetary incentives are effective de-
pends on their amount. They may increase effort if they are high enough, while a low pay-
ment may have the opposite effect. Boudreau et al. (2011) find that higher monetary incen-
tives may attract more competitors, leading to a decrease in the effort invested by each indi-
vidual.  
Nevertheless, there is also contrary evidence of the effect of monetary incentives on per-
formance, predominantly in the field of marketing, and especially concerning creative task 
performance. Toubia (2006) shows that monetary incentives have a positive impact on idea 
generation and creativity, namely that rewarding participants for their own performance as 
well as for their impact on the overall performance is beneficial. Burroughs et al. (2011) find 
that, with specific creativity training, the negative effect of monetary incentives on intrinsic 
creativity actually turns positive. Concerning the effort invested, Burroughs et al. (2011) addi-
tionally refer to the importance of monetary incentives and highlight their role as a compensa-
tor rather than a motivator. Incentives are found to not only actively influence people in their 
creative behavior, but also compensate their effort accordingly. Again, a review of existing 
literature points to the fact that there is no universally valid rule for the effect of monetary 
rewards on any of the relevant motivational aspects.  
2.3.2. On innovative users and their performance 
One major finding of user innovation theory in general and the private-collective innovation 
model in particular suggests that innovating users neither individually nor collectively neces-
sarily need monetary compensation for their innovative effort. On the contrary, past studies 
show that monetary rewards are unimportant for innovating users compared to an expected 
use benefit (e.g., Harhoff et al., 2003; von Hippel, 2010). As von Hippel (2010) points out, the 
benefits users gain from freely revealing their innovations result not only from the improve-
ments by others, but also from the network effects generated through a fast diffusion of their 
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idea. For all of these three aspects, demanding a monetary reward would be negative, since 
this would slow the diffusion and improvement process of the generated ideas since other 
users would have to buy the product.  
However, the abovementioned facts refer to a situation in which single users or user 
communities govern the exploitation of their creativity themselves. Hence, they are capable of 
generating their use benefit themselves. In ICs, this is actually not the case, since a predomi-
nant entity (the host) governs the exploitation of the output and tries to convince users by 
granting a monetary incentive for participation, which changes the mode of innovation to a 
hybrid one (Harhoff & Mayrhofer, 2010)  
In order to sustain stable conditions, Harhoff and Mayrhofer highlight the role of per-
ceived fairness, mostly in terms of a fair distribution of outcome. Hence, by offering a mone-
tary reward for ideas, the hosting firm attempts to increase participants' perception of fairness. 
In line with current management practice, Piller and Walcher (2006, p. 310) state that "com-
panies thus promise cash rewards or licensing contracts for innovative ideas." Similar insights 
are provided by Füller (2010, p. 109), who states that especially "reward-oriented consumers 
are highly motivated to engage in virtual co-creation. Beneath their interest in innovation ac-
tivities and the knowledge associated with them lies a desire for monetary rewards." Further, 
he points out that "reward-oriented participants are willing to participate more often as long as 
they get monetary compensation or other adequate incentives for it" (Füller, 2010, p. 114). All 
these examples show that arguments exist both for and against monetary incentives in user 
innovation. Hence, it seems plausible that monetary rewards play a noteworthy role in ICs 
that depends on various distinct factors.  
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3. Research gap and questions 
As stated earlier, past research on ICs (e.g., Füller, 2010; Piller & Walcher, 2006) often uses 
OSS to derive motivational constructs for participation in ICs (e.g., Lakhani & von Hippel, 
2003). However, fundamental differences between OSS and ICs make this approach highly 
questionable from a theoretical perspective due to three aspects. First, while in online com-
munities users govern the exploitation of their creativity themselves, in ICs it is the predomi-
nant hosting entity that governs the exploitation output, resulting in a kind of hybrid commu-
nity governance where "one entity systematically and repeatedly capitalizes commercially on 
freely revealed innovations generated by a user community" (Harhoff & Mayrhofer, 2010, p. 
137). Consequently, the suitability of the use of OSS motives in an IC setting has to be recon-
sidered. Second, OSS relies heavily on collaboration between users. In contrast, ICs foster 
competition by introducing a contest-like character and offering a monetary prize for the win-
ner (Füller, 2010; Leimeister et al., 2009; Piller & Walcher, 2006). This practice could, how-
ever, have detrimental effects on the collaboration among users and the effort of participants 
in general (Boudreau et al., 2011). Third, in contrast to ICs, OSS typically relies on non-
monetary rewards for participation, such as enjoyment, reputational gain, and an innovative 
outcome that yields a use benefit. As shown in Section 2, previous research has delivered ra-
ther ambiguous results regarding the effect of monetary rewards, yielding both negative (e.g., 
Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Ryan & Deci, 2000a) and positive effects (e.g., Burroughs et 
al., 2011; Toubia, 2006) and suggests that the effect may depend on the circumstances under 
which they are provided (Heyman & Ariely, 2004). To date, no study has examined whether, 
how, and when monetary rewards and a contest-like character indeed have a positive effect on 
participants' actual behavior in ICs, or whether, how, and when non-monetary reward expec-
tations are better capable of explaining participants' behavior. All aspects point to the fact that 
the validity of the motivational mechanism of OSS for ICs should be examined in more detail 
and more carefully. 
A second major source of open research questions arises from the methodological ap-
proach of past studies. Many studies examining motivational factors in ICs used surveys (e.g., 
Füller, 2010; Leimeister et al., 2009; Piller & Walcher, 2006) to ask participants about their 
motivation related to the past contest. Experimental approaches, which are more traditional in 
motivational research due to a stronger internal validity, are largely missing. In addition, sur-
veying participants after participation brings further methodical constraints, since the ex post 
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measurement approach also offers participants the possibility to rationalize their answers, i.e., 
to over- or underestimate certain motivational aspects. Further, the ex post measurement pro-
vides insights on why consumers participated, but not on what motives influenced the deci-
sion to participate or not, which is especially crucial when designing proper incentive mecha-
nisms and recruitment strategies. Finally, the results of these motivational insights may have 
generalizability issues, since participants could relate their motivation very strongly to experi-
ences made in the specific contest after which they were surveyed, rather than to ICs in gen-
eral. As a consequence, the results of prior studies cannot be truly analyzed in order to gener-
ate insights on the participation drivers of potential consumers, but only on those consumers 
that already belong to the group of participants. Transferring these insights to, e.g., a commu-
nication strategy design setting would result in a serious selection bias resulting from the tar-
get group. Therefore, it is crucial to generate insights on the general motives of both partici-
pants and non-participants in order to make valid statements about what types of motive have 
a significant impact on the decision to join an IC. 
Additionally, there is as yet no empirical evidence that analyzes what motives drive cer-
tain behavior. Almost all prior studies aim solely at explaining why participants took part on a 
general level, and do not analyze the specific actions. As a result, they do not generate in-
sights on how different motives lead to different behavior. It remains unclear whether certain 
motives are superior in explaining desirable behavior of participants within ICs as compared 
to others. Consequently, more research is needed that aims at analyzing the influence of mo-
tives from different categories (intrinsic, extrinsic, and prosocial) on different types of behav-
ior from a methodological perspective.  
Besides direct motivational aspects, questions arise concerning the design of ICs. It has 
been taken as given by a vast majority of studies on ICs that offering money and a competi-
tive reward mechanism is an effective trigger of participation (e.g., Füller, 2010; Leimeister et 
al., 2009; Piller & Walcher, 2006). However, as suggested in the motivation section above, it 
is doubtful whether this is actually the case. Offering a reward could potentially lead to a 
crowding out of motivation to participate (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997), while fostering 
competition could repel a certain category of participants (e.g., Boudreau et al., 2011) that 
could deliver valuable insights and be of great benefit for ICs. Prior studies are clearly limited 
in this regard, since they do not change those distinct design factors of ICs.  
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In addition, past research has dealt almost exclusively with the case where the host is a 
for-profit firm asking for a commercial topic. As a consequence, there is virtually no study 
that examines whether this method is also suited for non-profits and their primarily prosocial 
setting. This issue becomes even more important since consumers typically have a very dif-
ferent perception of those organizational stereotypes and associate different traits with them 
(Aaker, Vohs, and Mogilner, 2010). Besides the question of general usefulness, it is also 
worth examining whether the monetary reward and competitive interaction is also a dominant 
design for non-profit hosts.  
Finally, there has been no study that focuses on how participants and their different mo-
tives for participating in ICs should be addressed in order to convince them to join the IC. To 
date, there is no study that focuses explicitly on developing a proper communication strategy 
for ICs, since prior research has generated valuable insights on what happens during and after 
such a contest, but does not provide insights on what happens before the contest. More specif-
ically, prior research does not provide organizing hosts with insights on how the communica-
tion of ICs should be designed in order to foster participants' recruitment and their subsequent 
behavior. Showing the consequences of participation is a critical component in designing a 
proper communication strategy, and prior research on ICs has not provided insights on which 
consequence or motivational aspect (e.g., getting a monetary gain or improving one's own use 
experience) is more efficient in generating attention to ICs. In order to shed further light on 
these issues and fill some of the abovementioned research gaps, I address in particular the 
following research questions: 
1) How should incentive mechanisms in ICs be designed in order to attract 
high levels of participation? 
2) What motives are influenced by certain IC design factors, and how do they 
translate into different types of participation behavior? 
3) How should ICs be communicated in order to attract high levels of partici-
pation? 
4) Finally, which personal traits moderate the effects of motivating conditions 
such that a certain contest design and communication is appealing to dif-
ferent people? 
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Figure 2: Overview of the thesis research design 
 
Figure 2 provides an overview of the proposed research design. The core model consists 
of the impact of two distinct motivational aspects (summarized as monetary and non-
monetary reward expectations) on consumers' participation intention and behavior. This mod-
el is extended with contingency factors for both types of motivation, analyzing whether the 
efficiency of monetary and/or non-monetary benefit expectations is affected by individual 
traits of participants or specific design factors of ICs.  
Methodologically, I rely on three distinct research papers and studies. Paper 1, which is 
a combination of a survey and actual behavior analysis, aims at answering questions one and 
four. The results of Paper 1 lay the foundation for the other two studies. It examines whether 
and how monetary and non-monetary reward expectations lead to different kinds of desirable 
behavior within ICs, in order to form the basis for designing a corresponding incentive mech-
anism. Paper 2 uses the results of the prior paper and focuses on the effect of monetary incen-
tives, in order to further examine whether the effect is contingent on additional ideation con-
test design factors, addressing research question two. Finally, Paper 3 builds on both prior 
studies and uses their results to test different communication strategies in order to generate 
insights on whether monetary or non-monetary benefit expectations are more suited to foster 
the recruitment of participants in ICs. Hence, Paper 3 addresses research questions three and 
four. The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: First, I briefly introduce the three 
research papers in an extended abstract form. I then discuss the results of the different papers 
from a comprehensive perspective, highlight the contribution of this thesis, and give an out-
look on future research directions.  
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4. Short summary of the research papers 
The following chapter gives an overview of the three research papers that this thesis is com-
prised of. The short summary will focus on showing the research motivation, briefly introduc-
ing the theoretical and methodological background, and finally highlighting the key results 
and contributions.  
4.1. Paper 1: The Ambiguous Role of Monetary Rewards in Ideation with 
Users 
In this paper, I focus on the question of what motivates users to participate in ICs and find 
boundary conditions for these motives. Identifying these motives is a key prerequisite for de-
veloping appropriate incentive mechanisms that firms need to effectively tailor ICs to their 
customers' needs. As a motivational framework, I build on the private-collective innovation 
model by von Hippel and von Krogh (2003; 2006), which is commonly used to explain partic-
ipation in collaborative online settings such as OSS. The private-collective model emphasizes 
that non-monetary benefit expectations in particular are drivers of participation. These non-
monetary benefit expectations include the generation of an innovative outcome that fits users' 
needs, or enjoyment and reputational gains derived from participation. In addition, the model 
highlights the inferiority of monetary reward expectations as compared to non-monetary bene-
fit expectations.  
However, ICs deviate from the private-collective innovation model in one important re-
gard, as it is not the users or the community who govern the outcome of the collective effort, 
but a dominant entity. In this case, the host controls the outcome because it chooses the win-
ner and additionally decides which of the ideas will actually be put into practice. As a conse-
quence, this setting resembles a hybrid form of an innovative community (Harhoff & Mayrho-
fer, 2010), where monetary rewards can indeed be effective as a form of compensation. This 
points to the fact that monetary rewards can have an ambiguous role in ICs and need further 
examination. Specifically, I ask the following questions: (1) Do monetary reward expectations 
explain user participation when there is an asymmetric commercial exploitation of users' re-
vealed ideas by a hosting organization? (2) Do non-monetary benefit expectations proposed in 
user innovation and OSS literature explain participation in ICs? (3) Do boundary conditions 
exist that shift explanatory power from monetary to non-monetary benefit expectations; e.g., 
user characteristics or different kinds of participation behavior? 
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To answer these questions, I seek to empirically explain participation behavior by the 
example of a real ideation project. All invited users are surveyed on their expected benefits 
and motivational conditions ahead of the contest, in contrast to the ex post measurement of 
motivations in previous studies (e.g., Ebner, Leimeister, and Krcmar, 2009; Füller, 2010; 
Piller & Walcher, 2006). By doing so, I hope to maximize the possibility of causal inference 
because it should minimize the risk of selection bias that might be caused by the exclusion of 
non-participants. Additionally, it should minimize the possibility of respondents rationalizing 
their answers ex post in a socially desirable way. Furthermore, I employ variables for two 
distinct types of desirable behavior: (1) individually oriented idea submission behavior, which 
can be exhibited by single participants on their own, and (2) collectively oriented commenting 
and feedback behavior directed from one participant to another. 
Analyzing the data, I find that monetary reward expectations trigger individual behav-
ior, while non-monetary benefit expectations trigger collectively oriented behavior. Further, I 
find support for two boundary conditions where expected monetary rewards are less effective 
and non-monetary benefits proposed by the private-collective innovation model better explain 
participation behavior. The first condition is related to the type of desirable behavior. Intro-
ducing monetary rewards increases participants' willingness to engage individually. But in 
turn, it also fosters competition among users, thereby reducing the amount of effort that users 
allocate to collectively oriented activities like commenting on, improving, or evaluating other 
users' ideas. The second condition relates to an individual trait of participants. If users' per-
sonal involvement and needs in the innovation domain are high, they can better internalize the 
collective innovation outcome and capture private benefits from participation. Thus, compen-
sation through monetary rewards is deemed to be less important. When both boundary condi-
tions appear simultaneously, that is, when participants have a strong personal need and the 
desired behavior is collectively oriented, the effect of monetary reward expectations is indeed 
negative, lowering participants' efforts. 
Concerning the theoretical implications of this paper, my results are comparable to 
Toubia (2006), as they give another example of a positive effect of monetary rewards on idea 
generation behavior of customers. In addition, I show evidence of different patterns of moti-
vation for different kinds of innovative behavior. The theoretical contribution of this study 
lies in a more detailed explanation of user innovation behavior in "hybrid innovation settings" 
(Harhoff & Mayrhofer, 2010), where dominant entities with commercial interests interact 
with communities of innovating users and govern the exploitation of the innovative outcome. 
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This explanation is in line with the literature on behavioral economics and psychology on the 
boundaries of monetary and competitive reward structures in fostering the provision of public 
goods, as well as cooperative and prosocial behavior (e.g., Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; 
Vohs, Mead, and Goode, 2006). Further, it is in line with the non-monetary motivational con-
ditions put forward in the user innovation literature and specifically in the private-collective 
action model by von Hippel and von Krogh (2003; 2006). 
In terms of managerial contribution, I shed light on an important trade-off that practi-
tioners should consider when implementing ideation projects with customers: Besides raising 
the number of ideas submitted, offering monetary rewards may also erode collectively orient-
ed participation. Hence, it may be less effective in attracting users with extensive personal 
involvement and needs—a characteristic often associated with the most innovative lead users 
(Franke et al., 2006). This trade-off should be considered very carefully, as an effective idea-
tion process relies not only on the sheer volume of idea generation, but also on the improve-
ment, consolidation, and filtering of these ideas. In order to encourage a more cumulative ide-
ation process with users, firms should perhaps consider more complex monetary incentive 
schemes than simply offering separate monetary rewards for collectively oriented participa-
tion (cf. Toubia, 2006). 
4.2. Paper 2: The Prosocial Boundaries of Monetary Incentives in Idea Co-
creation  
While Paper 1 shows that the efficiency of monetary rewards is contingent on the recipient, 
Paper 2 shows that their effect is also dependent on who offers them. In this paper, I show that 
the decision to offer such a monetary incentive strongly influences consumers' exerted effort. 
To show this, I incorporate three different aspects that play a key role in how monetary incen-
tives are perceived, namely, the amount of the monetary incentives offered (low versus high), 
the organizational stereotype of the host (for-profit versus non-profit), and the task domain 
(commercial ideas versus prosocial ideas).  
Concerning the role of monetary incentives, prior research shows ambiguous findings. 
Since ideation resembles a creative task, it benefits from high levels of intrinsic motivation 
(Burroughs et al., 2011). Many authors therefore highlight the negative impact of monetary 
incentives because they decrease intrinsic motivation (Ryan & Deci, 2000a) and lead to 
crowding out (Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, 1997). However, marketing literature provides evi-
dence to the contrary, showing that rewarding participants can indeed be beneficial (Bur-
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roughs et al., 2011; Toubia, 2006). These ambiguous results highlight the need to further ex-
plore the role of monetary rewards as an incentive for participation in idea co-creation. 
Regarding the organizational stereotype of the host, the predominant examples of idea-
tion contests consist of large companies like Dell (Bayus, 2011). However, more recently, 
non-profit organizations have also begun to host ideation contests for prosocial topics. In con-
trast to all for-profit examples, many of them do not provide a monetary incentive for the par-
ticipants. Hence, the question arises whether this is the right choice. For for-profit hosts, Har-
hoff and Mayrhofer (2010) argue that monetary incentives are mandatory, since ideation con-
tests resemble a form of innovation where the host is capable of systematically utilizing the 
outcome of an innovative community. However, it remains questionable whether the same 
applies to non-profit organizations, since consumers perceive non-profits differently than for-
profits (Aaker, Vohs, and Mogilner, 2010). 
Finally, I examine the impact of the task domain. Heyman and Ariely (2004) find that 
monetary incentives have an ambiguous effect depending on what they are offered for. They 
explicitly differentiate between money markets, where relations among players are based on 
economic principles, and social markets, where relations among players are based on social 
exchange. Consequently, in money markets, where people intend to earn money, the impact of 
monetary rewards is positive. On the other hand, in social markets, where people intend to 
engage socially, they have a negative impact. This is closely related to the task the host asks 
for, because the actual perception of the relevant market could change if, for example, a for-
profit firm asks for a prosocial task or a non-profit host asks for a commercial task. If the task 
lies outside the organization's original sphere of activity, consumers could perceive a lack of 
competence for either form of organization. Following Vohs et al. (2006), who find that mon-
etary incentives have a strong signaling effect, Aaker et al. (2010) find that monetary rewards 
can be used to signal competence, which could also be the case for monetary incentives of-
fered for participation in idea co-creation.  
Hence, I postulate the following research questions: (1) Does the effect of monetary re-
wards differ for non-profit and for-profit organizations? (2) Does the effect of monetary re-
wards differ when organizations set tasks outside their original domain? To test these assump-
tions, I run an online scenario-based choice experiment with different scenarios of idea con-
tests. For data collection, 537 participants are recruited by an online panel. All participants are 
shown four different possible idea contest scenarios dealing with cars and mobility, leading to 
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a total of 2,148 observations. For the scenarios, I use a reduced design that includes the three 
main factors of interest, and additional factors that are included as controls. Two of these fac-
tors of interest are within factors, namely the host (for-profit versus non-profit) and the mone-
tary incentive (low versus high). The third is a between factor, namely the task domain (com-
mercial versus prosocial).  
Due to the nested nature of the data (four observations per participant), I use a random-
coefficient zero-inflated Poisson model with the hours participants would invest in the contest 
and a random-coefficient binary logit regression model with participation intention as a de-
pendent variable. Following the procedure for interaction terms in non-linear models suggest-
ed by Greene (2010), all interaction effects are plotted in order to interpret their effect. Results 
show that monetary rewards do in fact play an important yet ambiguous role as an incentive 
for participation in idea co-creation. Whether this role is positive depends strongly on who 
offers the monetary rewards (the host's organizational stereotype) and what they are offered 
for (the task domain). For both organizational stereotypes, monetary incentives work as sug-
gested by the literature—they are effective when used by for-profits (Harhoff & Mayrhofer, 
2010) and negative for non-profits (confirming the literature on the crowding-out effect). 
However, when outside their original activity domain (when for-profits ask for prosocial tasks 
or non-profits ask for commercial tasks) both types of firm must introduce monetary rewards 
in order to signal competence and willingness to use the consumer-generated ideas.  
My study contributes to theory by showing that monetary rewards for prosocial tasks do 
not necessarily lead to a crowding-out effect. Moreover, it shows that monetary rewards can 
in fact reinforce prosocial behavior if they are used by the for-profit host to show competence 
and willingness to use the idea and thus value consumers' prosocial effort of participating. 
Further, I contribute to motivational theory by giving further examples of the fact that the 
efficiency of monetary incentives is contingent not only on the traits and preferences of indi-
viduals, but also on the circumstances under which they are provided—in this case, for what 
and by whom they are offered. 
4.3. Paper 3: Attracting Consumers to Idea Co-creation 
While the preceding paper deals with identifying contingency factors of the efficiency of 
monetary incentives, this paper pursues a similar goal for non-monetary incentives, especially 
the role of innovative outcome expectations. In this paper, I show that the efficiency of inno-
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vative outcome expectations in attracting consumers depends on several factors such as the 
recipient of the innovative outcome and the individual relevance of the topic.   
As a consequence of the growing popularity of ICs, the formerly infinite resource 
"crowd" is becoming an increasingly scarce good and companies are starting to compete for 
participants, since such initiatives benefit from a larger number of participants. In contrast to 
the abovementioned large companies, smaller firms—especially those with a lower brand 
image and reputation—may soon find it hard to attract consumers to their own idea co-
creation initiatives. In order to face this challenge, managers must consider how to improve 
participant recruitment and ask themselves how to address customers and how to design 
communication strategies to convince them to join the contest. When designing an appropriate 
communication strategy, the key challenge is finding out how to communicate consequences 
of participation (Levin et al., 1998). In this paper, I use an approach where I examine both the 
benefit and the consequences of (non-)participation and the recipient thereof.  
First, I examine whether the dominant strategy companies employ to communicate this 
benefit, i.e., highlighting it as a personal gain, is indeed beneficial. To analyze this issue, I 
draw on message framing theory (e.g., Block & Keller, 1995; Levin, Schneider, and Gaeth, 
1998; White, MacDonnell, and Dahl, 2011), which is a popular stream of literature on ex-
plaining differences in value or benefit perceptions. Message framing builds on prospect theo-
ry (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), which emphasizes that people are very strongly influ-
enced by their own risk aversion. Message framing uses this risk aversion, implying that pre-
senting an object or behavior as either a gain or a loss situation influences people's decision 
making (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). However, in message framing literature, not 
much research has focused on the direction of the loss and gain. Related yet different studies 
can be found in the context of donation behavior literature (e.g., Brunel & Nelson, 2000; 
Hornikx, Hendriks, and Thijzen, 2010) and social dilemma literature (e.g., Fleishmann, 1988). 
Participation in idea co-creation differs from both of these, since it asks for creative effort and 
dedication rather than a monetary donation or a volunteering of one's time. This is especially 
relevant when taking into account the results of prior research, which have shown that time 
and money donations differ greatly in efficiency (e.g., Liu & Aaker, 2008). Additionally, it 
differs from social dilemmas due to the setting. For firm-initiated ideation, the setting is di-
vided into self-benefit and benefit for others, rather than a collective benefit that includes 
both, as proposed by social dilemmas. 
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Second, I examine the role of the recipient of the benefit mentioned in the communica-
tion strategy. Building on user innovation theory (von Hippel, 1978; 2005), which emphasizes 
the personal need or benefit of an individual as the dominant value of innovative behavior, I 
examine whether other people's individual needs or benefits also drive innovative behavior by 
consumers. While there is a considerable amount of literature showing that the expectation of 
benefits for others significantly influences consumer behavior, most of these studies focus on 
donation or non-profit marketing (e.g., White & Peloza, 2009).  
A recent study from the field of organizational behavior has shown that, in a coworker 
setting, the needs of others motivate people to participate in creative tasks (Grant & Berry, 
2011). However, due to the coworker setting, these studies cannot truly answer whether this 
also applies to complete strangers, such as in consumer settings. Therefore, I want to examine 
whether the effect of highlighting a benefit for others can be validated beyond own organiza-
tional boundaries. To examine boundary conditions of the efficiency of message framing and 
benefits for others in attracting consumers to idea co-creation, I rely on studies by Maheswa-
ran and Meyers-Levy (1990), as well as Meyers-Levy and Maheswaran (2004). In line with 
these studies, I further examine whether the degree of topic involvement and personal rele-
vance influences the efficiency of both consequence and benefit framing. Consequently, I ask 
the following research questions: (1) Are people more willing to engage in innovative behav-
ior when they recognize other people's needs and believe they can help prevent a loss that will 
impacts other people? (2) Is message framing applicable in idea co-creation, and does it work 
efficiently when highlighting consequences not for oneself but for others? (3) Do personal 
traits like relevance or involvement have an impact on the efficiency of message framing and 
on the effectiveness of highlighting benefits for others?  
Using a large-scale field experiment, I find that highlighting consequences for others 
does in fact lead to significantly more attention to idea co-creation. Hence, consumers are 
more willing to engage in idea co-creation when they believe that their time and creative ef-
fort will help other people. Furthermore, I find that message framing is not applicable to an 
idea co-creation setting on a general level. Its efficiency is contingent on the personal rele-
vance of and involvement in the topic; thus, when the individual relevance is low, "obtain 
gain" frames are better at attracting consumers, while "prevent loss" frames are more efficient 
when attracting consumers for whom the personal relevance is high. 
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In conclusion, the results imply that the expectation of benefits for others can be a driver 
of participation in idea co-creation, even if these others are complete strangers. This adds to 
findings from user innovation and literature on prosocial behavior. To user innovation litera-
ture, my study contributes by showing that highlighting self-related benefits addressing one's 
own unmet need as a dominant strategy to attract consumers is inferior to addressing the un-
met needs of others. Thus, I add another important motivational aspect to the literature on user 
innovation motivation. I additionally contribute to prosocial literature by introducing idea co-
creation as another way to exhibit individual prosocial behavior.  
From a managerial point of view, I show that managers must reconsider the current 
practice of inviting consumers by highlighting the personal extrinsic gain of participation. 
Moreover, if the topic is of great relevance for the participants, managers should design it in a 
way that emphasizes helping to prevent a loss for others. In contrast, if the individual rele-
vance for the target group is high, they should emphasize the gain for others.  
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5. General discussion and outlook 
The goal of this thesis is to explore the motivations of consumers to participate in firm-
initiated ideation and identify incentives that help to effectively address these motives. The 
present papers show that the effect of motivation on specific types of behavior within the con-
test is contingent on the type of behavior itself, individual traits of the participants, and specif-
ic design factors of the ideation contest itself. In the following chapter, I discuss these contin-
gencies, show their implications, and give an outlook for future research. 
5.1. Role of monetary reward (expectations) in ideation contests 
Concerning the motivation of consumers, Paper 1 finds that both monetary and non-monetary 
benefit expectations are drivers of participation behavior. With regard to monetary rewards, I 
find that, for the average consumer, the expectation of a monetary reward is the sole driver of 
individually oriented behavior such as submitting an idea. When addressing this average con-
sumer, offering a monetary incentive is thus effective. In this case, ICs also deviate from 
UI/OSS models. The predominant host that governs the outcome must introduce a monetary 
reward in order to induce users to reveal their ideas. These results oppose creativity theory, 
which generally speaks against the importance of monetary rewards and for the importance of 
intrinsic enjoyment. A possible explanation for this could be that idea submission appears to 
be seen as a creative task only by users who are attempting to solve their own problems in the 
respective contest. The average user, however, seems to have ideas at hand without much cre-
ativity involved and thus expects a compensatory monetary reward. In contrast, this effect is 
not present for participants with a strong personal need, providing evidence of an individual 
boundary condition of the effects of monetary rewards. 
Building on these results, Paper 2 shows that, besides the individual boundary condition 
of monetary rewards, another is related to the framework in which they are offered. The re-
sults imply that for-profit hosts can easily rely on monetary incentives to foster consumer par-
ticipation intention and effort. This strengthens the assumption that monetary incentives com-
pensate for consumer ideas, as suggested by Harhoff and Mayrhofer (2010). Moreover, the 
results also show that offering more money leads to more participants, and that the current 
practice of offering low to medium amounts of money is not optimal, since companies waste 
considerable potential to attract more participants with an ever higher reward and thus do not 
benefit from the positive effect to the full extent. Although raising the amount of money of-
fered would of course raise the cost of using ICs, this specific cost is incurred only once for 
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the winner and increases the effort and willingness of all participants, which could easily re-
sult in a few hundred or even thousand additional participants who all invest a greater amount 
of effort. In contrast to for-profit firms, non-profit hosts cannot trigger participation as easily 
by offering a monetary reward. Consumers do not expect non-profit hosts to offer monetary 
rewards for idea co-creation for prosocial tasks and thus are repelled by higher amounts of 
money offered, confirming previous studies on crowding out of prosocial behavior (e.g., Ari-
ely et al., 2009; Benabou & Tirole, 2003).   
Similar aspects can be observed in Paper 3 with regard to the design of ideation contest 
communication. When idea co-creation hosts design their communication strategy, they usu-
ally rely on highlighting a monetary reward that can be won. However, the results imply that 
the greatest benefit can be achieved not by highlighting a personal gain in money, but rather 
the consequences for others. It seems that consumers are very strongly motivated to engage in 
ideation when they recognize other people's needs. Therefore, firms should consider rethink-
ing their communication strategy when addressing consumers to encourage their participation, 
since it generates more attention to focus the communication on consequences for others. 
Taking a global perspective on all three papers and considering the main research ques-
tions of this thesis, I can conclude that monetary incentives can have a strong positive effect 
on consumer behavior and that they should therefore be considered when designing an incen-
tive mechanism (research question 1). As stated above, the positive effect depends on who the 
hosts want to address, what the money is offered for, and the host's organizational stereotype. 
This implies that the general usefulness of money as an incentive is strictly dependent on the 
organizational form of the host and the task, and that both design aspects show moderating 
conditions as proposed by research question 2. While firms can use monetary rewards regard-
less of the task setting, non-profit or governmental hosts can do so to the same extent as for-
profits only when they intend to use ICs outside their primary task domain.  
Additionally, hosts must consider who they want to address with their contest. Money 
can easily be used as an incentive tailored to the average consumer. If a host wishes to involve 
as many average users as possible, money is a strong incentive for those kinds of participants 
to share their ideas and should therefore be included. An interesting aspect arises from taking 
the results of both Paper 1 and Paper 2 into account. While Paper 1 shows that monetary in-
centives cannot trigger interaction among users, Paper 2 clearly shows that money can lead to 
an increase in the effort consumers would exert. Hence, building on both results, one can sug-
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gest that consumers would only be willing to exert self-related effort, e.g., posting more ideas, 
but not to invest more time in giving feedback to other participants when the setting asks for a 
commercial task. Moreover, Paper 2 also shows that in commercial settings the host can 
strongly increase participation by offering a higher monetary reward. Another interesting as-
pect is the evidence of a signaling effect of monetary rewards when hosts ask for tasks outside 
their primary task domain. This effect could be worth examining in more detail with respect 
to the results of Study 1 and 2. It would be valuable to examine whether the signaling effect of 
monetary rewards could for example also foster collectively oriented participation such as 
commenting, since consumers could in this case perceive generating a good solution for the 
prosocial setting more important than seeing their own idea win. With respect to the results of 
Paper 3, it would be interesting to see whether the signaling effect also generates more atten-
tion to ICs. The results of Paper 3 seem to point in this direction, as the benefit for others is 
closely related to prosocial behavior, and this effect may be reinforced by the signaling effect 
found in Paper 2. 
However, as mentioned above, these aspects address in particular the average (potential) 
participant. If the host is more interested in the more radical ideas often associated with par-
ticipants with a strong personal need, money is not an effective incentive and may even be-
come harmful due to the induced competition among participants. This presence of an indi-
vidual trait that affects the efficiency of the monetary reward expectations yields insights that 
help answer research question 4 of this thesis. As Paper 3 highlights, when designing a com-
munication strategy (research question 3) to foster recruitment and participation, highlighting 
the monetary benefit is not optimal.  
5.2. Role of non-monetary reward (expectations) in ideation contests 
All three papers also provide evidence of the relevance of non-monetary benefit expectations 
in ICs. Paper 1 clearly finds that non-monetary benefit expectations are a driver of consumers' 
innovative behavior, but that they are not capable of explaining users' participation behavior 
in general. While they have no impact on individually oriented behavior, they do affect the 
collectively oriented participation in terms of the innovative outcome expectations. Hence, I 
find that the expectation of an innovative outcome is clearly the most important non-monetary 
benefit expectation and should be considered when designing an incentive mechanism (re-
search question 1). However, other non-monetary benefit expectations are also capable of 
explaining both individually and collectively oriented participation behavior, at least for par-
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ticipants with a strong personal need. Hence, personal need strengthens the role of the non-
monetary reward expectation and in turn diminishes the effect of monetary rewards (research 
question 4). When experiencing a strong personal need, participants benefit from non-
monetary gains such as enjoyment (for individually oriented behavior) and peer recognition 
(for collectively oriented participation).  
However, the effect of non-monetary benefit expectations, especially users' interest in 
the innovation outcome, is considerably stronger on collectively oriented participation behav-
ior. The importance of the expected innovation outcome is even stronger when users also per-
ceive a strong personal need. This shows that collectively oriented participation is at least 
partly driven by users' motive to adapt the innovation outcome to their own personal needs, as 
proposed by user innovation theory. A secondary driver of collectively oriented participation 
that is important especially for users with a strong personal need is reputational gain. This is 
surprising, since UI/OSS and ICs deviate in terms of the time horizon. Many studies on OSS 
(and related fields such as online forums) relate the positive effect of reputational gain to the 
long-term character. But even in relatively short-term activities like ICs, people are willing to 
invest more collective effort due to the expectation of recognition from other participants. 
However, I do not find that intrinsic enjoyment plays a role in collectively oriented participa-
tion. In conclusion, I find that non-monetary benefits are especially important for collectively 
oriented participation, while in the case of individually oriented participation they are only 
important for people with a strong personal need. 
Concerning the role of non-monetary benefits, Paper 2 also yields interesting results. 
Building on the utmost importance of innovative outcome expectations, the paper adds a pro-
social component to the non-monetary benefit expectations when the contest asks for a proso-
cial topic. This setting thus changes the recipient of the non-monetary benefit from oneself to 
a third person. Consequently, users in such settings do not benefit from the innovative out-
come themselves, but unknown others do. One type of host that benefits particularly strongly 
from prosocial topics are non-profits, who, although they cannot trigger participation through 
monetary incentives, nevertheless benefit from a huge increase in participation. Results show 
that participants' initial intention to participate as well as the effort they would exert is twice 
as high as in the case of for-profits in commercial settings, which contributes to answering 
research question 2. One might suggest that this is a definite sign of the suitability of idea co-
creation as a way to express corporate social responsibility (CSR). The strength of this effect 
is even more surprising, since various studies from the field of CSR referring to the positive 
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effect of CSR for companies (e.g., Brown & Dacin, 1997; Bhattacharya & Sen, 2003) find 
that the effect is typically rather weak (e.g., Gürhan-Canli & Batra, 2004; Bhattacharya, Sen, 
and Korschun, 2006). This assumption is strengthened by the fact that, even without a mone-
tary incentive being offered, consumers' intention to join is about 1.5 times as high for a pro-
social task as for a typical commercial task. Similar aspects account for the effort, where the 
initial value stated by consumers is also 1.5 times as high. In conclusion, Paper 2 shows that 
an innovative outcome for others is an influential non-monetary benefit for consumer partici-
pation in ICs, and that firms can use that as an effective participation incentive. 
Finally, Paper 3 provides some more insights on the efficiency of non-monetary benefit 
expectations as a way to communicate the benefit of participation (research question 3). The 
results show that communicating an innovative outcome benefit for others can indeed be an 
efficient way to foster innovative behavior. The fact that consumers are attracted more easily 
by benefits for others could also imply that consumers do indeed perceive ICs as one way to 
exhibit prosocial behavior and engage for others, showing similar results to those of Paper 2. 
Surprisingly, the frames that focus on non-monetary personal benefits, such as the innovative 
outcome for oneself, are inferior to those directed at the benefit for others and even to the 
monetary control frame. This is somewhat contradictory to traditional user innovation theory 
(e.g., Harhoff et al., 2003), but is related to the results of Paper 1, which differentiate more 
finely between different kinds of useful behavior. Hence, Paper 3 finds that addressing self-
related non-monetary benefits is not effective in attracting participants and generating atten-
tion. 
One explanation for this could be provided by Paper 1, which shows that non-monetary 
benefit expectations are especially important for consumers with highly unmet needs; it may 
be that the sample for Paper 3 did not contain many of those. In addition, the results to a cer-
tain extent oppose those of White and Peloza (2009) since, despite the fact that the decision to 
click and take a look at the contest was made privately, the benefit for others still leads to a 
more desirable prosocial behavior. In contrast, according to White and Peloza (2009), the pri-
vate setting should rather foster the efficiency of personal benefits. One explanation for this 
issue could be the fact that the proposed public image concerns play no specific role in idea 
co-creation, as shown by the lack of influence in Paper 1. Another interesting aspect of Paper 
3 is the use of message framing, which does not work on a general level. One possible expla-
nation for this could be the fact that goal framing, as I used it in my setting, in general suffers 
from the lack of ability to deliver significant results in many cases (see, e.g., Levin et al., 
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1998; 2002). Levin et al. (2002) explain the non-significance by the fact that the task setting 
may not be "critical" enough, as compared to the initial health-related goal framing setting 
used by, e.g., Meyerowitz and Chaiken (1987).  
Although my topic seems to induce prosocial behavior related to benefits for others, it 
seems that a loss of use experience by others, as induced by the frames, is not capable of 
evoking the fear needed to make goal framing efficient on a general level. As suggested by 
Maheswaran and Meyers-Levi (1990), the personal relevance and topic involvement signifi-
cantly influences the consequence framing and thus increases the importance of message 
framing. When the individual relevance is high, consumers do indeed suffer from the fear of a 
decrease in use benefit. On the other hand, when the personal relevance is low, consumers 
have no obvious reason to fear a decrease in use benefit; thus, obtaining a gain becomes more 
important. Hence, individual relevance provides another example of an individual trait that 
serves as a boundary condition as proposed in research question 4. Further, this implies that, 
when the topic is not important to consumers, using an appeal describing a benefit for others 
increases attention. This can be explained by the fact that if consumers do not have a personal 
interest in the generation of use benefit improvements for themselves, they must be shown 
that other recipients could benefit from using it. In conclusion, one can say that non-monetary 
benefit expectations play an important role, especially in attracting consumers to ICs, which is 
a result that clearly contributes to answering research question 3. 
Concerning my main research objective, I can conclude that I found significant differ-
ences in patterns of motivation in idea generation and participation in ICs in line with all four 
research questions derived in Section 3. By examining both individually and collectively ori-
ented efforts, I find that individually oriented behavior is driven by monetary reward expecta-
tions, while collectively oriented behavior is driven by non-monetary ones. Both aspects are 
important to consider when companies deal with the question of how to design their firm-
initiated ideation activities. Further, I find that both monetary and non-monetary expectations 
are contingent on several aspects, such as individual traits of the consumers (Paper 1), as well 
as the organizational stereotype of the host and the task asked for (Paper 2). Surprisingly, 
none of the motives I analyzed are capable of explaining both types of behavior. The results 
seem to confirm the assumption that a monetary reward serves as a compensation rather than 
an incentive. People are only willing to post an idea if they are sufficiently and personally 
compensated for doing so. However, if participants believe that their participation has an im-
pact and that they can contribute to an innovative outcome, they are willing to invest much 
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more collectively oriented effort, helping other participants. This aspect becomes even more 
important and leads to a significant increase in attention to ICs if the innovative outcome ex-
pectation is not associated with oneself but with other people, showing the vast importance of 
prosocial behavior for idea co-creation and creativity. 
5.3. Contributions and implications 
Concerning the theoretical implications of this thesis, the results give multiple insights. First, 
they provide another example of a positive effect of monetary rewards on idea generation 
behavior of customers, similar to Toubia (2006) and Burroughs et al. (2011). In addition, I 
offer evidence of different patterns of motivation on different kinds of innovative behavior. 
Despite its origins in OSS, which usually has a long-term character, I also demonstrate evi-
dence of the influence of the expectation of non-monetary benefits—in terms of innovative 
outcome expectations and reputational effects—in short-term settings. Further, I show a first 
empirical explanation of users' innovative behavior in "hybrid innovation" (Harhoff & 
Mayrhofer, 2010); i.e., settings where entities with commercial interests asymmetrically ex-
ploit the output of innovative user communities. Hence, users are also willing to contribute to 
an innovative outcome when the opportunity of improving it is rather short, and even when 
the exploitation is governed by a dominant host. I give empirical evidence and contribute to 
literature by showing boundaries of monetary and competitive reward structures in ideation 
and innovation settings and highlight their ambiguous role. In addition, I contribute to user 
innovation literature by showing how the use of monetary incentives is contingent not only on 
the traits and preferences of individuals, but also on the circumstances under which they are 
provided. This offers a new perspective on the role of monetary incentives and their impact on 
innovating consumers.  
Moreover, this thesis also contributes to the literature on prosocial behavior by showing 
that monetary rewards for a prosocial task do not necessarily lead to a crowding-out effect. 
They can in fact be positive when offered by a firm showing competence and willingness to 
use the results. The results point to the fact that idea co-creation seems to be perceived as a 
very suitable way for individuals to express prosocial behavior and organizations to fulfill 
their corporate social responsibility. The thesis provides evidence that the prosocial nature of 
idea co-creation participation is not motivated by image concerns, since in my setting the de-
cision to look into the co-creation initiative was made privately. It further adds the donation of 
creative ideas—a combination of time and creative effort—as a new aspect of what is donat-
ed. Further, this thesis contributes by showing that the expectation of benefits for others can 
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indeed be a driver of innovative behavior. I find that highlighting self-related benefits that 
address the individual's own unmet needs (e.g., von Hippel, 2005) as a dominant strategy to 
attract consumers is inferior to addressing the unmet needs of others. Thus, I add another im-
portant motivational aspect to the literature on user innovation motivation, namely innovative 
outcome expectations for others. This effect is still present when these others are unknown 
and described only in abstract, and becomes especially important when the topic has no per-
sonal relevance. I further contribute to the literature on message framing by showing that 
message framing does not work in ICs on a general level, since neither the "prevent loss" nor 
the "obtain gain" frames lead to a significant increase in participation. This implies that, on a 
general level, the risk-aversion mechanism is not present in my innovation-related setting. 
Additionally, I confirm the results of Maheswaran and Meyers-Ley (1990) and add to them by 
showing that only the role of personal relevance and issue involvement makes the message 
framing effect work. Further, I show that it is also present in low-risk settings that are not di-
rectly related to life-critical issues like health and disease, which opposes prior findings of 
goal-framing literature (Levin el al., 1998).  
The results also have managerial implications in terms of considering participants' mo-
tivation, the design of ICs, and the recruitment of participants. Concerning participants' moti-
vation, firms seem to face a trade-off when introducing monetary rewards since, while they 
are likely to increase the number of submitted ideas, they may also reduce users' collectively 
oriented effort of improving and evaluating other ideas. This is especially worth considering 
since not only the generation of ideas, but also their improvement and filtering are important 
elements of an effective ideation process. In order to foster collective innovation by partici-
pants, firms should perhaps consider more complex monetary incentive schemes than simply 
offering separate monetary rewards for collectively oriented participation, such as offering 
rewards based on the individual impact on other ideas (Toubia, 2006).  
The results indicate that this trade-off may also be faced especially when recruiting par-
ticipants with high personal needs. For these users, both idea submission and collectively ori-
ented participation is contingent less on monetary rewards and more on their expectation of 
useful innovation outcomes. Considering managerial implications based on characteristics of 
participants, I can conclude that organizations that intend to use firm-initiated ideation must 
take both monetary and non-monetary motives into account. Offering a monetary reward may 
motivate people to post or generate more ideas, but it will not enhance the overall effort of 
participation. If organizations are more interested in animated discussions and interactions 
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between customers, they should consider emphasizing the innovative outcome of participa-
tion, e.g., by expressing their willingness to change the status quo. This becomes even more 
important when companies aim to address highly dissatisfied customers in order to benefit 
from their high innovative potential. 
Concerning implications based on the design of ICs, the results of this thesis show that, 
in order to maximize participation in their own ICs, managers have to take their organization-
al form into account. While this may be very easy to accomplish by the majority, it could 
prove challenging for certain firms or organizations that may not know how consumers per-
ceive them, such as associations or the like, which consumers may be unable to clearly identi-
fy as either a for-profit or a non-profit organization. Another important managerial implica-
tion is that that for non-profit organizations the use of monetary rewards in idea co-creation is 
not effective for prosocial tasks, while it is for commercial tasks. Drawing conclusions from 
the implications of the design of ICs, one can summarize that for-profit firms can use mone-
tary incentives both in a commercial setting and in a prosocial idea co-creation task to effec-
tively address consumers and motivate them to participate. Results indicate that idea co-
creation is in fact a good way for firms to practice CSR. For non-profit hosts, incorporating 
monetary rewards in a prosocial setting is not effective, while it can be beneficial when they 
ask for commercial ideas. 
Finally, this thesis comprises managerial implications related to recruitment of partici-
pants and communication of ICs. When IC hosts develop their communication strategy, they 
usually rely on highlighting the monetary benefit of participation, the innovation outcome for 
the individual (e.g., better products), or an image-related reward (e.g., public recognition). 
However, my results imply that highlighting an innovative outcome for others is most effec-
tive in recruiting participants. Therefore, firms should consider rethinking their communica-
tion strategy when addressing consumers to encourage their participation, since it generates 
more attention to focus the communication on consequences for others. The fact that consum-
ers are attracted more easily by the expectation of an innovative outcome for others could also 
imply that consumers do in fact perceive idea co-creation as one way to exhibit prosocial be-
havior and engage for others (see e.g., Grant & Berry, 2011). Hence, consumers believe that 
by sharing their idea they could actually help to generate a benefit for others. Concluding the 
section on implications for communication design, I find that the current practice of highlight-
ing an extrinsic reward for participation is optimal in attracting as many participants as possi-
ble. Where possible, managers should focus on the innovative outcome for others, as this gen-
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erates the most attention. Further, managers should consider the IC topic and how much rele-
vance it has for the addressed participants. For example, when addressing a large crowd of 
consumers, none of whom are customers, it would make sense to assume a low level of rele-
vance and thus focus on a potential gain for others. When addressing their own customers, for 
whom they know that their own product is likely to have a high relevance, they should high-
light the possible decrease in use benefit if customers do not participate in the idea co-creation 
initiative. In addition, the results show that it might be valuable to use customized communi-
cation, delivering different messages to different categories of consumers. 
5.4. Outlook 
This thesis leaves plenty of room for future research with regard to all three papers. Concern-
ing Paper 1 and the motivation of participants, one very promising path of future research 
could be to replicate the study in a different setting. In my setting, the host was a non-profit 
university and results may not necessarily generalize to other (for-profit) hosts in the sense 
that the sponsor type could moderate the importance of certain motives and incentives (see, 
e.g., Aaker et al., 2010). With for-profit hosts, monetary rewards could induce an even more 
competitive nature and thus an even stronger trade-off between individually and collectively 
oriented participation. Further, it is possible that for a certain kind of for-profit host, the ex-
pectation of an innovative outcome could also become more important, for example for-profit 
hosts that have a high-involvement product such as a healthcare device or an important hobby 
device. Moreover, it could be useful to further address the impact of the product category tar-
geted by the IC. 
Similar future research directions are related to the design of the IC itself. Although I 
endeavored to use a typical design for the IC, there may be important design aspects that were 
left out. As the study for Paper 2 shows, both the stereotype of the host and the amount of 
monetary incentives have an impact on participants' behavior. It could be valuable to see 
whether certain other design aspects of ICs, like who selects the winners (an impartial jury or 
the participants themselves), have an impact on participants' fairness perception or act similar 
to an empowerment strategy (e.g., Fuchs & Schreier, 2011). Similar aspects could be relevant 
when taking a closer look at the ideation task itself, in order to verify whether a broad and 
unspecific topic is more beneficial than a potentially more creative constrained task (e.g., Mo-
reau & Dahl, 2005). On the other hand, participants do not have the option of choosing the 
topic they want to work on, which might lower their overall intrinsic motivation (Iyengar & 
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Lepper, 1999). It would be useful to examine whether any such factors evoke certain kinds of 
behavior and whether organizations can direct participants' behavior in the contest by chang-
ing these factors.  
Concerning the role of monetary incentives, it could also prove valuable to examine 
whether the effectiveness of monetary rewards is contingent on the abovementioned factors of 
contest design or is similar for different incentive schemes, such as a collective payment or a 
performance-based component. Another promising aspect could be to examine other tangible 
rewards, e.g., laptops or T-shirts, which is also common practice. This could prove especially 
valuable for non-profit organizations, where prior research on donations and rewards has 
shown that other tangible rewards have a different effect than actual money. Furthermore, the 
question arises how non-profit hosts can actively enhance participation and what the incentive 
structure for their ICs should look like. Since prosocial motivation ultimately focuses on the 
outcome rather than the process (Grant, 2007; 2008) non-profit hosts could perhaps empha-
size their willingness to use the submitted ideas in a different way, e.g., by presenting applica-
tion scenarios, showing who would benefit, and highlighting the reason, in terms of a more 
abstract construal (White et al., 2011). Construal level theory could also prove valuable for 
theoretically extending Paper 3, highlighting how—and why—the benefit for others should be 
generated (White et al., 2011). Finally, it could prove valuable to test whether the nature of 
those others influences consumers in generating benefits for others. This could be the case 
when their type changes to a group with whom the consumers do not identify or to whom they 
may feel little attachment. In that case, their willingness to generate these benefits may be 
lower. Furthermore, it could prove valuable to examine image concerns in generating benefits 
for others, related to the design of the study by White and Peloza (2009). Hence, one could 
analyze whether anonymous or personalized participation in idea co-creation influences the 
generation of benefits for oneself or others. 
From a methodological perspective, this thesis provides opportunities for future re-
search. The approach I chose is limited in that I do not examine the usefulness of the behavior 
in any of the three papers. For example, in Paper 1, I cannot determine whether participants 
generated an idea within the IC or simply shared an idea they had generated earlier. This issue 
is caused by my "real-world" setting, which includes online participation. Examining this ef-
fect in more detail would require a more controlled data collection, for example, in a laborato-
ry experimental setting. Another promising path of future research could involve acquiring 
actual behavior data for Paper 2 and Paper 3, in order to determine whether the identified ef-
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fects are also present with regard to different kinds of behavior. It could be interesting to see 
whether the effect on behavior (quantitative or qualitative) differs for tasks that are intended 
to generate benefits for others, such as prosocial tasks. In addition, future research could ad-
dress individual differences between groups of participants in more detail. By incorporating 
the moderating role of personal need, I provide a first distinction parameter. Future work 
could address other personal traits that influence innovative behavior, for example, use expe-
rience or personal innovativeness (Schreier & Prügl, 2008).  
Concerning the field experimental approach in Paper 3, it could prove valuable to repli-
cate the experimental design within a laboratory setting in order to increase the internal validi-
ty of my approach and have the opportunity to examine the impact of participation on con-
sumers' motives and satisfaction. This could answer questions like whether consumers enjoy 
their participation more when benefits for others are highlighted, or whether they are more 
satisfied with their participation in general, and could also more closely address the relation-
ship between idea co-creation and CSR. Future work could indeed measure the extent to 
which hosting a prosocial ideation contest adds to the firm's brand value or creates a positive 
image for its products.  
Concluding this thesis, I can say that I intended to examine why consumers engage in 
creative behavior through the Internet. I provide first empirical evidence containing actual 
behavior analysis and experimental approaches to this topic. Perhaps the most interesting re-
sult of the thesis is the fact that it shows that, when talking about the usefulness of incentives 
and questioning how to benefit from ICs as a firm, the answer is "it depends." The three pre-
sented papers show boundary conditions of the proposed effects of different motives, but all 
three also provide a wealth of future research directions for these and further boundary condi-
tions. Hence, one cannot exclude any motivational aspect per se; for each category, be it ex-
trinsic, intrinsic, or prosocial, a host has to determine how they could be efficient for him (in 
terms of what he wants to achieve) and how this might affect possible participants (in terms of 
individual preferences). Hopefully, this thesis will serve as a starting point for the develop-
ment of more boundary criteria that can help organizations of all kinds to tailor ICs to their 
needs and benefit from the immense creative potential of consumers. 
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The Ambiguous Role of Monetary Rewards in Ideation with Users 
 
Abstract 
In firm-initiated ideation with users, the hosting organization typically dominates the com-
mercial exploitation of users' ideas. In light of this asymmetric exploitation, offering monetary 
prizes for the best-performing participants or the highest-rated ideas in the sense of a contest 
seems to be a reasonable form of compensation and incentive. However, we question the ef-
fectiveness of monetary rewards and propose two boundary conditions where non-monetary 
benefits proposed in the private-collective model of user innovation better explain participa-
tion: (1) If users' personal involvement and need in the innovation domain is high, an expecta-
tion of a monetary reward is less important because users expect to better internalize collec-
tive innovation outcomes and capture private benefits (non-monetary "compensation effect"). 
(2) If users are supposed to exert effort to collectively oriented activities like commenting on, 
improving, or evaluating other users' ideas, the expectation of monetary rewards is less effec-
tive because it induces rivalry among users ("competition effect"). We find support for these 
hypotheses in an empirical study where user participation in a real ideation project is re-
gressed on survey-based measures of motivating conditions that users perceived prior to the 
contest. We can conclude that monetary rewards can even have detrimental effects in firm-
initiated ideation if the two proposed boundary conditions are taken together. 
 
Keywords: User innovation, idea contests, incentives, motivation 
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Introduction 
New product development (NPD) is a crucial task for companies' long-term success. At the 
very beginning, at the "fuzzy front end of innovation" (e.g., Reid & De Brentani, 2004), NPD 
starts with the creation of promising ideas. For this task, practitioners have recently turned 
their attention on acquiring external knowledge from users and customers (Dahan & Hauser, 
2002; Fuchs & Schreier, 2011; von Hippel, 2005). Idea contests (ICs) are becoming increas-
ingly popular among firms as a means to access customers' creativity (e.g., Bayus, 2011; Eb-
ner et al., 2009, Füller, 2010; Piller & Walcher, 2006).  
Practical examples of ICs are manifold and range from industrial to consumer goods, as 
well as from general, abstract to concrete, specific ideation tasks. For example, SAP AG in-
vited customers to share specific ideas related to their service offering (Ebner et al., 2009). 
Siemens AG asked students for more general ideas on how to realize big cities in deserts. 
Dell's IdeaStorm initiative is a permanent IC that is a standing invitation to customers to share 
their thoughts on the service and product offering of the company on both an abstract and a 
concrete level (Bayus, 2011). 
ICs basically consist of two distinct activities for participants: (1) submitting ideas relat-
ed to a specified topic, and (2) evaluating, commenting on, and improving other participants' 
ideas. The former activity is typically done by individual users, while the latter is a more col-
lectively oriented task where users interact with and assist each other. 
Since ICs are relatively cheap and easy to implement, their number is constantly grow-
ing. This leads to the possibility that a seemingly infinite "crowd" of potential participants 
might become a scarce good in some branches of industry or some topics. Since ideation in 
the form of crowdsourcing relies heavily on researching many parallel paths simultaneously, a 
critical mass of participants is a driver of effectiveness (Benkler, 2002; Boudreau et al., 2011; 
Howe, 2008). Collaboration among users and building on previous contributions in the sense 
of collective and cumulative innovation (Allen, 1983; Scotchmer, 1991) may also be desirable 
in firm-initiated ideation because it may further increase effectiveness by producing less re-
dundant outcomes with improved and more elaborate quality. As a consequence, we believe it 
is necessary to investigate in more detail what expected benefits and motivating conditions 
attract users to firm-initiated ideation projects and how these conditions translate into differ-
ent kinds of behavior, i.e., individually oriented idea submission versus collectively oriented 
activities like evaluating, commenting on, and improving other users' ideas.  
High participation in firm-initiated ideations seems to be challenged by commercial in-
terests of hosting firms that exploit users' revealed ideas. Hence, firms typically try to com-
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pensate und incentivize users by offering monetary and competitive rewards for the best-
performing users or the highest-rated ideas. However, we question the effectiveness of mone-
tary rewards as a general driver of user behavior. We expect a richer picture of incentives that 
drive effective user participation in ideation contests. 
Specifically, we ask the following questions: (1) Do monetary reward expectations ex-
plain user participation when there is an asymmetric commercial exploitation of users' re-
vealed ideas by a hosting organization? (2) Do non-monetary benefit expectations proposed in 
user innovation literature also explain participation in firm-initiated ideation? (3) Do bounda-
ry conditions exist that shift explanatory power from monetary to non-monetary benefit ex-
pectations, e.g., user characteristics or different kinds of participation behavior? 
In order to theoretically guide our investigation of these research questions, we consider 
firm-initiated ideation with users as an example of private-collective user innovation (von 
Hippel & von Krogh, 2003; 2006) that deviates in the fact that one commercial entity predom-
inantly governs the exploitation of users' revealed ideas. To answer these questions empirical-
ly, we seek to explain participation behavior based on a real ideation project. All invited users 
were surveyed on their expected benefits and motivation conditions prior to ideation, in con-
trast to ex post measurement of motivations in previous studies (e.g., Ebner et al., 2009; Fül-
ler, 2010; Piller & Walcher, 2006). We hope to maximize the possibilities for causal inference 
with this approach because it should minimize the threat of a selection bias caused by the ex-
clusion of non-participants and rule out the possibility of respondents rationalizing their an-
swers ex post in a socially desirable way. 
In our results, we find support for two hypothesized boundary conditions where ex-
pected monetary rewards are less effective and non-monetary benefits proposed in the private-
collective innovation model better explain participation behavior: (1) If users' personal in-
volvement and need in the innovation domain is high, then they expect to better internalize 
the collective innovation outcome and capture private benefits from it, so that a compensation 
through monetary rewards is less important. (2) The expectation of monetary rewards may 
induce competition among users and thereby reduce the amount of effort that users allocate to 
collectively oriented activities like commenting on, improving, or evaluating other users' ide-
as. 
The theoretical contribution of this study is a more detailed explanation of user innova-
tion behavior in "hybrid innovation settings" (Harhoff & Mayrhofer, 2010) where dominant 
entities with commercial interests interact with communities of innovating users. Our expla-
nation is based on behavioral economics and psychology literature on the boundaries of 
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monetary and competitive reward structures in fostering the provision of public goods as well 
as cooperative and prosocial behavior (e.g., Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Vohs et al., 2006) 
with the non-monetary motivating conditions put forward in the user innovation literature and 
specifically in the private-collective action model by von Hippel and von Krogh (2003; 2006). 
In terms of managerial contribution, we hope to shed light on an important trade-off that 
practitioners should consider when implementing ideation projects with customers: While 
raising the number of ideas submitted, offering monetary rewards may at the same time erode 
collectively oriented participation and may be less effective in attracting users with extensive 
personal involvement and needs—a characteristic often associated with the most innovative 
"lead users" (Franke et al., 2006). 
 
 
Theoretical background 
User innovation and the private-collective innovation model 
In order to theoretically guide our investigation of these research questions, we conceive firm-
initiated ideation with users as an instance of user innovation and, more specifically, as an 
instance of private-collective user innovation (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003; 2006). Re-
search has dealt extensively with the question of why users become innovative as individuals 
(see Bogers et al., 2010; O'Hern & Rindfleisch, 2010, for recent reviews). Von Hippel (1976; 
1986) was among the first to identify unmet personal needs as the dominant driver of autono-
mous innovation by users. Users' strongest motivation to engage in innovative activities re-
sults from their desire to get their own problem solved, not from the desire to earn money 
(von Hippel, 2005). Instead of selling their innovations like manufacturers do, users benefit 
from using their self-developed products. Innovating users have been found in the industrial 
goods sector (von Hippel, 1986) as well as the consumer goods sector (e.g., Franke & Shah, 
2003). Accordingly, unsatisfied personal needs and the desire or expectation to fulfill them 
have been identified as one key characteristic of lead users (Herstatt & von Hippel, 1992; 
Schreier & Prügl, 2008; Urban & von Hippel, 1986).  
In addition to innovating, lead users have also been shown to freely reveal their innova-
tions to other firms or the public (von Hippel, 2005). This may seem irrational at first glance, 
but can be explained by a utility-maximizing aspect, as users can expect further diffusion and 
improvement of their innovation by other users and firms (Harhoff et al., 2003). Users do 
even innovate in collective settings where they have to expect externalities beyond their con-
trol. These collective or community settings of simultaneously and jointly innovating have 
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arisen due to advances in information and communication technology and the rise of the In-
ternet (von Hippel, 2005). The most prominent example of this form is open-source software 
development (OSS), where many users unite and create a complex but freely available soft-
ware program (Lakhani & von Hippel, 2003).  
Studying OSS, von Hippel and von Krogh (2003; 2006) observe that the two predomi-
nant traditional models of "private investment" and "collective action" are insufficient. The 
private model assumes that market players innovate by investing their own resources and ap-
propriate rents from this investment, either through intellectual property rights or direct mone-
tary compensation. However, in OSS, users invest private resources, but receive no rights or 
compensations in exchange. In contrast, the collective action model seeks to explain the pro-
vision of public goods that typically are non-excludable and non-rival, thus in danger of ex-
cessive free-riding. According to the collective action model, these public goods nevertheless 
come to existence due to careful recruiting of participants as well as the encouragement and 
motivation of contributions over free-riding. However, in OSS, no efforts are made to careful-
ly recruit contributors because scores of users self-select their contributions, but also free-ride 
at any time and on any piece of code (cf. von Hippel & von Krogh, 2003). 
Accordingly, von Hippel and von Krogh (2003) propose a private-collective innovation 
model that deviates from the private investment model in that users, as opposed to selling 
manufacturers, do not necessarily expect a monetary reward in return for their innovations. 
This may be due to low competition among users or low expected profits from selling their 
innovations. This is in line with the previous arguments in favor of innovating users. 
On the other hand, the private-collective innovation model also deviates from collective 
action in that freely revealed user innovations are not always perfectly public such that free-
riders can benefit from them to the same extent. Private benefits can even arise from largely 
collective innovation outcomes if users are able to better adapt the outcome to their private 
and own personal need. This influence can only happen by means of their own participation 
and contribution. In consequence, the collective innovation outcome may be more adapted to 
revealing and contributing users rather than to free-riders. In addition to the benefits that stem 
from expected private captures of the innovation outcomes, there are other potential benefits 
that may accrue uniquely to contributors rather than free-riders, i.e., reputational gains or in-
trinsic enjoyment from being innovative (e.g., Lakhani & Wolf, 2005).  
In line with the private-collective innovation model, we argue that firm-initiated idea-
tion with a user community is a collective innovation setting where user contributions are 
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subject to externalities. That users nevertheless contribute is also due to expected non-
monetary benefits which occur to participants rather than free-riders. In particular, users bene-
fit to a larger extent from the collective innovation outcome than free-riders even though the 
latter may formally have the same access. This is because users can more extensively adapt 
the innovation outcome to their personal need by means of their own participation and thus 
capture a larger, more customized part of the innovation outcome. 
Compared to free-riders, users may even benefit individually from their participation in 
terms of reputational gains or intrinsic enjoyment. In line with the user innovation logic, we 
would expect that the extent of these private benefits users expect to capture from participa-
tion positively depends on their involvement and especially their unsatisfied personal need in 
the innovation domain. This leads to our first hypothesis: 
H1: The influence of expected non-monetary benefits (innovation outcome, enjoyment, 
reputation) on user participation in firm-initiated ideation is larger for users with high 
personal need. 
 
The (ambiguous) role of monetary rewards 
Monetary incentives seem to play a minor role for user innovation, especially when other us-
ers are likely to develop similar ideas and innovations, or when the expected profits from pri-
vate appropriation are low (von Hippel & von Krogh, 2006). As opposed to technical prob-
lem-solving tasks (Terwiesch & Xu, 2008) submissions to firm-initiated ideation projects typ-
ically tend to have a low specificity and degree of elaboration (Piller & Walcher, 2006). 
Therefore, monetary incentives may not be necessary. 
The question is whether this also is true in firm-initiated ideation, where one predomi-
nant entity (the hosting firm) governs the exploitation of the innovation output, as opposed to 
settings where this is done collectively by users. Harhoff and Mayrhofer (2010, p. 173) de-
scribe such settings as "hybrid innovation forms" where "one entity systematically and repeat-
edly capitalizes commercially on freely revealed innovations generated by a user community." 
User participation in hybrid settings may be challenged by this asymmetric commercial ex-
ploitation of users' revealed ideas. Harhoff and Mayrhofer (2010) therefore highlight the role 
of perceived fairness, mostly in terms of a fair distribution of outcome, in order to sustain 
stable conditions. Accordingly, firms typically try to compensate und incentivize users by 
offering monetary and competitive rewards for the best-performing users or the highest-rated 
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ideas. However, we propose to qualify the effectiveness of monetary rewards with the above 
insights from the user innovation phenomenon which grounds in users' unmet needs and their 
desire to solve their own problems (von Hippel, 2005). If users' personal involvement and 
needs in the innovation domain are high, an expectation of monetary rewards is deemed less 
important, because users can expect to internalize collective innovation outcomes and capture 
private benefits to a larger extent. We therefore hypothesize a "non-monetary compensation 
effect." 
H2: The influence of expected monetary rewards on user participation in firm-initiated 
ideation is smaller for users with high personal need. 
 
Despite the general effectiveness of (sufficiently high) monetary rewards to compensate 
for effort (Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000), prior research in behavioral economics and psycholo-
gy has produced quite useful insights into the boundaries of monetary rewards for diverse 
tasks and settings. On this basis, we aim at examining the effectiveness of monetary rewards 
in firm-initiated ideation as well. Specifically, we examine the effect of monetary incentives 
based on three streams of literature that relate to central aspects of firm-initiated ideation: (1) 
rewards and creativity, since users are supposed to generate novel ideas, (2) competitive re-
ward structures in the form of tournaments, since users are also likely to compete against each 
other to win the contest, and (3) rewards and prosocial behavior, since users are supposed to 
collectively contribute to a common innovation outcome. 
Creativity is strongly believed to stem from high levels of intrinsic motivation (e.g., 
Amabile et al., 1996; Burroughs et al., 2011). Many authors have highlighted the negative 
impact of monetary incentives in terms of crowding out intrinsic motivation (e.g., Deci et al., 
1999, Eisenberger & Shannock, 2003; Ryan & Deci, 2000). However, Borroughs et al. (2011) 
find that, with specific creativity training, the negative effect of monetary rewards on intrinsic 
creativity actually turns positive. And for ideation tasks, Toubia (2006) finds that properly 
designed incentive structures can have a highly positive effect on the outcome of an ideation 
session. In addition, Piller and Walcher (2006) find that users have often developed their ideas 
in advance and already have them in mind when entering an ideation contest just to share 
them. As such, monetary rewards have limited potential to disturb the creative focus of partic-
ipants.  
The literature on tournaments in general indicates that a competitive reward structure 
can lead to highly efficient outcomes (e.g., Lazear & Rosen, 1981; Prendergast, 1999). Espe-
cially in firm-initiated ideation, it has been shown to be a major motivator for participants to 
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exert effort (Füller, 2010; Piller & Walcher, 2006). However, this effort is likely to be focused 
on individually oriented behavior of submitting ideas as a dominant strategy to increase the 
likelihood of winning the competition. Studies have shown that, besides positive effects, a 
competitive incentive can lower the trust between individuals (Ferrin & Dirks, 2003), crowd 
out voluntary cooperation between individuals (Irlenbusch & Ruchala, 2008), and even lead 
to intentional malicious behavior such as sabotage (Harbring & Irlenbusch, 2008). Hence, 
inducing a tournament-style competition among participants may indeed lead to a higher indi-
vidual performance, but in turn may decrease collective action. 
This assumption also finds support in the literature on rewards and prosocial behavior 
and the provision of public goods. When people are supposed to engage in social activities, 
offering monetary incentives may have a negative effect, since it undermines the prosocial 
motivation to perform that task (e.g., Ariely et al., 2009; Benabou & Tirole, 2006). As 
Benabou and Tirole (2006) highlight, "rewards […] create doubt about the true motive for 
which good deeds are performed, and this 'overjustification effect' can induce a partial or even 
net crowding out of prosocial behavior by extrinsic rewards" (p. 1652). Ariely et al. (2009) 
show that the mere presence of monetary incentives makes people think about how others 
perceive their behavior—as "doing good or doing well." Heyman and Ariely (2004) show that 
the effectiveness of monetary incentives depends on the setting in which they are offered: In 
social markets, where exchange is based on social norms, their effect is negative, whereas in 
money markets, where exchange is based on economic principles, monetary incentives have a 
positive effect. In firm-initiated ideation, these two settings could be associated with user-to-
user and user-to-firm relationships, respectively. 
All in all, monetary rewards can induce fiercer competition. The expectation of high 
levels of competition among users may in turn impede high levels of participation (Boudreau 
et al., 2011). At a minimum, a competitive mode may incentivize users to focus on their own 
ideas and crowd out their collective orientation of helping fellow participants. This speaks in 
favor of monetary rewards when it comes to the individually oriented effort of idea submis-
sions, but against monetary rewards when it comes to the collectively oriented effort of com-
menting on, evaluating, and improving other users' ideas. Rather than in absolute terms, we 
prefer to formulate the corresponding hypotheses about the different effects of expected mon-
etary rewards on individually and collectively oriented behavior in relation to non-monetary 
benefits: 
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H3a: The influence of expected monetary rewards on users' individually oriented par-
ticipation to submit an idea is larger than the effect of expected non-monetary benefits 
(innovation outcome, enjoyment, reputation). 
 
H3b: The influence of expected monetary rewards on users' collectively oriented partic-
ipation is smaller than the effect of the expected non-monetary benefits (innovation out-
come, enjoyment, reputation). 
 
The following figure summarizes the research framework of this study. 
 
Figure 1: —Research framework 
 
Data and measures 
In order to test our hypotheses, we collected data in two stages: The first stage measured mo-
tivating conditions and expected benefits of participation, while the second stage gathered 
behavior data in form of a field study. The first stage consisted of a survey among students at 
a major German university to investigate their intention to participate in a hypothetical IC on 
improving student services and study infrastructure at that university. We purposely chose the 
university setting, since it resembles a case that allows for an analysis of all aspects of our 
theoretical considerations. Students in Germany are typically customers of the university's 
educational service offering, for which they pay a semiannual fee, which shows a clear cus-
tomer and user relationship.  
In this IC, the university (the host) is the dominating entity that is capable of exploiting 
the students' (the users') ideas related to their service offering (the topic asked for). In this 
setting, the students can also clearly see the exploitative interest and get a clear impression of 
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how the university could use that to generate profit, since the study conditions are directly 
related to the university's key offering as a service provider.  
Next to this, the setting also allows for non-monetary compensation effects, as men-
tioned in the previous section. In certain settings of firm-initiated ideation, such as in prob-
lem-solving contests (e.g., Boudreau et al., 2011), there is no chance of non-monetary com-
pensation effects, since those contests are often anonymous (with no peer recognition and 
reputational gains possible), and participants often do not benefit from the innovative out-
come. In contrast, our setting allows users to easily perceive the opportunity of non-monetary 
compensation effects, since they can easily imagine potential peer recognition from fellow 
students, whom they may even know, and they may benefit directly from the innovative out-
come, i.e., the improvement in the host's offering.  
Our sample consisted of a total of 1,015 students in 20 different fields of study. All of 
them attended the class on principles of management, which was a mandatory class for stu-
dents in early semesters. All students received a personalized invitation link to the online sur-
vey. No formal incentives or credits were awarded for participating in the survey. Overall, the 
survey had 585 (57.64%) participants of whom 470 (46.31%) completed the survey, which 
can be considered a good result. 32.8% of the participants were female and 67.2% male, 
which is representative of the university's student population. The mean age was approximate-
ly 21.89 years. Gender, age, and the time enrolled at the university were used as controls for 
the model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2a: Screenshot of the ideation platform (university logo blurred; text anonymized and partially translated) 
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Figure 2b: Screenshot of the ideation platform (text anonymized and partially translated) 
 
The research setting was designed to capture real expectations and motivations. Partici-
pants were asked about their intentions and attitudes towards participating in a hypothetical 
upcoming contest. The invitations were sent online and answered ahead (four weeks) of the 
real contest. Upon completing the questionnaire, participants were informed that the real con-
test would take place. 
To measure our constructs, we built on existing scales which we modified slightly to 
suit our purposes. Reputation, enjoyment, and monetary reward expectations were derived 
and adapted from OSS literature (Hars & Ou, 2002; Roberts et al., 2006). We measured per-
sonal need with scales adapted from Franke et al. (2006). The innovative outcome scale was 
adapted from Zirger and Maidique (1990) as well as Dellaert and Dabholkar (2009). All moti-
vational constructs were measured with multiple items on a five-point Likert scale anchored 
with "I fully disagree" and "I fully agree." A more detailed table of all constructs and items 
can be found in the Appendix.  
In the pursuit of validating the measures, we first conducted exploratory factor and reli-
ability analyses. The intended factors could be extracted from all constructs. Next, we con-
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ducted a confirmatory factor analysis with all model constructs. Overall, the CFA model 
showed an excellent fit ([χ2 = 118.36, df = 80, χ2/df = 1.478], root mean square error of ap-
proximation [RMSEA] = 0.032, non-normed fit index [NNFI] = 0.981, and comparative fit 
index [CFI] = 0.986). 
In order to prove our assumptions about the effect on behavior, in the second stuy an actual IC 
was conducted, with the topic "What services or products could the university offer to im-
prove your study conditions?" In order to achieve a certain amount of generalizability of re-
sults, an IC design was chosen that is common in real-world applications. Following a similar 
rewarding approach as Toubia (2006), we offered monetary incentives for posting ideas as 
well as for the overall effort. We used six Amazon coupons as monetary incentives, three for 
the best ideas (€300, €200, and €100, respectively), as well as three more for the best support-
ers (€50 each), to be awarded to the participants who submitted the most comments and eval-
uations, in order to incentivize other activities. To combine the survey data with the behavior 
data from the contest, the same 1,015 students from the first study were included in the analy-
sis. 241 people from this sample logged into the contest at least once. Of these, 79 users had 
not participated in the survey and were therefore excluded from the analysis. This led to a 
total of 162 valid participants. The average age of the valid participants was 21.74 years. 
72.84% of the participants were male and 27.16% female, which is comparable to the ratio of 
the first study. 
To measure individual idea generation behavior, we built a binary variable that states 
whether or not a participant posted an idea in the IC. The variable was labeled ID_YN. In 
order to capture the collective participation effort, a behavioral count variable was built. The 
variable included all activities related to the collectively oriented, supportive functionalities of 
the contest tool. This includes all comments made and all evaluations given and was therefore 
labeled ACT_CE.  
To choose the right kind of regression for the count variable, we followed the recom-
mendations of Chin and Quddus (2003): Zero inflation was assessed by means of the Vuong 
statistic (1989), showing that zero-inflation was present in both count models (3 and 4). Addi-
tionally, the overdispersion parameter α was found highly significant. Hence, we used a zero-
inflated negative binominal regression. 
There has been a recent debate about the interpretability of effects based on coefficients 
in non-linear models, especially if variables appear more than once in interaction terms or 
models with more than one regression equation, like in our case (cf. Ai & Norton, 2003; 
Greene, 2010; Hoetker, 2007). Ai and Norton (2003) argue that interpreting the effects of in-
68 
 
 
 
teracted variables or interaction terms in terms of significance and sign is impossible based on 
coefficients alone or even based on marginal effects if one does not take into account that 
involved variables appear in both main and interaction terms. Hence, Ai and Norton (2003) 
suggest using partial and cross-partial derivatives to obtain these effects. 
Commenting to this procedure, Greene (2010) questions whether hypothesis testing 
should be conducted at the level of (cross-)partial or marginal effects at all, since these effects 
are a function of all data and all coefficients. He recommends plotting interaction effects to 
interpret them in post-estimation analysis, but leaving hypothesis testing to the estimation 
stage.  
We ultimately combined both approaches for our analysis of the interaction effects. For 
our study, we obtained the partial derivatives of the respective conditional mean functions 
(probit and zero-inflated negative binomial) with respect to the expected benefits, and the 
cross-partial derivatives with respect to the moderator variable "personal need" in such a way 
that it recognizes non-linearity and all interaction terms. In addition, the significance of these 
effects was assessed using the Delta method (Greene, 2010). All values of the average mar-
ginal main effects and respective 95% confidence intervals were plotted over the range of the 
moderator variable “personal need” in order to visualize the effect size of the moderation. 
When both confidence intervals are above zero for a specific value, the interaction effect is 
positive, while it is negative when both confidence intervals are below zero for a specific val-
ue. If the confidence intervals are not both either above or below zero, the interaction effect is 
not significant.  
 
 
Results 
Concerning the probit models (Models 1 and 2), we find that the sole influence with a signifi-
cant impact on idea generation behavior is the monetary reward expectation, while the expec-
tation of non-monetary rewards like enjoyment, reputational gains, or an expected innovative 
outcome does not have a significant effect. An analysis of the interaction effects shows that 
monetary reward expectation is negatively moderated by personal need, while the non-
monetary rewards like enjoyment or innovative outcome expectation are positively moderat-
ed. For the count models (Models 3 and 4), we find that the non-monetary innovative outcome 
expectation is the only driver of collectively oriented behavior. Again, most personal need–
related interaction terms show significant effects. While this is positive for the non-monetary 
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reward expectations, i.e., enjoyment and innovative outcome, it is negative for monetary re-
ward expectations. Hence, we find a first indication of support for our hypotheses H1 and H2. 
 
Table 1: Regression tables 
An analysis of the plots of the average marginal effects (AME) yields interesting results, 
which partially oppose the results derived from the sole interpretation of the marginal effect. 
For the probit models, the AME of an expected monetary reward is positive for all values of 
personal need and significant for all values besides the highest ones. Consequently, monetary 
reward expectations have a positive impact on the probability of submitting an idea. For non-
monetary rewards, the AME plots show that the impact on the probability of submitting an 
idea is negative for low values of personal need, while it is positive for high values of person-
al need, although only marginally significant. An analysis of the AME plot of the difference 
between monetary and non-monetary reward expectations shows that the effect of monetary 
Model
Dependent variable
(Regression)
Independent variables Parameter (S .E.) Parameter (S .E.) Parameter (S .E.) Parameter (S .E.)
Motivating conditions
Monetary reward 0,341 *** (0,131) 1,671 *** (0,645) 0,057 (0,068) 0,984 ** (0,428)
Innovation outcome 0,111 (0,146) -1,387 * (0,779) 0,332 *** (0,091) -0,950 *** (0,320)
Reputational gain -0,199 (0,166) 0,775 (0,867) 0,072 (0,074) -0,889 *** (0,345)
Intrinsic enjoyment 0,053 (0,151) -1,545 * (0,792) 0,048 (0,087) -0,099 (0,336)
Personal need (PN) 0,036 (0,100) -0,664 (0,547) 0,123 ** (0,061) -1,043 *** (0,331)
Moderating effects
PN * monetary reward -0,309 ** (0,148) -0,234 ** (0,096)
PN * innovation outcome 0,356 ** (0,179) 0,307 *** (0,088)
PN * reputational gain -0,208 (0,197) 0,243 *** (0,084)
PN * intrinsic enjoyment 0,375 ** (0,182) 0,044 (0,076)
Controls
Gender [female = 1] 0,040 (0,106) -0,003 (0,111) 0,181 *** (0,060) 0,059 * (0,032)
Age [years] 0,003 (0,031) 0,000 (0,031) -0,024 * (0,012) -0,031 *** (0,010)
Semester [count] -0,048 (0,049) -0,051 (0,052) -0,070 *** (0,023) -0,027 * (0,016)
Constant -2,770 *** (0,873) -0,199 (2,254) -1,261 *** (0,378) 3,483 *** (1,321)
Overdispersion (α) 9,679 *** (0,765) 9,640 *** (0,420)
Zero inflation (τ) -2,239 *** (0,646) -5,201 *** (1,655)
No of obs.
Parameters (k)
Log likelihood (1)
Log likelihood (k)
Chi-square * *** *** ***
McFadden R2
Two-tailed t-tests; * < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
0,062 0,121 0,760 0,765
-96,941 -90,812 -404,744 -396,915
12,808 25,066 2.564,873 2.580,532
9 13 11 15
-103,345 -103,345 -1.687,181 -1.687
(Probit) (Zero-inflated negative binomial)
470 470 470 470
I II III IV
Individually oriented participation Collectively oriented participation
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reward expectations on idea generation behavior is indeed stronger than the sum of the non-
monetary ones. This confirms hypotheses H3a. In addition, it shows that the effect is weaker 
for participants with high personal need, which strengthens H1.  
 
Figure 3: Average marginal effects of expected monetary and non-monetary benefits as a function of personal need 
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The results are similar for the count models. The AME plots show that the expected 
monetary reward has a marginally significant positive impact for participants with very low 
personal need, while this effect is significantly negative for participants with a high level of 
personal need. 
Similar aspects apply to the role of non-monetary reward expectations. Their effect on 
collectively oriented participation is significantly negative for participants with low personal 
need, but positive for participants with high personal need. Finally, the AME plot of the dif-
ference between monetary and non-monetary reward expectations shows that, while the effect 
of monetary reward expectations is significantly stronger for participants with low personal 
need, it is considerably weaker than the non-monetary reward expectations for participants 
with high personal need. This confirms H2 and H3b. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
 
 
Discussion and implications 
This study aims to answer the following questions: (1) Can monetary reward expectations 
explain user participation in firm-initiated ideation when there is an asymmetric commercial 
exploitation of users' revealed ideas by a hosting organization? (2) Can non-monetary benefit 
expectations proposed in user innovation literature also explain participation in firm-initiated 
ideation? (3) Do boundary conditions exist that shift explanatory power from monetary to 
non-monetary benefit expectations, e.g., user characteristics or different kinds of participation 
behavior? 
Concerning the first question and the role of monetary rewards, we find that the expec-
tation of a monetary reward is, on average, the sole driver of the probability of submitting an 
Mean Std.Dev. Min Max (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(1) Individually oriented participation 0,12 0,23 0 1 0,40 0,14 0,07 0,03 0,06 0,03 0,02 -0,01 -0,06
(2) Collectively oriented participation 1,23 7,17 0 134 0,07 0,11 0,12 0,04 0,08 0,05 -0,04 -0,05
(3) Monetary reward 3,08 0,95 1 5 0,35 0,52 0,40 0,02 0,03 -0,01 -0,19
(4) Innovation outcome 3,54 0,80 1 5 0,48 0,44 0,09 -0,05 0,04 -0,05
(5) Reputational gain 3,07 0,78 1 5 0,50 0,00 0,06 -0,06 -0,12
(6) Intrinsic enjoyment 3,19 0,81 1 5 0,10 -0,07 0,06 -0,04
(7) Personal need 3,85 0,98 1 5 -0,07 0,10 0,02
(8) Gender 0,34 0,94 -1 1 0,01 0,10
(9) Age 21,89 3,12 18 51 0,50
(10) Semester 2,52 3,21 1 21
Variable
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idea. Hence, firm-initiated ideation deviates from UI/OSS models such as the private-
collective innovation model. A predominant entity that governs ideation (in this case, the 
firm) must introduce a monetary reward to induce users to reveal their ideas. While creativity 
theory would speak against the relevance of monetary rewards and for the importance of in-
trinsic enjoyment, we find opposing results to some degree.  
On the other hand, expected monetary rewards on average do not seem to encourage 
collectively oriented participation behavior, which appears to confirm our assumption that 
monetary incentives foster competition, thus lowering incentives for collectively oriented par-
ticipation. This is underlined by our study setting, since in this specific ideation project com-
menting on, improving, and evaluating other users' ideas was also incentivized by monetary 
rewards in our IC. Concerning the second research question regarding the role of non-
monetary reward expectations, we find that the expectations proposed by the UI/OSS litera-
ture are not capable of explaining users' participation behavior in general. While they have no 
impact on idea generation behavior, they affect collectively oriented participation, but only in 
terms of the innovative outcome expectations. However, non-monetary expectations are capa-
ble of explaining the participation behavior of participants with strong personal need. Hence, 
personal need provides a boundary condition that reinforces the role of non-monetary rewards 
and diminishes the effect of monetary rewards. When experiencing a strong personal need, 
participants benefit from non-monetary benefits such as enjoyment (for idea generation be-
havior) and peer recognition (for collectively oriented participation). This is in line with our 
assumptions, as well as with prior research on OSS.  
This effect holds for both kinds of behavior. For idea-sharing behavior, the importance 
of monetary rewards is lower for users who have a strong personal need and thus an interest in 
the innovation outcome. Users with a strong personal need also seem to expect some intrinsic 
enjoyment when articulating their ideas. For collectively oriented participation behavior, both 
non-monetary interests of users in the innovation outcome and personal needs are of the ut-
most relevance. In addition, for users with strong personal need, monetary rewards seem to be 
even detrimental for collectively oriented participation. As another strong interaction effect, 
the importance of users' expected innovation outcome is even stronger when they also per-
ceive a strong personal need. This implies that collectively oriented participation is partly 
driven by users' motives to adapt the innovation outcome to their personal needs, as proposed 
by user innovation theory and the private-collective innovation model. This aspect is further 
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strengthened by the results of the examination of the difference between monetary and non-
monetary rewards. 
A secondary driver of collectively oriented participation that is especially important for 
users with a strong personal need is reputational gain. This is interesting since UI/OSS and 
firm-initiated ideation deviate in terms of the time horizon. Many studies on OSS (and related 
fields such as online forums) relate the positive effect to the long-term character. But even in 
relatively short-term activities like firm-initiated ideation, people are willing to invest more 
effort due to expectation of recognition from other participants. We do not, however, find that 
intrinsic enjoyment plays a role in collectively oriented participation. 
In conclusion, we find significant differences in patterns of motivation in idea genera-
tion that address different behavioral aspects. By examining the probability of submitting an 
idea as well as the collectively oriented effort, we intended to cover two different types of 
participation. Both aspects are important to consider when companies deal with the question 
of how to design their ideation activities with customers. We find that both monetary and non-
monetary expectations play an important role in explaining users' and customers' participation 
behavior. Surprisingly, none of the motives we analyzed is capable of explaining both kinds 
of behavior.  
The results seem to confirm our assumption that monetary rewards act as compensation 
rather than an incentive. People are only willing to submit an idea if they are sufficiently and 
personally compensated for doing so. However, if they believe that their participation has an 
impact and that they can contribute to an innovative outcome, they are willing to invest much 
more into a collectively oriented effort, helping other participants.  
Concerning the theoretical implications of this paper, these results give another example 
of a positive effect of monetary rewards on idea generation behavior of customers. In addi-
tion, we provide evidence of different patterns of motivation for different types of innovative 
behavior. Further, we give a first empirical explanation of users' innovative behavior in "hy-
brid innovation" (Harhoff & Mayrhofer, 2010), i.e., settings where entities with commercial 
interests asymmetrically exploit the output of innovative user communities. Hence, we show 
that customers are willing to contribute to an innovative outcome even when the possibility of 
improving it is rather short-term, and even when the exploitation is governed by a dominant 
host. In addition, we provide empirical evidence and contribute to literature by showing 
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boundaries of monetary and competitive reward structures in ideation and innovation settings 
and highlighting their ambiguous role. 
For managers, our results have implications on the design of firm-initiated ideation as 
well as the recruitment of participants. Firms seem to face a trade-off when using perfor-
mance-based monetary rewards in a contest-like fashion. While monetary rewards are likely 
to increase the number of submitted ideas, they may also reduce users' collectively oriented 
effort of commenting on, improving, and evaluating other ideas. This trade-off may be worth 
bearing in mind since it is not just the number of generated ideas, but also their improvement, 
consolidation, and filtering that is important for an effective ideation process. In order to 
stimulate a more cumulative process of ideation with users, firms should possibly consider 
more complex monetary incentive schemes than simply offering separate monetary rewards 
for collectively oriented participation (cf. Toubia, 2006). 
Our results indicate that this trade-off may also be eased by recruiting participants with 
high personal need, e.g., by using certain invitation framings that emphasize users' opportuni-
ty to articulate their personal needs. For those users, both idea submission and collectively 
oriented participation is contingent less on monetary rewards and more on their expectation of 
useful innovation outcomes. Furthermore, firms can choose and frame an ideation theme in a 
way that makes collective interest in the innovation outcome more salient, as our results show 
that this interest evokes more altruistic and collectively oriented behavior. 
We conclude that organizations that intend to use firm-initiated ideation must take mon-
etary as well as non-monetary motives into account. Offering a prize may incentivize people 
to post or generate more ideas, but it does not increase the overall effort of participation. If 
organizations are more interested in frequent discussions and interactions between customers, 
they should consider fostering the innovative outcome of participation (e.g., by emphasizing 
their willingness to change the status quo). This becomes even more important when compa-
nies aim to address highly dissatisfied customers in order to benefit from their high innovative 
potential. 
 
 
Limitations and outlook 
Of course, the results generated in this study have some limitations. First, we only measured 
quantitative behavior, meaning that we can answer questions about how much effort partici-
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pants invested or whether they contributed an idea, but we cannot determine how useful that 
participation was. Our approach thus cannot distinguish the quality of participation among 
participants, e.g., exploring whether higher private benefits lead to higher-quality ideas1. Fur-
ther research is needed that addresses this issue, providing insights on what type of motivation 
evokes desirable or good behavior in firm-initiated ideation.  
Second, our research setting could have some limitations, since the scenario was univer-
sity-based. Although we purposely chose the setting since it offers both an exploitative inter-
est of the host and the possibility of non-monetary compensation effects, we cannot truly say 
whether the setting influences one or the other. One could argue that the exploitation interest 
of a university is slightly different from that of a for-profit host. The university setting might 
also overestimate non-monetary compensation effects. We cannot truly exclude these issues. 
Hence, replicating this study in several other commercial settings could shed light on this is-
sue. However, we do not see many downsides to the fact that the users in our settings are stu-
dents, since targeting students as participants in ICs is common practice. 
The main limitation of this study, however, is that it covers only one ideation project 
and, more importantly, only one kind of sponsor—in our case, a public university. Findings 
may not necessarily generalize to other sponsors in the sense that the sponsor type could mod-
erate the importance of certain motives and incentives (see, e.g., Aaker et al., 2010). With for-
profit sponsors, monetary rewards may perhaps induce an even more competitive nature and 
sharper trade-off between individually and collectively oriented participation, while the inter-
est in the collective innovation outcome may be less important. Instead of pure correlational 
approaches, future research should manipulate the salience of monetary rewards, personal 
needs, and collective innovation interest through factors like incentive schemes, types of 
sponsor, and ideation domains in (field) experiments to more rigorously show their effect on 
different facets of participation.   
Similar limitations arise from the method itself. Although we endeavored to use a com-
mon setting for the IC, there may be important design aspects that had to be left out. It could, 
e.g., be interesting to see whether results differ for different types of hosts. Related to this, it 
could be valuable to see whether certain design aspects of ICs, like who selects the winners 
(an impartial jury or the participants themselves), have an impact on participants' perception 
of fairness or act similar to an empowerment strategy (e.g., Fuchs & Schreier, 2011). Similar 
                                                 
1 We did in fact measure the quality of ideas generated by letting three independent judges evaluate them, but we 
were not able to find significant results for the impact of motives on idea quality. 
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aspects could be relevant when taking a closer look at the ideation task itself in order to verify 
whether a broad, unspecific topic is more beneficial than a more creative, contained task (Mo-
reau & Dahl, 2005). On the other hand, participants do not have the option of choosing the 
topic they want to work on, which could lower their overall intrinsic motivation (Iyengar & 
Lepper, 1999). It would be useful to examine whether any such factors evoke certain types of 
behavior and whether by changing these factors organizations can direct participants' behavior 
in the contest.  
Another limitation arises from the fact that, due to our method of data collection, we 
cannot say whether participants generated an idea or just shared the idea. This issue is caused 
by our "real-world" setting, which includes online participation. Examining this effect in more 
detail would require a more controlled data collection, for example, in an experimental labora-
tory setting. Another promising path of future research could deal with disentangling the col-
lective benefit perception and measuring the extent to which it consists of personal benefits 
and benefits for others (e.g., White & Peloza, 2009). It could be interesting to see whether the 
effect on behavior (quantitative or qualitative) differs for tasks that are intended to generate 
benefits for others, for example prosocial tasks.   
Finally, future research could address differences between groups of participants in 
more detail. By incorporating the moderating role of personal need, we provide a first distinc-
tion parameter. Future work could address other personal traits that influence innovative be-
havior, such as use experience or personal innovativeness (Schreier & Prügl, 2008). 
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Appendix A: Measures 
A.1 Exploratory factor analysis 
Construct: Personal need; Cronbach α = .79; explained variance = 70.2% 
Item: statement* Item-to-total 
Need1: I am dissatisfied with some aspects of my studies. .548 
Need2: There is still substantial room for improvement in XXX's study conditions. .633 
Need3: Something has to change to make me completely satisfied with my studies. .708 
Construct: Monetary reward; Cronbach α = .72; explained variance = 78.3% 
Mon1: I have the chance to win attractive awards. .566 
Mon2: The chance to win the award for the best idea is a great incentive. .566 
Construct: Innovative outcome; Cronbach α = .82; explained variance = 73.1% 
Outc1: This idea contest will bring about necessary changes for XXX. .612 
Outc2: This idea contest will make a contribution to XXX's development. .712 
Outc3: This idea contest will influence XXX's development. .732 
Construct: Reputational gain; Cronbach α = .80; explained variance = 62.9% 
Rep1: I can make a good impression with my participation. .615 
Rep2: Others will become aware of me. .619 
Rep3: I can impress others with my ideas.  .604 
Rep4: I can present myself as a key member of XXX. .747 
Construct: Intrinsic enjoyment; Cronbach α = .83; explained variance = 75.2% 
Enj1: Participation is very exciting. .674 
Enj2: Participation is great fun. .734 
Enj3: Participation is very entertaining. .677 
Enj4: Participation is a good pastime. a .488 
* All items were rated on five-point Likert scales and anchored "strongly disagree"—"strongly agree." 
a Item was deleted in further analysis. 
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A.2 Confirmatory factor analysis 
Construct: Personal need 
Item Item reliabil-ity 
Item loading 
(stand.) t-value 
Construct 
reliability 
Explained 
variance 
Fornell-
Larcker ratio 
Need1 .379 .615 -- 
.800 .579 .017 Need2 .545 .738 12.226*** 
Need3 .788 .887 11.651*** 
Construct: Monetary reward 
Item Item reliabil-ity 
Item loading 
(stand.) t-value 
Construct 
reliability 
Explained 
variance 
Fornell-
Larcker ratio 
Mat1 .529 .727 -- 
.726 .574 .803 
Mat2 .605 .778 11.169*** 
Construct: Innovative outcome 
Item Item reliabil-ity 
Item loading 
(stand.) t-value 
Construct 
reliability 
Explained 
variance 
Fornell-
Larcker ratio 
Outc1 .482 .694 -- 
.821 .607 .566 Outc2 .708 .841 14.817*** 
Outc3 .618 .786 14.433*** 
Construct: Reputational gain  
Item Item reliabil-ity 
Item loading 
(stand.) t-value 
Construct 
reliability 
Explained 
variance 
Fornell-
Larcker ratio 
Rep1 .492 .701 -- 
.804 .507 .909 
Rep2 .506 .711 13.364*** 
Rep3 .477 .690 13.029*** 
Rep4 .549 .741 13.823*** 
Construct: Intrinsic enjoyment  
Item Item reliabil-ity 
Item loading 
(stand.) t-value 
Construct 
reliability 
Explained 
variance 
Fornell-
Larcker ratio 
Enj1 .605 .778 -- 
.836 .629 .595 
Enj2 .707 .841 17.151*** 
Enj3 .580 .762 16.002*** 
Enj4 -- -- -- 
***: p < .001 
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The Prosocial Boundaries of Monetary Incentives in Idea Co-creation 
 
Abstract 
Firms rely on idea co-creation to engage consumers in the early stages of new product or ser-
vice development. In order to properly compensate consumers, the hosting organizations typi-
cally rely on monetary incentives. However, it remains unclear whether this procedure is in-
deed effective, especially when taking into account the vast body of literature dealing with the 
adverse effects of monetary incentives on motivation and the absence of a study that examines 
this aspect in a co-creation setting. We fill this gap and show boundary conditions for the ef-
fectiveness of monetary rewards as an incentive in idea co-creation. We show that the effec-
tiveness of monetary incentives in ideation contests is contingent on the organizational stereo-
type of the initiating host and the task asked for. In more detail, we postulate the following 
research questions: (1) Does the effect of monetary rewards differ for non-profit and for-profit 
hosts? (2) Does the effect of monetary rewards differ when hosts ask for tasks outside their 
primary task domain, e.g., when a for-profit firm asks for a prosocial task and a non-profit for 
a commercial task? By using an online choice experiment, we show that within their primary 
task domain, for-profit firms can rely on monetary incentives as a trigger of consumers' par-
ticipation, while non-profit hosts cannot. In addition, the results show that when outside their 
primary task domain, both kinds of hosts can use monetary incentives to signal competence 
and willingness to use the consumer-generated ideas. 
 
Keywords: Ideation, prosocial behavior, incentives 
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Introduction 
Recent research has shown that companies are not the only sources of innovation, but also 
users and customers who participate in the innovative process and take on the role of co-
creators (e.g., Bendapudi & Leone, 2003; Fang, 2008; Ogawa & Piller, 2006). Next to the 
access to very implicit need information, recent studies have found positive effects of custom-
er participation, for example, more favorable attitudes towards the company (Fuchs & 
Schreier, 2011) and stronger product demand (Fuchs et al., 2010). These studies point to the 
fact that it is beneficial for firms to engage with their consumers in idea co-creation, not least 
because of the ideas accessed.  
A popular example of co-creation is that of firm-initiated innovation or ideation con-
tests, which have been used extensively in recent years by various companies from diverse 
fields of business (e.g., Bayus, 2011; Boudreau et al., 2011; Terwiesch & Xu, 2008). Drawing 
on Piller and Walcher (2006), ideation contests can be described as a competitive activity that 
is hosted by a firm in order to gather external ideas from consumers with respect to specific 
topics. Such contests are often incorporated into an online platform, allowing extensive com-
munication between the hosts and participants as well as among the participants themselves.  
A common best practice among companies hosting idea co-creation, such as Dell, 
BMW, or Procter & Gamble, is to offer consumers a monetary incentive in order to trigger 
their participation. Recent studies have confirmed this effect as being of the utmost im-
portance (e.g., Füller, 2010; Piller & Walcher, 2006). In addition, this research highlights that 
the origins of idea co-creation can clearly be found in a commercial setting, where for-profit 
organizations intend to capture the creative potential of consumers. Practical examples of this 
setting are provided by Dell's IdeaStorm, Procter & Gamble's Connect, and the BMW Co-
Creation Lab. However, more recently, non-profit organizations have also begun to use idea 
co-creation for their purposes, often representing prosocial settings of idea co-creation (see 
Table 1 for an exemplary list of contests varying by the organizing host, the task, and the re-
ward offered). 
 
Table 1: Exemplary overview of different ICs with distinct parameters  
(source: www.innovation-contest.com) 
 
Contest Name Host Organizational stereotype Topic Task domain Incentive
NYC  Competition 3.0 New York City Non-profit Improving life in NYC Prosocial A total of $ 50,000
Lifting Bavaria Bavarian Government Non-profit Iimproving life in Bavaria Prosocial Weekend trip to Munich
Pepsi Refresh Project Pepsi For-profit Pro-social project ideas Prosocial A total of $ 20,000,000
Freeride 2015 University of Innsbruck Non-profit Future of freeriding (skiing) Commercial Skiing equipment
Cisco I-Prize Cisco For-profit New businesses for Cisco Commercial $ 250,000
BMW  Interior Design BMW For-profit Personalize the interior of a car Commercial Weekend trip to Munich
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In contrast to almost all commercial examples, some of these prosocial contests did 
not offer a reward for the best idea, but were nevertheless very successful. At first glance, this 
seems surprising, but it is in line with theoretical reasoning, since the effect of monetary in-
centives differs depending on how consumers perceive their participation, i.e., whether it is 
based on social or economic exchange principles (e.g., Heyman & Ariely, 2004).   
Current practice shows a steadily growing number of examples of hosts asking for 
tasks outside their original domain, mainly for-profit organizations hosting idea co-creation to 
engage in prosocial tasks. Consider as an example the commercial innovation agency Hyve, 
which hosted an ideation contest to gather ideas to help the victims of the Japanese tsunami in 
2011. Siemens AG hosted an ideation contest to gather ideas on how to facilitate urban areas 
in deserts. Given the rather low success of these initiatives in terms of ideas generated or 
shared by participants, the question arises whether this was due to the uncommon task domain 
or due to the incentives provided.  
Building on the literature discussing the effect of monetary incentives on consumer 
behavior and their creativity, as well as the literature on corporate social responsibility, in this 
paper we investigate whether the effectiveness of monetary incentives depends on the organi-
zational stereotype of the host and the fit of the contest topic with the host's primary activity 
domain. More specifically, we postulate the following research questions: (1) Is the use of 
monetary rewards in idea co-creation beneficial for non-profit and for-profit organizations 
alike? (2) Does the effect of monetary rewards differ when organizations ask for tasks outside 
their primary domain, e.g., when a for-profit asks for a prosocial task, or a non-profit asks for 
a commercial task? 
We show that whether or not monetary incentives offered for participation in idea co-
creation are beneficial depends on how consumers perceive their participation, i.e., as being 
based on social norms or on economic principles (Heyman & Ariely, 2004). We find that 
when hosts ask for a task that fits with their primary business field, offering monetary incen-
tives is beneficial for for-profits and harmful for non-profits. However, when both types of 
hosts offer incentives for tasks that do not fit with their primary task domain, the effect is pos-
itive. These results provide valuable insights from both from a managerial and a theoretical 
perspective.  
From a managerial perspective, we show that decision makers should take various as-
pects into account when designing the incentive structure for their co-creation initiative. Man-
agers of for-profit companies can use monetary incentives to enhance participation in tasks 
both within and outside their primary domain. Moreover, our results indicate that idea co-
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creation can be a good approach for companies to engage in social responsibility topics if the 
reward is chosen properly. However, managers of non-profit organizations cannot rely on 
monetary incentives within their primary task domain, but they can rely on monetary incen-
tives when outside their primary task domain. From a theoretical perspective of view, our 
study provides empirical evidence allowing a more detailed view on the impact of monetary 
incentives on idea co-creation. We provide evidence of the existence of effects of monetary 
incentives on idea co-creation behavior and provide first boundaries for this effect. We show 
that this effect on consumer behavior is not invariable. In addition, our study also contributes 
to the literature on prosocial behavior, showing that offering a monetary reward for prosocial 
behavior does not necessarily lead to a crowding-out effect if it is used to signal willingness 
and ability to use people's efforts (in this case, their ideas).  
 
 
Theoretical background 
In this chapter, we provide a review of the relevant literature for our study. Since our study 
aims to answer the question under which conditions monetary incentives are beneficial for 
idea co-creation, we start by giving an overview of prior research on the impact of monetary 
incentives on consumer behavior. To support our assumptions about the usefulness of mone-
tary incentives more specifically, we further address the organizational form of the host (who 
is offering the incentive) and the fit of the task domain with the host (what is being asked for). 
 
Monetary incentives and their impact on consumer behavior 
The effect of monetary incentives on consumer behavior has been the subject of studies from 
various disciplines, such as behavioral economics, marketing, and psychology. In each of the-
se disciplines, recent research has shown that monetary incentives often have an ambiguous 
effect, mostly because they might undermine consumers' intrinsic motivation to pursue tasks, 
often referred to as crowding out (Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, 1997). Economic literature shows 
various examples of crowding out and provides boundary conditions for it. Ariely et al. 
(2009b) demonstrate that, for physical tasks, performance-based monetary incentives work 
efficiently and enhance performance, while for cognitive tasks they lead to choking and de-
crease performance. Heyman and Ariely (2004) show that whether or not monetary incentives 
are effective depends strongly on the market in which they are offered. In money markets, 
where exchange is based on economic principles, monetary incentives have a positive effect, 
whereas in social markets, where exchange is based on social norms, their effect is negative.  
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In line with these findings, psychology literature hosts a living debate on whether mone-
tary incentives actually lead to a crowding out of intrinsic motivation to pursue a task. Many 
psychologists highlight the negative impact of monetary incentives, since they lower intrinsic 
motivation (e.g., Deci et al., 1999; Ryan & Deci, 2000). In contrast, psychology literature also 
underlines that monetary incentives can indeed be beneficial, since they increase consumers' 
perceived autonomy (Eisenberger et al., 1999). Similarly, Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) find 
that whether or not monetary incentives are effective depends on the amount offered. They 
may increase effort if they are high enough, while a low payment may have the opposite ef-
fect. 
In the field of marketing, there also is empirical evidence of an opposite impact of mon-
etary incentives on consumer behavior, especially concerning creative tasks. Toubia (2006) 
developed a model and empirically tested the influence of monetary incentives on idea gener-
ation and creativity, showing that rewarding participants for their own performance as well as 
for their impact on the overall performance is beneficial. Borroughs et al. (2011) find that, 
with specific creativity training, the negative effect of monetary incentives on intrinsic crea-
tivity actually turns positive. With regard to the effort invested, Borroughs et al. (2011) addi-
tionally highlight their role as a compensator rather than a motivator. Incentives are found to 
not only actively influence people in their creative behavior, but also to compensate their ef-
fort accordingly.  
These opposing results show that no universally valid rule as to whether or not mone-
tary incentives are beneficial in idea co-creation can be derived from the literature. The multi-
tude of studies examining the effect and their opposing results reinforce this assumption. 
Hence, it is necessary to further examine under which situations and circumstances monetary 
incentives have a positive or negative impact on idea co-creation. In order to generate valua-
ble insights and build on the abovementioned literature, we focus on three distinct aspects of 
offering monetary incentives, namely on the amount offered, the organization that offers 
them, and the task for which they are provided. By doing so, we suggest that both the organi-
zational form and the fit of the task domain to the host's primary task domain influence the 
usefulness of monetary incentives in idea co-creation. We suggest that, depending on these 
two factors, consumers' motives for participating differ and that monetary incentives have 
differing effects on these different motives.  
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The role of the organizational stereotype of the host  
One aspect which we suspect has an influential role on the efficiency of monetary incentives 
is the organizational stereotype of the host, its primary field of action, and the task domain 
(e.g., commercial versus prosocial). Consumers have a habit of assigning human traits to or-
ganizations and in doing so tend to be influenced by firm stereotypes (Aaker et al., 2010). 
Following those stereotypes, consumers judge for-profit organizations and non-profit organi-
zations differently (Aaker et al., 2010). Two distinct traits proposed by prior research are 
warmth and competence (Fiske, Cuddy, and Glick, 2007). Consumers typically judge non-
profit firms as possessing warmth, which includes traits such as kindness and generosity as 
well as trustworthiness. In contrast, for-profit firms are more likely to be perceived as compe-
tent, mostly in terms of having production skills and related expertise. Reasons for such dif-
ferences in consumer perception can be found in, e.g., whether or not they are profit-making, 
different work practices, or a more rigorous focus on hard bottom-line metrics like sales and 
costs (Aaker et al., 2010).  
A closely related factor in consumer judgments of organizations is the primary domain 
(the business field) in which the specific organizations work, since it heavily influences con-
sumers' perception of organizations, e.g., their trustworthiness (Arrow, 1963). As an example, 
Arrow (1963) refers to the healthcare sector, where there is a trade-off between generating 
revenue and providing the best medical service. Following the example, a non-profit firm is 
more likely to be perceived as trustworthy in this setting. A reason for this lies in the fact that 
hosts of this type are not perceived as wanting to make profit, but as being more interested in 
providing solutions that improve the status quo or help other people. Hence, consumers' pri-
mary motivation for participating in idea co-creation for a non-profit host could actually differ 
from the one valid for a for-profit. Due to this help focus and the abovementioned factor 
"warmth," we propose that for non-profit-hosted idea co-creation, consumers' primary driver 
is prosocial motivation.  
Within a non-profit's primary (prosocial) domain, consumers could perceive themselves 
as actors in a social market, since both the non-profit status and the prosocial task are opposed 
to rational economic principles. Following Heyman and Ariely (2004), the impact of mone-
tary incentives in social markets, where people intend to engage socially, is negative, hinting 
at a crowding-out effect of the (prosocial) motivation to participate (e.g., Benabou & Tirole, 
2006; Ariely et al., 2009a). As Benabou and Tirole (2006) highlight, "rewards […] create 
doubt about the true motive for which good deeds are performed, and this 'overjustification 
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effect' can induce a partial or even net crowding out of prosocial behavior by extrinsic re-
wards" (p. 1652).    
Ariely et al. (2009a) point at similar facts, showing that the mere presence of a mone-
tary incentive makes people think about how others perceive their behavior, as "doing good or 
doing well" (p. 544). Consequently, we suggest that when non-profits offer a monetary incen-
tive for a prosocial task (a task consumers perceive as being within the "warm" non-profits' 
primary domain), these incentives lead to a crowding out of the prosocial motivation triggered 
by the host's organizational form and task. By offering a monetary incentive for participating 
in idea co-creation in a perceived social market (due to the host's non-profit status and the 
prosocial task), hosts actually lower consumers' perception of behaving prosocially; we there-
fore hypothesize as follows: 
H1a: Offering a monetary incentive for idea co-creation is harmful for non-profit 
hosts and results in a decrease of consumer participation. 
 
However, different rules apply to for-profit organizations. Again taking Heyman and Ariely 
(2004) into account, consumers could interpret monetary rewards offered by a for-profit host 
as acting in a money market, due to the commercial setting of a for-profit host and the com-
mercial task, where the impact of monetary incentives is positive. Hence, the main objective 
differs strongly from that of the non-profit hosts. 
In "commercial" idea co-creation, the host governs the outcome exploitation of consum-
ers' efforts, resembling a hybrid innovation form. Following Harhoff and Mayrhofer (2010), 
such hybrid innovation forms represent arrangements where "one entity systematically and 
repeatedly capitalizes commercially on freely revealed innovations generated by a user com-
munity" (p. 173). In order to sustain stable conditions, Harhoff and Mayrhofer highlight the 
role of perceived fairness, mostly in terms of a fair distribution of outcome. Hence, by offer-
ing a monetary incentive for ideas, the hosting firm is trying to increase participants' percep-
tion of fairness (e.g., Füller, 2010; Piller & Walcher, 2006). Burroughs et al. (2011) find simi-
lar insights, stating that when a company offers its employees appropriate monetary incentives 
for developing new ideas, they work as a compensator. 
These examples point to the fact that in money markets, where a for-profit host is capa-
ble of making money with the co-created ideas, the effect of monetary incentives actually 
turns positive, since consumers behave under economic principles. We therefore hypothesize: 
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H1b: Offering a monetary incentive for idea co-creation is beneficial for for-profit 
hosts and results in an increase of consumer participation. 
Fit between the ideation task and the host's primary activity domain  
The previous section argues that the effectiveness of monetary incentives depends on the host 
offering it and the host's primary activity domain. For-profit and non-profit organizations are 
predominantly labeled as either "warm" or "competent," and consumers perceive their interac-
tion with them as either a social market exchange or an economic money market exchange. 
However, we suggest that this is only valid when organizations act within their primary do-
main, i.e., non-profits setting a prosocial task, and for-profits a commercial task. As a conse-
quence, we assume that the effectiveness of monetary incentives also depends on how well 
the task fits with the host's primary domain and what the task specifically asks for. When out-
side this domain, one must make an important distinction, since both for-profit and non-profit 
organizations lack competence outside their domain. This competence is crucial for both types 
of hosts in idea co-creation.  
For commercial tasks, consumers share their ideas in the hope that the host will turn 
them into an actual product (Harhoff et al., 2003). From this point on, participants do not have 
control over the implementation of their ideas and hence cannot influence the likelihood of 
their idea actually being put into practice. 
Similar aspects apply to prosocial tasks. Although a non-profit's "warmth" has an im-
portant effect in evoking prosocial behavior, competence is also a crucial aspect, since proso-
cial motivation focuses on achieving an outcome rather than on the process itself (see Grant, 
2007; 2008). Hence, prosocial motives are only satisfied when the host assures that the "do-
nated" idea will be put into practice. As pointed out by Arrow (1963), with prosocial tasks, 
consumers indeed perceive non-profits as more goal-oriented, in terms of pursuing what is 
best for everybody and not just for the firm. Hence, non-profits possess the competence for a 
prosocial task which for-profits lack, but in turn, consumers are more likely to use commer-
cial products from a for-profit, which has competence in commercial tasks (see, e.g., Aaker et 
al., 2010). 
Therefore, an organization's perceived competence may be of the utmost importance 
when a host asks for tasks that do not fit with its organizational form, since it signals the ca-
pability to actually implement a consumer-generated idea and heavily influences users' per-
ception of actually improving their own situation or helping someone else. Furthermore, com-
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petence signals credibility (Moscarini, 2007), which could be an addition to the abovemen-
tioned aspects on outcome beliefs.  
The importance of competence is reinforced by Brown and Dacin (1997), who showed 
that consumers' perception of corporate ability, and hence their competence, has a particularly 
strong impact on consumers' evaluation of the generated output, i.e., the product developed. In 
addition, competence also serves as a reference level for consumers, who "will and can use 
corporate ability associations as the basis for inferences about missing product attributes" 
(Brown & Dacin, 1997, p. 80). Similar insights about the task fit are provided by Sen and 
Bhattacharya (2001), showing that the closer a social task is to the company's core business 
(where the host's level of competence is high), the more likely it is that this task will be rec-
ognized positively by consumers. Transferred to idea co-creation, this implies that if consum-
ers cannot observe the outcome, they will base their expectations about this outcome on their 
overall impression of the host's competence. When outside their primary domain, both types 
of organization have to signal competence in order to convince consumers to participate in 
idea co-creation.  
One way to influence consumers that has been identified in prior research is using the 
signaling effect of money. Empirical insights on this issue have been demonstrated by Vohs et 
al. (2006), who found that the mere presence of monetary incentives has a strong impact on 
consumers' behavior, driving them to take on more work and invest more effort. Similar in-
sights are provided by Zhou, Vohs, and Baumeister (2009), who find that for consumers "the 
idea of having money should be associated with feelings of strength, efficacy, and confi-
dence" (p. 705). Additionally, they find that this effect is also present even if the consumer 
does not actually have the money—the thought of having money itself yields psychological 
benefits.  
Referring to consumers' perceptions of firms, Aaker et al (2010) find that this effect is 
also valid for non-profit organizations. In addition, when primed with money, consumers are 
much more likely to perceive non-profits as competent. Hence, by offering a monetary incen-
tive, a non-profit host signals competence and convinces consumers that their submitted ideas 
can really be put into practice by the host. This "putting into practice" addresses the main mo-
tivation of consumers to participate in commercial idea co-creation mentioned above, namely 
the use benefit (von Hippel, 1978; Harhoff et al., 2003).  
Similar aspects apply to for-profit organizations. When for-profit hosts ask for tasks 
outside their domain, they must introduce a monetary incentive to signal their competence and 
willingness to use consumers' input. Again, this addresses the main motivation of consumers 
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in prosocial idea co-creation, namely generating an output for others (Grant, 2007; Grant & 
Berry, 2011). Hence, we suggest that monetary incentives offered by the host have a signaling 
effect; we therefore hypothesize: 
H2a: When the idea co-creation task does not fit with the host's typical activity domain, 
the introduction of a monetary incentive is beneficial for non-profit hosts and results in 
an increase of consumer participation. 
 
H2b: When the idea co-creation task does not fit with the host's typical activity domain, 
the introduction of a monetary incentive is beneficial for for-profit hosts and results in 
an increase of consumer participation. 
 
The following figure summarizes our research framework: 
 
Figure 1: Research framework 
 
 
Method and data 
To test our assumptions, we chose to run an online scenario-based within-subject choice ex-
periment. Thus, we created different scenarios of so called idea contests, which we chose as 
an exemplary idea co-creation method. In addition to the well-known co-creation method, we 
chose a topic (cars and mobility) that we presume everyone to be familiar with. Within this 
topic, we chose improving older people's mobility as a prosocial task and improving cars for 
leisure and hobby purposes as a commercial scenario. For data collection, 537 participants 
were recruited by an online panel provided by a professional market research firm. All partic-
ipants received an e-mail invitation from the panel provider and were directed to an online 
96 
 
 
 
survey, where they were consecutively shown four different potential idea contest scenarios 
(see Figure 2), each dealing with cars and mobility.  
For each scenario, participants were asked about their intention to participate and the ef-
fort they would invest in that specific idea contest. This led to a total of 2,148 observations. 
The participant sample was drawn representatively from the panel. We set participants having 
a driver's license as a criterion to make sure they would have some knowledge about the topic. 
 
 
Figure 2: Sample idea co-creation scenario (translated) 
 
To implement the scenarios, we used an experimental design that included the three 
main factors of interest and four additional factors that were included as controls in order to 
maximize the robustness of the results. The main factors were the host (two distinct non-
profits versus two distinct for-profits), the task domain (a prosocial task [elderly people] ver-
sus a commercial task [sport, tourism]), and a monetary incentive (€100, €500, €2,500, or 
€10,0002). The task domain was chosen as a between-subject design factor, while all others 
we incorporated as within-subject factors. As controls we added several aspects that common-
                                                 
2 We purposely chose not to offer €0 as the lowest level of financial reward. We did this due to our research 
setting. Ideation contests all use an announcement of winning something. We think it could have led to a bias in 
participants if we had announced "What can you win? Nothing!" (see Figure 2 for the scenarios). Hence, we 
chose to use €100, which is only 1% of the maximum amount of €10,000 offered within the high-reward scenar-
io.   
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ly vary in actual practice of ideation contests and/or have been the subject of prior research 
(see, e.g., Füller, 2010; Piller & Walcher, 2006). Those aspects were the task (pure ideation 
versus interactive development of other people's ideas), the topic (narrow [cars] versus wide 
[mobility]), the winner selection (choice by jury versus by the community), intangible image-
related rewards (yes versus no), and the current participation level (50, 250, 1,000, or 5,000 
participants).  
Since a full factorial design would have included 2 × 24 × 43 = 2,048 different scenarios, 
we used the commercial software application nGene to create a fractional factorial design that 
allowed for two-way interaction of the host and prize attributes with all other attributes, re-
sulting in 2 × 32 scenarios. We used an eight-level blocking factor to orthogonally allocate 4 
out of 32 possible factors randomly to each participant. 
Due to the nested nature of our data (four observations per participant), we used ran-
dom-coefficient models to analyze the data; more specifically, we used a random-coefficient 
logit regression with participation intention (Model 1) and a random-coefficient zero-inflated 
Poisson regression with the stated hours of effort as the dependent variable (Model 2). There 
is an ongoing debate about the interpretability of effects based on coefficients in non-linear 
models, especially if variables appear more than once in interaction terms (cf. Ai and Norton, 
2003; Greene, 2010; Hoetker, 2007). Interpreting the significance of interacted variables is 
impossible based on coefficients and their signs alone, or even based on marginal effects if 
they do not take into account that involved variables appear in both main and interaction 
terms (Ai and Norton, 2003). Hence, Ai and Norton (2003) suggest using appropriate partial 
and cross-partial derivatives to obtain these effects. Building on this argumentation, Greene 
(2010) questions whether hypothesis testing can be done at the level of (cross-)partial or mar-
ginal effects in general, since these effects are a function of all data and all coefficients. He 
suggests plotting interaction effects to interpret them in post-estimation analysis, but leaving 
hypothesis testing to the estimation stage.  
We combined both approaches for our analysis of the interaction effects. First, we ob-
tained the partial derivatives and the cross-partial derivatives. In addition, the significance of 
these effects was assessed using the Delta method (Greene, 2010). All values of the average 
marginal main effects and respective 95% confidence intervals were plotted over the range of 
the moderator variable in order to visualize the effect size of the moderation. When both con-
fidence intervals are above zero for a specific value, the interaction effect is positive, while it 
is negative when both confidence intervals are below zero for a specific value. If the confi-
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dence intervals are not both either above or below zero, the interaction effect is not significant 
(see Figure 3). 
 
Results 
The results show that monetary incentives do indeed have an ambiguous role in idea co-
creation. In line with our hypotheses, they are harmful for non-profit hosts when offered for a 
task with a high fit, such as a prosocial task. Consumers' participation probability is lower the 
higher the reward offered (from 68% for a €100 reward to 52% for a €10,000 reward). How-
ever, the analysis of the confidence intervals of the partial effect reveals that this effect is only 
significant for very high values of monetary incentives. Monetary incentives also lead to a 
decrease in the effort that consumers are willing to invest (from approx. 14 hours for €100 to 
approx. 9 hours for €10,000). Again, the analysis of the confidence intervals of the partial 
effect reveal that this negative effect is not significant for very small amounts of money of-
fered. Therefore, H1a can be confirmed. 
 
Table 2: Prosocial task regression results 
 
In line with our second hypothesis, we also find that monetary incentives are beneficial 
for for-profits in commercial settings, i.e., when for-profit hosts ask for tasks fitting with their 
primary domain. Consumers' probability of participating for for-profits rises considerably 
Task domain
Model
Dependent variable
(Regression)
Means for random parameters 0,154 (0,226) 0,093 (0,362) 1,210 *** (0,027) 1,542 *** (0,052)
Scale parameters for distances of random parameters 5,545 *** (0,386) 5,900 *** (0,425) 2,001 *** (0,015) 1,556 *** (0,014)
Independent variables (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.)
Organizational stereotype -0,012 (0,152) -0,262 (0,557) -0,029 * (0,015) 0,276 *** (0,062)
Prize 0,172 *** (0,023) 0,685 *** (0,154) 0,026 *** (0,002) 0,221 *** (0,016)
Image award 0,347 * (0,198) 0,560 * (0,322) 0,010 (0,015) -0,069 (0,043)
Winner selection -0,089 (0,195) -0,378 (0,399) -0,064 *** (0,015) -0,161 *** (0,051)
Current participation level -0,142 *** (0,044) -0,094 (0,090) 0,003 (0,004) 0,045 *** (0,011)
Topic -0,139 (0,179) -0,124 (0,318) 0,037 ** (0,018) 0,108 *** (0,037)
Task 0,612 *** (0,172) -0,227 (0,300) -0,708 *** (0,011) -0,883 *** (0,038)
Interaction terms
Organizational stereotype * prize -0,544 *** (0,139) -0,216 *** (0,015)
Organizational stereotype * image award 0,115 (0,445) 0,065 (0,053)
Organizational stereotype * winner selection 1,158 ** (0,547) 0,329 *** (0,065)
Organizational stereotype * current participation level -0,037 (0,103) -0,046 *** (0,011)
Organizational stereotype * topic 0,099 (0,412) 0,018 (0,042)
Organizational stereotype * task 1,462 *** (0,383) 0,044 (0,043)
Prize * image award -0,073 (0,056) 0,015 *** (0,006)
Prize * winner selection -0,397 *** (0,145) -0,148 *** (0,016)
Prize * current participation level 0,013 (0,011) -0,003 *** (0,001)
Prize * topic -0,023 (0,047) -0,020 *** (0,004)
Prize * task 0,003 (0,048) 0,010 * (0,005)
Chi-squared 511,879 *** 521,499 *** 72419,631 *** 72138,533 ***
Log likelihood function -459,129 -446,897 -2657,762 -2662,790
McFadden pseudo R² 0,358 0,368 0,932 0,931
Two-tailed t-tests; * <0.1, **<0.05, ***<0.01
PROSOCIAL
II
INTENTION
Random-coefficient binary logit regression
I
Parameter Parameter
III IV
HOURS
Random-coefficient Poisson regression
Parameter Parameter
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(from 32% for a €100 reward to 85% for a €10,000 reward) with the amount of the monetary 
incentive offered. The plot of the partial effect shows that this effect is constantly positive and 
highly significant (see figure set 3). Similar aspects apply to the effort invested. By offering a 
larger reward, a for-profit with a fitting task can double the average consumer effort invested 
(approx. 7 hours for €100 compared to approx. 15 hours for €10,000). Again, this effect is 
constantly positive and significant. Hence, H1b can be confirmed.  
Concerning the effect in non-fitting tasks, we can also find support for the hypothesized 
effects. Consumers' probability of submitting an idea to a non-profit host actually increases 
(from 45% for €100 to 58% for €10,000), although an analysis of the partial effect shows that 
it is not significant. However, the effort consumers are willing to exert is almost three times as 
high for the highest monetary rewards offered (approx. 7 hours for €100 compared to approx. 
21 hours for €10,000). An analysis of the partial effect reveals that this effect is strongly sig-
nificant for most values, but only marginally significant for extremely high values. Thus, Hy-
pothesis 2a can be confirmed.  
 
 
Table 3: Commercial task regression results 
 
The results are similar for for-profit organizations and non-fitting tasks: Consumers' 
willingness to participate grows with the amount of the reward offered, although the effect 
slowly diminishes (from 30% for €100 offered to 87% for €10,000 offered). The partial effect 
Task domain
Model
Dependent variable
(Regression)
Means for random parameters 0,337 (0,211) 0,153 (0,323) 1,806 *** (0,027) 2,401 *** (0,044)
Scale parameters for distances of random parameters 3,633 *** (0,231) 3,716 *** (0,237) 1,056 *** (0,011) 0,977 *** (0,012)
Independent Variables (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.)
Organizational stereotype 0,009 (0,129) 0,006 (0,419) -0,081 *** (0,013) -0,192 *** (0,061)
Prize 0,149 *** (0,018) 0,391 *** (0,110) 0,038 *** (0,002) -0,025 (0,016)
Image award -0,039 (0,162) 0,056 (0,304) 0,013 (0,016) 0,151 *** (0,049)
Winner selection 0,199 (0,163) -0,625 (0,405) 0,000 (0,017) -0,050 (0,060)
Current participation level -0,191 *** (0,039) -0,059 (0,077) -0,021 *** (0,004) -0,050 *** (0,013)
Topic -0,055 (0,146) -0,128 (0,276) 0,035 ** (0,017) 0,039 (0,038)
Task -0,906 *** (0,147) -1,087 *** (0,265) 0,478 *** (0,019) -0,034 (0,051)
Interaction terms
Organizational stereotype * prize -0,271 ** (0,105) 0,078 *** (0,014)
Organizational stereotype * image award -0,138 (0,342) -0,164 *** (0,056)
Organizational stereotype * winner selection 1,620 *** (0,423) 0,134 * (0,072)
Organizational stereotype * current participation level -0,043 (0,082) 0,014 (0,009)
Organizational stereotype * topic -0,133 (0,334) -0,062 * (0,038)
Organizational stereotype * task 0,063 (0,322) -0,043 (0,057)
Prize * image award -0,006 (0,045) -0,015 ** (0,007)
Prize * winner selection -0,162 (0,111) 0,045 *** (0,014)
Prize *current participation level -0,003 (0,008) 0,003 ** (0,001)
Prize *topic 0,021 (0,037) -0,001 (0,005)
Prize *task 0,023 (0,038) 0,025 *** (0,006)
Chi-squared 366,557 *** 368,120 *** 71410,048 *** 70976,226 ***
Log likelihood function -545,106 -534,876 -2758,666 -2730,101
McFadden pseudo R² 0,252 0,256 0,928 0,929
Two-tailed t-tests; * <0.1, **<0.05, ***<0.01
COMMERCIAL
V VI VII VIII
Random-coefficient binary logit regression Random-coefficient Poisson regression
Parameter Parameter Parameter Parameter
INTENTION HOURS
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shows that this is strongly significant for all values. Similar aspects apply to the effort exerted, 
where monetary rewards have a positive impact (approx. 7 hours for €100 compared to ap-
prox. 16 hours for €10,000). The partial effect shows that the results are strongly significant 
for lower and medium values and only marginally significant for extremely high values. The 
following set of figures shows the interaction effects and the respective plots of the partial 
effects and their confidence intervals. 
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Figure 3: Interaction effects of monetary incentives for prosocial topics 
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Figure 4: Interaction effects of monetary incentives for commercial topics 
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Discussion and implications 
With this paper, we aim to provide insights on the boundaries of monetary incentives in idea 
co-creation. Our study shows that the effectiveness of monetary incentives in idea co-creation 
is limited in several ways. First, their effect depends on the host that is offering them. Results 
imply that for-profit hosts can easily rely on monetary incentives to foster consumer participa-
tion and effort. This reinforces our assumption that monetary incentives are a suitable com-
pensator for idea co-creation, as suggested by Harhoff and Mayrhofer (2010). Indeed, the re-
sults also show that the current practice of offering low to medium amounts of money is not 
optimal, since companies waste considerable potential to attract more participants with an 
even higher reward. Hence, companies do not benefit from the positive effect to the full ex-
tent, especially taking the almost linear correlation with effort invested into account. At this 
point, it is important to highlight that, although increasing the amount of money offered 
would of course raise the costs of using idea co-creation, this specific cost is only needed once 
for the winner and increases the effort and motivation of all participants.   
Additionally, our results point to the fact that, next to the suggested compensation ef-
fect, it also evokes more creative behavior. If it were just a compensator for ideas generated 
previously and shared on the platform, the effect of monetary incentives on the participation 
effort should be neutral. But since it is strongly positive, this could imply that higher mone-
tary incentives can also influence participants to invest more time in thinking about ideas to 
submit and/or to improve, thereby stimulating their innovative behavior as well as their will-
ingness to contribute to collective actions like improving the ideas of others. 
For non-profit hosts, the effect is also as we suggested. Consumers do not expect them 
to offer monetary rewards for idea co-creation and are therefore repelled by higher amounts of 
money offered. This is in line with prior studies on crowding out of prosocial behavior (e.g., 
Ariely et al., 2009a; Benabou & Tirole, 2006). However, not having the chance to trigger par-
ticipation with monetary incentives is not a huge disadvantage for non-profits, since partici-
pants' initial intention to participate as well as the effort they would exert is twice as high as in 
the case of for-profits in commercial settings. One important aspect to address is the lack of 
significance of low values of monetary rewards; hence, crowding out only takes place for high 
values. As a consequence, offering a monetary reward for participation is not beneficial for 
non-profit hosts within their prosocial primary task domain. 
Next to the organizational form of the host, we also find that the task domain plays a 
critical role in how monetary incentives are perceived. When setting tasks outside their do-
main, both types of hosts must offer monetary incentives, demonstrating their willingness to 
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use the consumer-generated ideas and signaling competence. Interestingly, this effect is very 
strong for for-profit hosts—even stronger than the effect of monetary rewards within their 
primary task domain. 
One could suggest that this is a definite sign of the suitability of idea co-creation as a 
way to express corporate social responsibility (CSR). The strength of this effect is even more 
surprising given the fact that previous research on CSR refers to its positive effect for compa-
nies as typically being rather weak (e.g., Gürhan-Canli & Batra, 2004; Bhattacharya et al., 
2006). This assumption is confirmed by the fact that even without a monetary incentive, con-
sumers' intention to join is about 1.5 times as high for prosocial tasks as for "typical" com-
mercial tasks. Similar aspects apply to the effort, where the initial value stated by consumers 
also is 1.5 times as high. Thus it seems that prosocial idea co-creation topics are indeed per-
ceived as a suitable way for companies to exhibit CSR. In addition, the results show that this 
signaling effect is also stronger than that of a possible crowding out that one could have ex-
pected due to the prosocial task setting. 
For non-profits the signaling effect is also present, but not as strong as for for-profit 
hosts. More specifically, the signaling is not significant for participation intention, but for the 
effort invested, at least up to a medium level of rewards offered. This seems to indicate that 
non-profits can indeed signal competence and willingness to use the ideas by offering a mone-
tary reward, albeit not to the same extent as for-profits. In addition, they do not benefit as 
much from very high monetary rewards as for-profit firms do. Consequently, it seems that 
for-profit firms find it easier than non-profits to host contests outside their primary task do-
main by offering large monetary awards. Non-profit hosts that wish to obtain commercial 
ideas from consumers will need to find another way besides monetary incentives to incentiv-
ize consumers and signal their competence and willingness to use the ideas. 
The results of this study have both theoretical and managerial implications. From a 
managerial perspective, it shows that in order to maximize participation in their own idea co-
creation activities, managers have to take their organizational form into account. While this 
may be very easy to accomplish by the vast majority, it may be challenging for certain firms 
or organizations that may not know how consumers perceive them. In our study, we analyzed 
two clearly distinguishable stereotypes, similar to the approach by Aaker et al. (2010). How-
ever, we are aware that there are other organizational forms, such as associations or the like, 
that may not be clearly identifiable for consumers as either a for-profit or a non-profit organi-
zation.   
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Another important managerial implication is that the use of monetary rewards in idea 
co-creation is not generally beneficial for non-profit organizations; they therefore may have to 
find other ways to foster participation. In contrast, for-profit firms can use monetary incen-
tives in prosocial idea co-creation tasks to effectively address and engage consumers. The 
results indicate that idea co-creation is indeed a good way for firms to exhibit CSR, while it 
only works to a certain extent for non-profit hosts offering monetary incentives for a commer-
cial task. 
From a theoretical perspective, our study is also valuable in several ways. First, we con-
tribute to the literature on prosocial behavior by showing that monetary rewards for a proso-
cial task do not necessarily lead to crowding out. Moreover, they can even be positive when 
offered by a firm showing willingness to use the ideas generated. Second, our findings are 
somewhat contradictory to those of Aaker et al. (2010), implying that, at least in an idea co-
creation setting, non-profits can use smaller monetary rewards to signal competence in order 
to induce participation in a commercial setting, but cannot rely on high rewards. In addition, 
we contribute to user innovation literature by showing another contingency factor of the effec-
tiveness of monetary incentives. While traits and preferences of individuals are usually found 
to be of importance, we show that their efficiency also depends on the circumstances under 
which they are provided. This offers a new perspective on the role of monetary incentives and 
their impact on innovating consumers. Further, we give evidence of the role of prosocial mo-
tivation in users' willingness to become innovative. On average, they are much more willing 
to engage in other-oriented prosocial settings than in self-oriented commercial settings. This 
extends the motives commonly used to explain why consumers and users engage in innova-
tive behavior. 
 
 
Limitations and directions for future research 
Our study contains a number of limitations which have to be addressed. First, we only meas-
ured participation intention and intended effort of consumers. While objective participation 
behavior would be more reliable, the setting of our study simply made it impossible to con-
duct an ideation contest for each of our scenarios. We tried to address this issue by choosing a 
definite binary variable as our dependent variable. Therefore, all consumers had to clearly 
state whether or not they intended to participate, rather than merely indicating intention, e.g., 
on a Likert scale. 
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Although we did our best to choose a very general topic for each task domain that 
would be clearly perceived as either commercial or prosocial, we cannot guarantee that all 
consumers perceive these aspects the same way. In addition, we did not examine the extent to 
which the topic is relevant to the specific individual in terms of, e.g., an individual involve-
ment with both kinds of cars. Another limitation arises from the stereotypes we chose. We did 
include two different versions of each host in order to minimize possible effects of brand at-
tachment or influence of the host's image. For the non-profit hosts that differ in terms of com-
petence and warmth, we cannot truly say whether this is valid for all non-profit organizations. 
Similar aspects apply to the for-profit hosts: Although we included two very different car 
manufacturers (an upmarket and a downmarket one), we cannot truly say whether the results 
hold for any for-profit firm.  
The methodological approach also presents limitations. The consumers on the commer-
cial panel were of course paid to participate, which could have an effect on their choice be-
havior. However, we suggest that this issue even reinforces our results, since the panel partic-
ipants are generally very likely to be highly extrinsically motivated; otherwise, they would not 
be part of a commercial market research panel. Taking this into account, the strong effect of a 
prosocial topic and the negative crowding out of monetary rewards is even more impressive. 
Another issue is related to social desirability. It could be possible that participants stated their 
intention and effort in a socially desirable way, favoring the prosocial topic. We tried to ad-
dress this issue by using the task domain as a between-subject factor, so consumers saw either 
only prosocial scenarios or only commercial scenarios. However, we cannot completely rule 
out the possibility of socially desirable responses. Finally, although our results indicate that 
idea co-creation appears to be a suitable way for firms to engage in CSR, we cannot truly say 
whether idea co-creation as CSR has a positive effect on hosts and how large this effect is. 
Further research is needed that addresses this issue more prominently and also more explicitly 
than we did in our approach. 
Furthermore, this study leaves plenty of room for other future research directions. We 
showed that monetary incentives are always appropriate for for-profit hosts, but not universal-
ly for non-profit hosts. Hence, the question arises how non-profit hosts can actively enhance 
participation and what the incentive structure for their idea co-creation initiatives should look 
like. One promising path would be to examine the impact of monetary rewards on different 
types of participation behavior. Hence, one could analyze whether or not money fosters par-
ticipants' creativity, gets them to collaborate more or less, or leads to other desirable behavior. 
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This would back up the results with data capable of also measuring qualitative aspects of par-
ticipation behavior.  
Since prosocial motivation ultimately focuses on the outcome rather than the process 
(Grant, 2007; 2008), as we highlighted in our theoretical background, non-profit hosts can 
perhaps emphasize their willingness to utilize the submitted ideas differently, e.g., by present-
ing application scenarios, showing who will benefit, and highlighting the reason, in terms of a 
more abstract construal (White et al., 2011).Within the current study, we only offered a mone-
tary incentive for winning the contest. However, it could also prove valuable to examine 
whether the effectiveness of monetary rewards is contingent on this contest character or also 
similar for different incentive schemes, such as a collective payment or a performance-based 
component. Another promising aspect could be to examine other tangible rewards, e.g., lap-
tops or T-shirts, which is currently also common practice. This could prove especially valua-
ble for non-profit organizations, where prior research on donations and rewards has shown 
that other tangible rewards have a different effect than actual money. Further research is also 
needed to more closely address the relationship between idea co-creation and CSR. For ex-
ample, future work could measure the extent to which hosting a prosocial ideation contest 
adds to the firm's brand value or creates a positive image for its products. In conclusion, we 
can say that we provide evidence of contingencies of the efficiency of monetary incentives in 
idea co-creation. We show that they can be both beneficial and harmful. Picking up these re-
sults and exploring the new research directions can lead to a better understanding of situation-
al circumstances that speak for or against their use. 
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Attracting Consumers to Idea Co-creation 
 
Abstract 
We examine how different communication strategies lead to more attention to and increased 
participation in idea co-creation. Opposing current practice of highlighting either self-related 
monetary or non-monetary benefits, we examine whether the expectation of other benefits can 
be a driver of innovative behavior. Building on message framing theory, we also examine 
whether the way benefits are presented influences consumer attention to idea co-creation. In 
particular, we ask the following research questions: (1) Are people more willing to engage in 
innovative behavior when they consider other people's needs and believe they can help oth-
ers? (2) Does message framing work in an idea co-creation setting? (3) Do personal traits like 
personal relevance or issue involvement have a moderating influence on these effects?  
Using a field experiment, we show that highlighting consequences for others leads to 
an increase in consumer attention to the idea co-creation initiative. While message framing 
does not have an influence on generating attention to idea co-creation for the average individ-
ual, it has an effect depending on the individual relevance of the topic. When relevance is low, 
showing a gain leads to more attention, whereas loss frames lead to significantly more atten-
tion when individual relevance is high. 
 
Keywords: Ideation, message framing, benefits for others 
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Introduction 
Instead of building exclusively on in-house R&D, managers from diverse industries have 
turned their attention to external sources of ideas for new products or services. New commu-
nication platforms and channels have made the Internet a promising medium for getting in 
contact with consumers and using their knowledge for innovation purposes, treating them as 
co-creators (Bendapudi & Leone, 2003; Fuchs et al., 2010). Popular examples of this are firm-
initiated innovation or ideation contests (Bayus, 2011; Boudreau et al., 2011; Terwiesch & 
Xu, 2008), which can be described as a competitive activity hosted by a firm in order to gath-
er external ideas from consumers with respect to specific topics (Piller & Walcher, 2006).  
The number of firms relying on idea co-creation is currently rising steadily and includes 
firms from diverse businesses such as BMW, McDonald's, and Dell. Idea co-creation has be-
come an increasingly common and popular method. It has also become the subject of recent 
research (e.g., Bayus, 2011, Füller, 2010, Leimeister et al., 2009, Möslein et al., 2010, Piller 
& Walcher, 2006). While these studies have generated valuable insights on what happens dur-
ing and after such a contest, they do not focus on what happens before the contest, when the 
contest is designed and communicated by the host. Typically, in advance of such a contest, 
the organizing host plans how the task and the interaction among participants should be de-
signed (Piller & Walcher, 2006). She then starts to communicate the availability of the con-
test, e.g., by sending e-mails to the customer database or by placing banners on the organiza-
tion's homepage, trying to attract as many participants as possible.   
Communication has recently become even more important considering that, as a conse-
quence of the frequent use, the resource "crowd" is becoming an increasingly scarce good and 
companies are starting to compete for participants, since such activities need a certain number 
of participants to work properly. In contrast to the large companies mentioned above, smaller 
firms may soon find it hard to attract consumers to their own idea co-creation initiatives. In 
order to face this challenge, managers should consider participant recruitment and ask them-
selves how to address customers and especially how to design communication strategies in 
order to convince them to join the contest.  
Following communication theory, the key challenge of designing an appropriate com-
munication strategy is finding out how to communicate the consequences of performing an act 
(Levin et al., 1998). In an idea co-creation setting, the main consequence often resembles the 
use benefit of the innovative outcome (e.g., Franke et al., 2006; von Hippel, 2005). Surpris-
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ingly, the common practice of organizations in addressing possible participants is different, 
since most hosts highlight the personal extrinsic gain of participation, namely the chance of 
winning an (often monetary) prize (Füller, 2010; Piller & Walcher, 2006). In contrast, we use 
an approach where we examine both what the use benefit and consequences of (non-) partici-
pation are, and who the recipient of these benefits and consequences is.  
First, we examine whether the dominant strategy of companies to communicate this 
benefit, highlighting it as a personal gain, is indeed beneficial. To analyze this issue, we draw 
on message framing theory (e.g., Block & Keller, 1995; Levin et al., 1998; White et al., 
2011), which is a popular stream of literature on explaining differences in value or benefit 
perceptions. Message framing builds on prospect theory (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), 
which emphasizes that people act irrationally when faced with risks, and challenges dominant 
economic behavioral theories like expectancy value theory (e.g., von Neumann & Morgen-
stern, 1944). 
Message framing uses this risk aversion, implying that presenting an object or behavior 
as either a gain or a loss situation influences people's decision making (e.g., Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981). However, within message framing literature, not much research has fo-
cused on the direction of the loss or gain. Comparable yet distinct studies can be found in the 
context of donation behavior literature (e.g., Brunel & Nelson, 2000; Hornikx et al., 2010). 
Contribution to idea co-creation is different, since it asks for creative effort and time, rather 
than a monetary donation. This is particularly important when taking into account the results 
of prior research, which has shown that time and money donations are considerably different 
in efficiency (e.g., Liu & Aaker, 2008). 
Second, we examine the role of the recipient of the benefit mentioned within the com-
munication strategy. Building on user innovation theory (von Hippel, 1978; 2005), which em-
phasizes the personal need or benefit of an individual as the dominant value for innovative 
behavior, we examine whether other people's individual needs or benefits also drive consum-
ers' innovative behavior. While there is a considerable amount of literature showing that the 
expectation of benefits for others influences consumers' behavior, most of these studies focus 
on donation or non-profit marketing (e.g., White & Peloza, 2009). However, literature exam-
ining the effect of benefits for others on innovative or creative behavior is scarce. A notable 
exception comes from the field of organizational behavior, where a recent study has shown 
that, in a co-worker setting, the needs of others do in fact drive people to participate in crea-
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tive tasks (Grant & Berry, 2011). However, due to the co-worker setting, these studies cannot 
truly answer whether this is also valid among complete strangers, such as in consumer set-
tings.  
When examining boundary conditions of the efficiency of message framing as well as 
benefits for others in attracting consumers to idea co-creation, we rely on studies by Mahe-
swaran and Meyers-Levy (1990), and Meyers-Levy and Maheswaran (2004). We further ex-
amine whether the degree of topic involvement and personal relevance influences the effi-
ciency of both consequence and benefit framing. Hence, we ask the following research ques-
tions: (1) Are people more willing to engage in innovative behavior when they recognize oth-
er people's needs and believe they can help prevent a loss that will impact other people? (2) Is 
message framing applicable in idea co-creation and does it work efficiently when highlighting 
consequences not for oneself but for others? (3) Do personal traits like relevance or involve-
ment have an impact on the efficiency of message framing and on the efficiency of highlight-
ing benefits for others?  
Using a large-scale field experiment, we find that highlighting consequences for others 
does in fact lead to significantly more attention to idea co-creation. Thus, consumers are more 
willing to engage in idea co-creation when they believe that their time and creative effort will 
help other people. Furthermore, we find that message framing is not applicable in an idea co-
creation setting on a general level. Its efficiency is contingent on the personal relevance and 
involvement in the topic; thus, when individual relevance is low, "obtain gain" frames are 
better at attracting consumers, while "prevent loss" frames are more efficient when attracting 
consumers for whom the personal relevance is high. 
The results imply that the expectation of benefits for others can indeed be a driver of 
participation in idea co-creation, even if these others are complete strangers. This adds to 
findings from user innovation and prosocial behavior literature. To user innovation literature, 
our study contributes by showing that highlighting self-related benefits that address the indi-
vidual's own unmet needs (e.g., von Hippel, 2005) as a dominant strategy to attract consumers 
is inferior to addressing the unmet needs of others. Thus, we add another important aspect to 
the literature on user innovation motivation. We additionally contribute to prosocial literature 
by introducing idea co-creation as another way to exhibit individual prosocial behavior. 
From a managerial perspective, we show that managers have to reconsider the current 
practice of inviting consumers by highlighting the extrinsic gain of participation. Moreover, if 
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the topic is of great relevance for the participants, managers should design it in such a way 
that it emphasizes a loss for others, while it should emphasize a gain for others if the individ-
ual relevance for the target group is low.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In the next section, we review the 
relevant literature and derive hypotheses related to the abovementioned research questions. 
We then introduce our empirical study and present and discuss the results. We end by giving 
conclusions, limitations, and an outlook for future research. 
Theoretical background 
In this chapter, we use a three-step approach to examine the relevant literature and derive the 
hypotheses that embody our analysis method. First, we examine literature on message framing 
in general, i.e., the "consequence framing" of presenting participation as either obtaining a 
gain or preventing a loss. Second, we assess literature on differences between framing the 
benefit for either oneself or others arising from participation, and the suitability of this "bene-
fit framing" in generating attention to idea co-creation. Third, we examine the impact of per-
sonal relevance and involvement on both the consequence and benefit framing in order to 
identify boundary conditions for the expected effects.  
Framing the consequences of participation—the role of message framing 
Prior research has shown that message framing is capable of explaining seemingly irrational 
preferences of consumers. Message framing uses the principles of prospect theory by Kahne-
man and Tversky (1979). Specifically, it makes use of the fact that people act in a risk-averse 
manner. Hence, highlighting the positive or the negative consequences of an action can have a 
significant impact on people's subsequent behavior (Block & Keller, 1995).  
In their overview on past literature, Levin et al. (1998) differentiate three distinct forms 
of message framing, namely risky choice, attribute framing, and goal framing. Of these, goal 
framing seems especially promising for our approach, because Levin et al. (1998) consider it 
particularly valuable in communication design. According to Levin et al. (1998, p. 167), goal 
framing means that "the message stresses either the positive consequences of performing an 
act or the negative consequences of not performing the act." Hence, this type of message 
framing examines which frame has the best persuasive effect on evoking a certain kind of 
behavior. 
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Past research has demonstrated the efficiency of goal framing in various settings, in-
cluding the provision of public goods (e.g., Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Fleishmann, 1988), 
health-related behavior (e.g., Banks et al., 1995; Block & Keller, 1995), or use of new prod-
ucts or services (e.g., Breugelmanns et al., 2012). Meyerowitz and Charkin (1987) argue that 
the efficiency of goal framing can be explained by the fact that negative information is more 
influential than positive information. This is described as a negativity bias (Smith & Petty, 
1996). Similar insights are provided by Baumeister et al. (2001, p. 323) who show that 
"events that are negatively valenced (e.g., losing money, being abandoned by friends, and 
receiving criticism) will have a greater impact on the individual than positively valenced 
events of the same type (e.g., winning money, gaining friends, and receiving praise)." 
Kahneman et al. (1990) explain the loss aversion in goal framing with the so-called en-
dowment effect, which describes that consumers overvalue things they already own. Levin et 
al. (1998, p. 177) point to something similar, referring to a status quo bias that describes that 
"people are reluctant to trade an option they already possess to obtain a different option." 
Given the vast number of settings in which message framing has been proven to be an effi-
cient way of communication, we expect that this will also be the case for designing appropri-
ate communication strategies to attract participants to idea co-creation. We expect that the 
abovementioned status quo bias evoked by a loss frame will attract consumers more effective-
ly than a possible gain frame, since consumers overvalue a possible loss in their use experi-
ence. 
Further indicators of the advantageousness of "prevent loss" frames can also be derived 
from user innovation literature, which has shown that users become innovative because they 
benefit mainly from using their innovation, in contrast to firms, which benefit from selling 
their innovation (Harhoff et al., 2003). Hence, users are primarily interested in improving 
their use experience, and this high expected benefit (Franke et al., 2006) is their main motiva-
tion to engage in innovative behavior. Taking this vast importance of the expected use benefit 
into account, we suggest that the "prevent loss" message framing mechanism will work 
properly in this setting. Showing consumers how to avoid a loss, e.g., by emphasizing how 
their participation could prevent a decrease in their use experience, leads to an increase of 
attention to idea co-creation. Taking both arguments together, we hypothesize as follows: 
H1: Highlighting avoiding a loss will attract more participants to idea co-creation than 
highlighting obtaining a gain. 
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Framing benefits from participation—expectation of benefits for others as a 
driver of behavior 
The expectancy value theory (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944) emphasizes that any eco-
nomic action will only be taken if the expected utility from doing so is high enough. It high-
lights economically rational behavior. Hence, people only pursue a task if their perceived per-
sonal benefit is sufficiently high. More recently, economic literature has developed additional 
theories that explain why the expectation of benefits or an outcome for others and caring for 
others can also generate benefit for people and hence explain their behavior. Those theories 
are summarized under the topic of prosocial behavior (see Meier, 2007, for an overview). Be-
sides the economic roots, many applications of the difference between appeals highlighting 
benefits for oneself and those for others can be found in the fields of psychology and market-
ing. Popular examples arise mostly from fundraising via donations and charitable behavior.  
White and Peloza (2009) show that the efficiency of benefits for oneself and others is 
especially dependent on the extent of individual public image concerns and on whether the 
decision is made publicly or privately. While self-benefit appeals are more efficient when 
people can decide in private, appeals regarding benefits for others are more efficient when 
people are publicly accountable for their decisions. Further, they show that this effect is 
evoked by people's desire to generate impressions according to normative social expectations. 
Hupfer (2006) shows that self-interest appeals, including a self-reference, are especially 
valuable when addressing younger people. In a blood donation context, she shows that when 
addressing younger non-donors, agencies should emphasize the potential future relevance for 
them. Chang and Lee (2009) examine charity advertising and find that negatively framed 
messages are more effective than positive ones, especially when paired with a negative pic-
ture of the "other" that is in need. Brunel and Nelson (2000) find that the effectiveness of ap-
peals regarding self-benefits and benefits for others depends on the gender and the general 
worldview of participants. They find that women are more likely to respond to appeals em-
phasizing benefits for others, while men are more effectively addressed by self-benefit ap-
peals. Similar insights are provided by Hornikx et al. (2010), who find that the culture heavily 
influences whether or not people have a care-oriented worldview that fosters the effectiveness 
of appeals regarding benefits for others.  
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However, while those studies seem to be closely related, it is nevertheless crucial to 
make notable distinctions. All the studies mentioned above have compared self-benefits and 
benefits for others only to possible positive outcomes. As a result, none of them examine a 
loss to oneself or others. In addition, all of these studies try to answer the question of which 
benefit appeals lead to more donations and fundraising and may not be generalizable to idea-
tion due to the nature of the task itself. Ideation is different since ideas do not directly benefit 
other people, but primarily the hosting firm, which uses the ideas in a certain context. In using 
these ideas, firms are typically not required to use all ideas submitted and can instead decide 
themselves which idea to use and implement (Piller & Walcher, 2006).This is different from a 
money donation setting, where an organization typically uses everything that was donated. 
Further, ideation differs from donation in terms of time, as it requires a more continuous effort 
compared to the donation of money, which is generally just a one-time action and a different 
resource.  
Various studies have dealt with the question of whether asking for time differs from 
asking for money (e.g., Leclerc, Schmitt, and Dube, 1995). In a charity context, Liu and 
Aaker (2008) find that asking people to donate time instead of money leads to more charitable 
behavior and is therefore beneficial. This is especially interesting since research has also 
shown that having time leads to more happiness than having money, if people use time "in 
ways that cultivate personal meaning and social connections" (Aaker et al., 2011, p. 129). 
Thus, one could argue that giving time is even more generous than giving money. 
Further, ideation requires creativity, which is heavily dependent on intrinsic motivation, 
such as a desire for challenge and excitement (e.g., Burroughs et al., 2011). One study that 
addresses the interplay of developing ideas for others and creativity is provided by Grant and 
Berry (2011). Opposing the "self-need" proclaimed by user innovation literature (e.g., von 
Hippel, 2005), they show that, in a co-worker setting, the needs of others do in fact drive peo-
ple to participate in creative tasks. Within this setting, the desire to help other colleagues in-
creases the creativity of employees. One underlying mechanism of this effect is perspective 
taking, which is caused by individual prosocial motivation. Grant and Berry (2011, p. 78) 
explain this by proposing that "prosocial motivation provides employees with the meaningful 
outcome goal of helping others." This study generates important insights for answering our 
research objectives, but it differs in one important aspect, namely in the others that receive the 
benefit. In Grant and Berry's (2011) setting, the recipients are co-workers whom the idea gen-
erators know. Thus, while this resembles a benefit for others, these others are not complete 
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strangers and consequently are a very small subsample of the possible group of others that can 
be addressed via idea co-creation.  
In summary, we can conclude that there is plenty of evidence for the existence of bene-
fits for others as a driver of behavior in general. Furthermore, we have shown arguments that 
an innovation context asking for a kind of "creative time donation" additionally favors the 
efficiency of benefits for others. Building on Liu and Aaker (2008), we suggest that when 
consumers are asked to invest time in idea co-creation (by participating), it generates more 
attention to the idea co-creation initiative and that this also holds true for completely unknown 
others, according to the results of Grant and Berry (2011). Hence, we postulate the following 
hypothesis: 
H2: Highlighting consequences for others will attract more participants to idea co-
creation than highlighting consequences for oneself. 
Next to the direct effects, we additionally argue that the framing of the consequence and 
the framing of the recipient of the consequence mutually impact each other. Following the 
argumentation presented above, we suggest that appeals relating to benefits for others are es-
pecially effective when combined with a "prevent loss" frame. Hence, we postulate the fol-
lowing hypothesis:  
H3: Highlighting consequences for others, combined with highlighting avoiding a loss, 
will attract more participants to idea co-creation. 
Contingencies of consequence and benefit framing—the role of personal 
relevance and topic involvement 
Taking a more granular view on the negativity bias and supremacy of negatively formulated 
frames, research has shown that these effects depend on personal relevance and issue in-
volvement. Maheswaran and Meyers-Levy (1990, p. 362) highlight that "when issue involve-
ment is high, messages relevant to the issue not only should be processed in detail but also 
should be more persuasive when they are negatively rather than positively framed." In a later 
study, Meyers-Levy and Maheswaran (2004) show that not only the involvement but also the 
personal relevance affects the type of processing used by people and hence favors the negativ-
ity bias and influences the effectiveness of the goal framing mechanism. 
122 
 
 
 
We suggest that personal relevance is especially valuable in our setting. As the common 
saying goes, "necessity is the mother of invention," pointing to the fact that people have to 
recognize a need in order to fuel their innovative behavior. This is in line with many studies 
from user innovation literature (von Hippel, 2005) that emphasize the utmost importance of 
dissatisfaction as a driver of innovative behavior, since users get a much higher benefit from 
using a product than from selling it (Harhoff et al., 2003).  
According to the abovementioned study of Maheswaran and Meyers-Levy (1990) and 
the prior argumentation of hypothesis H1, we hence suggest that participants for whom the 
topic is highly relevant should be addressed by using an "prevent loss" frame in order to bene-
fit from the endowment effect and status quo bias. Consequently, we additionally argue that 
when the topic has low personal relevance, highlighting a gain leads to more attention to idea 
co-creation. Thus, we postulate the following hypotheses:  
H4a: When the personal relevance of the ideation contest's topic for consumers is high, 
showing the loss of non-participation will lead to more attention. 
H4b: When the personal relevance of the ideation contest's topic for consumers is low, 
showing the gains of participation will lead to more attention. 
Next to the effect of relevance and involvement on the consequence framing, we also 
suggest that personal relevance has an effect on the benefit framing. Similar insights are pro-
vided by Small and Simonsohn (2008), who show that people are more likely to donate to a 
charitable initiative if they have a close relationship to a person who suffers from the misfor-
tune the fundraiser addresses. They explain this effect by a reduced social distance, prior per-
sonal experience, and the closeness of relations with the people who experienced it. 
However, user innovation literature highlights that one's own personal need drives in-
novative behavior. When the topic is not relevant to users, it is very unlikely that they will 
engage in creative behavior, due to the lack of motivation. When they do not have a feeling of 
relevance for a topic, they do not expect self-benefits to be important and, as a consequence, 
favor benefits for others. In conclusion, when consumers do not see how participation could 
improve their own situation, due to the irrelevance of the topic, they have to see how their 
participation matters, which is provided by showing an appeal relating to benefits for others. 
We therefore hypothesize:  
123 
 
H5: Appeals relating to benefits for others will lead to more attention when the person-
al relevance of the ideation contest's topic for consumers is low. 
 
Data and method 
In order to prove our assumptions, we used an e-mail-based field experiment that aimed at 
gathering empirical evidence of the presence of the hypothesized effects. We used a 2 × 2 
between-subject experimental design where we manipulated the consequence of participation 
(obtain gain versus prevent loss) and the recipient of these consequences (oneself versus oth-
ers). In addition, we added a control group following the current practice of highlighting ex-
trinsic aspects of participation (e.g., winning the prize). To recruit our sample, we used the 
database of a non-profit organization that contained all people who had ordered information 
material from that organization at least once in the past and who had subscribed to its newslet-
ter. Next to the e-mail addresses, the organization had also stored information on gender, ad-
dress, and age3. The mean age of the consumers within the database is 55 years and 48.45% 
are female. The whole database was randomly divided into five different treatment groups; 
four according to the 2 × 2 design and one additional control group. All five frames can be 
found in the Appendix.  
Each participant received an e-mail containing a manipulated invitation frame for an ac-
tual ideation contest hosted by that non-profit organization and a traceable link that was not 
visible to participants. The contest's topic was to improve general working conditions, espe-
cially taking into account the impact of demographic change and aging of society on the 
workforce in general. We chose this very general topic since we assume that almost all people 
in the sample have some experience with working, in contrast to a typical firm-hosted contest 
that is related to a specific type of product. The contest was officially hosted by a consortium 
of both for-profit and non-profit organizations. Hence, consumers could expect both that the 
hosting for-profit organizations have a commercial interest, and that the participating non-
profits are interested in helping to improve working conditions for older people. The contest 
                                                 
3 While gender and address were mandatory fields, age was not. For participants with an unknown age, the or-
ganization uses a professional service provided by a subsidiary of the German postal service. Besides adding 
ages for participants for whom the postal service has data (for example from Amazon or eBay), the procedure 
estimates the age based on an analysis of the person's first name, the region they live in, and their shopping be-
havior. This procedure is common practice for firms that are updating and improving their customer database 
and is generally very accurate. 
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was conducted by the hosts, with participants unaware of the field experiment and thus una-
ware of the different invitation frames used.   
8,982 e-mail links were successfully sent out, of which 253 were clicked by partici-
pants, corresponding to a response rate of 2.8%. Taking into account the field experimental 
character, the fact that we did not use a reminder, and the fact that the database also contained 
older addresses, this rate appears acceptable. To analyze the data, we use binary logit regres-
sions provided by NLOGIT 5 software. As a dependent variable, we used a binary variable 
(CLICK) that states whether the recipient of the e-mail clicked on the invitation link and 
viewed the actual contest homepage.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Example of frames used (self/gain treatment- translated; original frame included pictures that have 
been removed) 
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To analyze participants' involvement and personal relevance, we used the age of partici-
pants as a proxy, since the field experimental setting makes it impossible to explicitly measure 
participants' topic involvement. By doing so, we imply that the topic of the contest (improving 
work conditions) has a lower relevance for participants with a high age and is a low-
involvement topic for them, since they are already retired or very close to retirement. Corre-
spondingly, we assume that work is a high-involvement topic for younger participants be-
cause it is a key aspect of life that is of the utmost importance for people and, even at a higher 
age, work will be an important issue for them. We use hierarchical regressions to be able to 
examine both the direct main and the interaction effect.  
There is a current discussion about the interpretability of effects based on coefficients in 
non-linear models (cf. Ai and Norton, 2003; Greene, 2010; Hoetker, 2007). Interpretion of the 
significance of interacted variables cannot be done based on coefficients and their signs alone, 
or even based on marginal effects if one does not take into account that involved variables 
appear in both main and interaction terms (Ai and Norton, 2003). Hence, Ai and Norton 
(2003) suggest using partial and cross-partial derivatives to find these effects. Building on this 
argumentation, Greene (2010) questions whether hypothesis testing can be done based on 
(cross-)partial or marginal effects in general, since these effects are a function of all data and 
all coefficients. He suggests plotting interaction effects to interpret them in post-estimation 
analysis, but leaving hypothesis testing at the estimation stage.  
We combined both approaches for our analysis of the interaction effects. First, we ob-
tained the partial derivatives and the cross-partial derivatives. The significance of these effects 
was assessed using the Delta method (Greene, 2010). All values of the average marginal main 
effects and respective 95% confidence intervals were plotted over the whole range of the 
moderator variable in order to visualize the effect size of the moderation. When both confi-
dence intervals are above zero for a specific value, the interaction effect is positive, while it is 
negative when both are below zero. If the both of the confidence intervals are not either above 
or below zero, the interaction effect is not significant. 
 
Results  
The data and the regressions yield interesting results. First, the "others" frames are clicked far 
more often than the "self" frames and the extrinsic control frame. The following figure shows 
the click rates per treatment: 
126 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Number of clicks per treatment 
The binary logit regressions show that highlighting consequences for others has a strong 
significant impact on the probability of clicking on the commercial for the ideation contest. 
This points to the fact that highlighting benefits for others is more likely to generate attention 
to idea co-creation. Thus, we find confirmation for our assumption and for hypothesis H1. 
Regarding the effect of message framing efficiency, we find that neither the "obtain 
gain" nor the "prevent loss" frame play a significant role in consumers' decision to click on an 
e-mail link or not. The interaction between the two factors is not significant, which points to 
the fact that self-benefits or benefits for others are not particularly promising with either an 
"obtain gain" or a "prevent loss" frame. As a consequence, H2 and H3 cannot be confirmed.  
Interaction between the variables and personal relevance reveals that personal relevance 
and topic involvement have a significant impact on generating attention to idea co-creation. 
For the consequence framing, analyzing the interaction coefficient shows significant results. 
Plotting the effect shows that loss framing is indeed negative for people with a low personal 
relevance and involvement (although only marginally significant at the 10% level), but posi-
tive for people with a high personal relevance and involvement (see Figure 2).    
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Figure 3: Average marginal effect of preventing loss in generating attention to idea co-creation 
Hence, similar to the results of Maheswaran and Meyers-Levi (1990), H4a and H4b can 
be confirmed. In addition, the interaction with benefits for others also yields interesting re-
sults. Although the coefficient is not significant, plotting the effect shows that this is valid 
only for people with high personal relevance and involvement, while for people with low per-
sonal relevance and involvement, this effect is strongly positive (see Figure 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Average marginal effect of benefits for others in generating attention to idea co-creation 
Hence, when people do not expect to benefit themselves from topics irrelevant to them, 
they are much more likely to be attracted by appeals relating to benefits for others. This con-
firms H5. The following table summarizes the regression results. 
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Table 1: Results of binary logistic regressions 
Discussion and implications 
When idea co-creation hosts design their communication strategy, they usually rely on high-
lighting aspects like winning a prize, the challenge, or giving an image-related reward like 
public recognition (Piller & Walcher, 2006; Füller, 2010). However, our results imply that 
highlighting consequences for others is favorable for benefit framing, as compared to the 
common practice. It seems that consumers are very much motivated to engage in ideation 
when they recognize other people's needs. Therefore, firms should consider rethinking their 
communication strategy when addressing consumers to encourage their participation, since it 
generates more attention to focus the communication on consequences for others. The results 
show that the expectation of benefits for others can in fact be a driver of innovative behavior, 
adding to the literature on user innovation, even if these others are unknown and described 
only abstractly. The fact that consumers are attracted more easily by benefits for others could 
also imply that consumers indeed perceive idea co-creation as one way to exhibit prosocial 
behavior and engage for others. This is in line with studies proposed by Grant (2008) and 
Grant and Berry (2011), which define prosocial motivation as outcome-focused. Hence, by 
sharing ideas, consumers feel that their idea can actually help to generate benefits for others.   
Surprisingly, the frames that focus on non-monetary self-benefits, such as the innova-
tive outcome for oneself, are inferior to the monetary control frame. This is somewhat contra-
dictory to traditional user innovation theory (e.g., Harhoff et al., 2003). Hence, addressing 
Model
Dependent Variable
(Regression)
Independent Variables (S.E.) (S.E.)
Constant -4.738 *** (0.376) -4.949 *** (0.709)
Age (proxy for individual relevance) 0.015 ** (0.006) 0.021 * (0.012)
Gender (1=male) -0.108 (0.198) -0.115 (0.148)
Benefit recipient (1=other) 0.680 *** (0.195) -0.447 (0.774)
Benefit framing (1=loss) 0.046 (0.044) 1.520 ** (0.733)
Interaction terms
Benefit recipient * individual relevance 0.017 (0.013)
Benefit framing * individual relevance -0.030 ** (0.012)
Benefit framing * benefit recipient 0.341 (0.303)
N
Chi-squared *** ***
Log likelihood function
McFadden Pseudo R²
Two-tailed t-tests; * <0.1, **<0.05, ***<0.01
7125
36.367
-446.897
0.019
7125
28.468
-918.717
0.015
Binary Logit Regression
Parameter Parameter
I II
Click on Invitation
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self-related non-monetary benefits is not effective in attracting participants and generating 
attention. In addition, the results to a certain extent oppose those of White and Peloza (2009) 
since, despite the fact the decision to click and take a look at the contest was made privately, 
the benefit for others leads to more desirable prosocial behavior, whereas according to White 
and Peloza (2009), the private setting should instead foster the efficiency of self-benefits. One 
explanation for this issue could be the fact that the proposed public image concerns play no 
specific role in idea co-creation. Hence, participants may not see that their participation in 
idea co-creation is capable of generating image benefits for themselves. This effect could be 
evoked by the online character of ideation contests, since participants are unlikely to know 
each other in real life and the interaction is only for a limited time (the contest duration). 
Thus, participants may not be that interested in creating a positive image by all means. 
Concerning the consequence framing, we do not find an effect for all participants. Nei-
ther the "prevent loss" nor the "obtain gain" frame lead to a significant increase in the proba-
bility of clicking. This implies that, on a general level, the risk-aversion mechanism is not 
present in our setting. One possible explanation for this could be the fact that in many cases 
goal framing in general suffers from the lack of delivering significant results (see, e.g., Levin 
et al., 1998; 2002). Levin et al. (2002) explain the non-significance by the fact that the task 
setting may not be "critical" enough, as compared to the health-related setting used by, e.g., 
Meyerowitz and Chaiken (1987). Similar reasons for this are proposed by Steffen et al. 
(1994). Hence, although our topic seems to induce prosocial behavior related to benefits for 
others, it seems that it is not capable of evoking the fear needed to make goal framing effi-
cient on a general level.  
Additionally, our results show that there is no interaction between consequence framing 
and benefit framing. This implies that there is no specific effect of benefit framing on the effi-
ciency of the consequence framing. One possible explanation for this could result from the 
fact that the consequence framing mechanism itself has only a weak non-significant effect. 
However, the results also show that there are individual aspects of participants that make the 
consequence framing mechanism work. As suggested by Maheswaran and Meyers-Levi 
(1990), the personal relevance and topic involvement influence the consequence framing. 
When the individual relevance is high, consumers do indeed suffer from the fear of a decrease 
in use benefit, pointing to the presence of the endowment effect and the status quo bias. 
Hence, when work and working life are important to them, they overestimate the importance 
of avoiding a change for the worse in their working conditions. On the other hand, when the 
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personal relevance is low, consumers have no obvious reason to fear a decrease in their use 
experience; hence obtaining a possible gain thus becomes more important. The results also 
imply that when a topic is not important to consumers, using an appeal regarding benefits for 
others increases attention. This can be explained by the fact that if consumers do not have a 
personal interest in the generation of use benefit improvements for themselves, they must be 
shown other recipients who could benefit from using them, as we suggested. Hence, if con-
sumers see not potential use benefit for themselves, hosts have to show them that their partic-
ipation actually matters, by demonstrating that other people benefit from their participation. 
Our study has some clear implications for theory and management practice alike. From 
a theoretical perspective, our study contributes by showing that the expectation of benefits for 
others can indeed be a driver of innovative behavior. Our study contributes to the user innova-
tion literature by showing that highlighting self-related benefits that address the individual's 
own unmet needs (e.g., von Hippel, 2005) as a dominant strategy to attract consumers is infe-
rior to addressing the unmet needs of others. Thus, we add to the literature on user innovation 
motivation another important motivational aspect, namely use benefits for others. This effect 
is present even when those others are unknown and described only abstractly, and becomes 
especially important when the topic has no personal relevance. Further, our study confirms the 
results of Maheswaran and Meyers-Ley (1990) and adds to them by showing that the role of 
personal relevance and issue involvement is also present in a "low-risk" setting that is not 
directly related to life-critical issues like health and disease.  
Our study also contributes to the literature on prosocial behavior. The results point to 
the fact that idea co-creation seems to be perceived as a very suitable way to express prosocial 
behavior. They provide evidence that idea co-creation participation is not motivated by image 
concerns, since in our setting the decision to look into the co-creation initiative was made 
privately. They further add donating ideas as a new aspect of what is donated. As highlighted 
in the theoretical background chapter, this is especially interesting since ideas require a com-
bination of both time and creativity, which makes them distinct from a monetary or even time 
donation like volunteering.  
From a managerial perspective, our work can serve as advice for managers who want to 
design communication strategies for idea co-creation. It shows that the current practice of 
highlighting an extrinsic reward for participation is not the best option to attract as many par-
ticipants as possible. Where possible, managers should focus on the benefit for others, as this 
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approach generates the most attention. Further, managers should consider the idea co-creation 
topic and how much relevance it has for the addressed participants. For example, if they ad-
dress a large crowd of consumers, none of whom are customers, it would make sense to as-
sume a low level of relevance and hence focus on a possible gain for others. When addressing 
their own customers, for whom they know that their own product is likely to have a high rele-
vance, they should highlight the possible decrease in use benefit if customers do not partici-
pate in the idea co-creation initiative. In addition, the results show that it might be effective to 
use customized communication, delivering different messages to different categories of con-
sumers. 
 
Limitations and outlook 
Of course, our study has several limitations. First, the method we use has some limitations. 
Due to the field experimental setting, we could suffer from a lower internal validity, since we 
are unable to conduct a manipulation check or something similar to prove internal validity 
more definitively. In addition, we have only very limited access to control variables. Hence, 
we cannot truly say whether our manipulations are indeed the strongest aspects of evoking the 
effects we found.  
Further limitations arise from the sample itself. We used the customer database of a 
non-profit organization, which could be different from the customer database of a for-profit 
firm, although the latter are also associated with the contest for which we ran the field exper-
iment. Therefore, the results may not be fully generalizable to for-profits. Another sample-
related aspect is the size: Although all treatment groups exceed the commonly used reference 
level of 30, compared to the total ratio, it remains very small. Hence, it could prove valuable 
to replicate the study with a larger sample size. More limitations exist due to the topic we 
chose for idea co-creation. As stated above, we intentionally used a topic that offers a chance 
to highlight benefits for others in combination with a topic of high personal relevance. Thus, it 
remains questionable whether the results can be transferred to every setting. For example, we 
would not expect the results to be replicable in low-involvement consumer good co-creation 
initiatives, which have become very popular. Another limitation arises from our examination 
of the interaction effect. We do not include the personal relevance as a distinct experimental 
design factor since it is not possible to host several idea co-creation contests with different 
topics and different levels of relevance. In addition, we would not have been able to judge 
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whether or not this is indeed relevant, due to the abovementioned lack of possibility of con-
ducting a manipulation check.  
Our study shows various new research directions. As our focus is on the attention level, 
it could be worth examining whether this attention also leads to more desirable behavior, i.e., 
more creative ideas and more effort invested. This would further extend the findings on bene-
fits for others as a driver of innovative behavior.  
In addition, it could prove valuable to replicate the experimental design in a laboratory 
setting in order to increase the internal validity of our approach and have the opportunity to 
examine the impact of participation on consumers' motives and satisfaction. This could an-
swer questions like "Do consumers enjoy their participation more when benefits for others are 
highlighted?” or “Are they more satisfied with their participation in general?”  
A second interesting aspect could be to find other influences on the efficiency of high-
lighting benefits for others. This could, for example, include further theoretical extensions 
such as the construal level (e.g., White et al., 2011), highlighting how—or why— the benefit 
for others should be generated. Furthermore, it could prove valuable to examine image con-
cerns in generating benefits for others, related to the design of the study by White and Peloza 
(2009). Hence, one could analyze whether anonymous or personalized participation in idea 
co-creation influences the generation of benefits for oneself or others.   
Another promising path of future research could be to build on the economic literature 
(e.g., Ariely et al., 2009) and examine whether monetary incentives proposed for idea co-
creation do in fact lead to crowding out of consumers' motivation to generate benefits for oth-
ers. Moreover, it could be promising to test whether this expected crowding out is contingent 
on several factors, such as the host.  
Finally, it could prove valuable to test whether the type of others influences consumers 
in generating benefits for others. This could be the case when the type of others changes to a 
group with whom the consumers do not identify or to whom they may feel little attachment. 
In that case, their willingness to generate these benefits may be lower.  
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Appendix  
 
Frames used in the e-mail experiment (translated; original frames included 
pictures that have been removed) 
Others/loss frame  
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Others/gain frame  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
140 
 
 
 
Self/loss frame  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
141 
 
Self/gain frame  
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Control frame  
 
 
